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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THINGS FALL APART: THE
DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY
MUTINIES

Military mutinies are occurring more frequently in the last two decades than ever
before. Mutinies impact every region of the world. Given that they are occurring more
frequently, impact every region, and often have disastrous implications, scholars must
answer the foundational question: why do mutinies occur? What are the proximate
domestic conditions that give rise to military mutinies? This project makes three
contributions. First, I set out to formally define mutinies and collect a new dataset that
will allow scholars to examine mutinies empirically. Second, I present a theoretical
framework that explains when and why mutinies will occur. Finally, I present three novel
empirical tests of the theory.
The first portion of this dissertation defines mutinies and describes the data
collection process. I present the Military Mutinies and Defections Databases (MMDD).
Using news articles from various sources, I code 460 mutiny events from 1945 – present
day. I code a number of other variables that give users details about the event, such as:
whether or not violence was used, whether or not civilians were killed, and whether or
not soldiers defected from the military apparatus.
Next, I utilize a nested principal agent model to describe when mutinies are likely to
occur. Agent models describe hierarchical relationships of delegation. A nested structure
allows for multiple agents and multiple principals in a given model. I apply this nested
structure to the military to generate three various nests. The first examines foot soldiers
as an agent of the military leadership. In this nest, policy failures (e.g., bad strategy)
secured by the military leadership will drive foot soldier mutinies. The second nest
explores foot soldiers as agents of the executive, a civilian principal. In this nest, I expect
that situations that place soldiers in conflict with the executive will generate shirking. The
final nest considers foot soldiers and military leadership as collective agents of the
executive. I theorize that risk aversion and divergent preferences will drive shirking, or
mutinies, in this nested structure. The final nest presents an interesting trade-off for a
coup-worried leader. I argue that while executives can utilize regime securing strategies,
such strategies might actually agitate the military and drive low level military rebellions.
Coup proofing, a common practice among executives that are worried they will be ousted

by the military, effectively wards of coups but can generate unintended consequences.
Specifically, I expect that counterbalancing measures and other coup proofing tactics
should spur mutinies because the intended purpose of these measures is to create
coordination challenges which likely spur military splintering.
The first empirical chapter sets out to explore the relationship between civil
conflict and the likelihood of mutinies. I expect that when civil wars are extremely
bloody or long lasting, mutinies will be more likely as war-weary soldiers no longer want
to invest in the war effort. I find evidence that indeed civil war intensity and duration
contribute to the probability of a state experiencing a mutiny. The second empirical
chapter explores scenarios that pit foot soldiers preferences against the executive’s. I
expect that scenarios that impose steep costs on foot soldiers, yet provide some benefit to
the executive are likely to spur mutinies. I find evidence that protest events and
divisionary conflict spur mutinies. The final empirical chapter explores the military
apparatus as a whole. I find that coup proofing measures increase the likelihood of
mutinies. Additionally, I find that scenarios that are likely to spur widespread dissent
among military actors will increase the likelihood of a mutiny in the context of steep
coordination challenges that stifle coup activity.
The final chapter concludes by providing policy recommendations. I offer
recommendations for leader states (e.g., major powers and democratic leaders in the
international system) and for states experiencing mutinies. I conclude by discussing the
many possible extensions for this project. This section seeks to emphasis the fact that this
is a young, novel research program with many promising avenues for future research.
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Chapter 1
An Introduction: Why Do Mutinies Matter?
Introduction and Background
Military mutinies do not occur in isolation. Often they are the first stage in a cascade of
events that impact the lives’ of civilians. Mutinies are frequently followed by gross
violations of human rights, the onset of civil war, and military coups that result in
repression. There are a myriad of examples that one could use to highlight the grave
impacts that mutinies have on the lives’ of individuals. Below I will outline a recent case
that occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mutinies that have impacted
this state have had severe consequences, but this anecdote does not stand out when
reading through the case descriptions of mutinies (see Appendix). Indeed, there are many
anecdotes that could have been selected to portray the impact of mutinies.
In late March of 2012, Bosco Ntaganda, a former rebel leader, and his troops
mutinied against the DRC national army (FARDC). Ntaganda and his soldiers had
previously signed a peace agreement with the central government in 2009 that
incorporated rebels back into the state’s military apparatus. However, after feeling that
the central government had not held up the terms of the agreement, Ntaganda and his
troops defected from the FARDC in an effort to protest the central government’s actions
and to display discontent over unpaid salaries. The renegade troops carved out an area of
control in Masisi with several hundred renegade soldiers serving under him (Human
Rights Watch 2013). Within several weeks, he declared that the mutiny had given way to
a full scale rebellion. This rebellion gave birth to one of the most infamous, notorious
rebel groups in recent history, the M23 rebels. A simple mutiny had created a scenario
that was quickly spiraling towards disaster and protracted civil war.
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The impact that M23 has had on the lives of individuals cannot be understated.
Approximately 80% of the total recruitment of child soldiers in 2013 occurred in the
North and South Kivu provinces where M23 consolidated power after the mutiny (The
International Peace Support Training Centre Report 2013). Within the first three months
of M23’s formation, Human Rights Watch estimated that M23 raped at least 61 civilians
and summarily executed at least 44, although these are likely underestimates (Human
Rights Watch 2013). The formation of M23, as a direct result of a military mutiny,
produced horrific conditions for civilians and spurred years of ongoing conflict in the
DRC.
Mutinies occur in every region of the world and are dramatically increasing in
frequency. While I outlined recent events in DRC, there are many other states that have
repeatedly experienced mutinies. For example, Nigeria has experienced several
protracted mutinies in recent years that have resulted in soldier defections to Boko
Haram. Afghanistan’s military has seen soldiers regularly defect to the Taliban. Mutinies
in Yemen have contributed to the rise of the Houthi rebellion. In many of these instances,
mutinies involve state trained and equipped soldiers defecting to violent non-state actors.
This type of defection does not bode well for the security of the state. Mutinies have the
ability to embolden violent non-state actors by creating parity between these traditionally
weak and ill-resourced groups and the traditionally stronger state. Given the potentially
disastrous effects that mutinies can have on the state and its civilians, further exploration
is needed.
This dissertation starts from the basic premise that while mutinies can have
disastrous effects, scholars and policy makers have virtually no systematic information
2

about mutinies. There is no empirical, quantitative work that explores why mutinies
occur. The recent civil military relations literature has focused almost exclusively on
military coups d’état. Our aggregate state of knowledge regarding coups has expanded
greatly in the last decade. While this knowledge on coups has expanded, a systematic
understanding of mutinies is practically nonexistent. To illustrate this point, I surveyed
two top International Relations, sub-field journals. Examining The Journal of Conflict
Resolution and The Journal of Peace Research, there have been 463 articles that contain
the word “coup”.1 In contrast, there are 49 articles in these two journals that mention the
word “mutiny”. This incongruity in knowledge is surprising given that mutinies are
occurring more often than coups at present. This dissertation sets out to enhance our
scholarly understanding of why mutinies happen and explore policy-relevant implications
of systematic research findings.
One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the empirical task of building
a new dataset that codes global instances of military mutinies from 1945-presentday.
Beyond facilitating the empirical tests of this dissertation that were previously impossible
to carry out due to a lack of data, these data will provide scholars the ability to answer a
number of policy-relevant questions about the determinants and effects of military
mutinies. These data will also allow scholars to ask questions about variation in the
nature of mutinies, such as, why are some mutinies violent and others are not? It is my
hope that these data will make lasting and meaningful contribution to scholars’ and
policymakers’ understanding of civil-military relations.

1

This count covers the life of these journals. JCR was created in 1957. JPR was created
in 1964.
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Outline of Dissertation
Given that there are no cross-sectional datasets that code mutinies across regions, data
collection was the first step in this project. The following chapter presents a new dataset:
the Military Mutinies and Defections Database (MMDD). This chapter presents basic
descriptive statistics of MMDD as well as exploratory analyses. Here, I unearth a number
of patterns in this new catalog of military mutinies. The descriptive statistics presented in
this chapter are novel in that scholars and policy makers alike have virtually no
systematic knowledge about the nature of mutinies.
Chapter 3 seeks to answer the primary research question of this dissertation,
“what are the proximate causes of military mutinies?” I utilize a nested principal agent
framework to outline scenarios that are likely to spur military mutinies. There are three
primary actors in this nested framework: the foot soldiers, the military leadership, and the
executive. These three actors form various hierarchical nests, making a nested principal
agent model a suitable theoretical framework. I describe how agents may shirk, or
mutiny, due to risk aversion or divergent preferences that do not align with the principal.
After outlining the main theoretical mechanisms, I present a number of testable
implications regarding scenarios that are expected to create divergent preferences or test
risk averse agents and thus are likely to result in shirking.
The subsequent chapters present empirical tests of these theoretical expectations.
The first empirical chapter explores the relationship between foot soldiers as agents and
military leadership as principals. Here, I argue that foot soldiers are largely risk averse
due to their position of individual vulnerability. The risk of conflict for soldiers is grave,
imposing steep costs and even death on individuals. Military leaders are tasked with
4

securing good strategy, or strategies that mitigate individual risk for foot soldiers. When
military leaders fail to secure good strategy, the risk posed to foot soldiers is steep. Due
to risk aversion, foot soldiers are likely to shirk when bad strategy is selected by military
leadership. As an indicator of bad strategy, I examine the impact of long lasting and
intense civil war on the likelihood of shirking. I find evidence that risk aversion does
drive shirking in this nest where foot soldiers are serving as agents of military leadership.
Bloody and enduring civil wars raise the risk of mutiny.
The second empirical chapter examines the relationship between foot soldiers
and the executive. In this nest, foot soldiers serve as agents of the civilian principal, the
executive. I argue again that risk aversion and divergent preferences will drive shirking in
this nest. I expect that military regimes, or regimes where the executive branch and
military leaders are essentially one cohesive unit, will be more mutiny prone. I do not
find strong empirical support for this expectation. I then examine the impact that protests
have on mutinies. Protests can impose steep costs on foot soldiers. I find that indeed,
protests spur mutinies. Diversionary war creates scenarios of great danger for foot
soldiers and also great benefit for executives. Thus, I expect this relative risk and reward
should incentivize shirking by way of mutiny. I find support for this expectation that
diversionary conflict increases the chances of a mutiny.
The final empirical chapter examines all the actors in the interaction. In this nest,
the foot soldiers and military leadership are serving as agents of the executive. Adding
all of the actors back into the model generates complex dynamics and tradeoffs for the
executive to consider. Executives are fearful of coup activity as such extraconstitutional
shifts in power threaten their tenure. As such, they are likely to impose coup proofing
5

measures, or strategies that are effective at minimizing the risk of coup activity.
However, such tactics increase coordination challenges and exaggerate existing cleavages
in a military, such as those along ethnicity, or generate artificial rifts in order to minimize
conspiratorial tendencies. In doing so, executives can unintentionally increase the
propensity for mutinies by imposing coup proofing measures on their military.
Additionally, I examine scenarios that are likely to generate wide spread grievances
among the military and would traditionally be associated with coup activity. However, in
the context of high coup proofing, where coup activity may not be able to be fully
realized, I argue that mutinies will be used as a substitution for coups. I examine the
impact of democratization and human rights violations on the likelihood of mutinies
given a highly counterbalanced military. I find evidence that of all the various types of
human rights violations, political imprisonment in the context of high coup proofing
spurs mutinies.
The final chapter explores a number of policy implications that arise from the
research findings presented in this dissertation. I demonstrate that policy makers in the
West have often encouraged and incentivized mutinies in the developing world as a
solution to civil conflict. However, I offer a strong caution here. There is actually no
evidence that mutinies shorten wars or produce favorable outcomes. Next, I discuss
whether or not mutinies may serve as a harbinger for other domestic processes. I show
preliminary evidence that mutinies can serve as an early indication of possible coup
activity. This evidence is useful to both policy and scholarly communities seeking to
predict when and where the next coup may occur. Finally, I offer recommendations to
leaders trying to secure their tenure. While coup proofing can ward off coups, there are

6

potential risks with maximizing counter balancing measures. Specifically, in placing the
steepest coup proofing measures on a military, mutinies are more likely. While mutinies
do not directly oust the executive, they can give way to escalating processes that pose
serious threats to a leader’s security, such as: rebellion or full scale revolution. In the last
portion of Chapter 7, I put forward many avenues for future research. One of the
strengths of this research program is the potential for expansion. I offer several ideas
research projects that will serve both scholarly objectives and produce meaningful policy
implications.

Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018
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Chapter 2
Military Mutinies and Defections (MMDD) 1945-2017: A New Dataset
Special Data Feature
While research on civil-military relations has burgeoned recently, the focus has remained
largely on coups d’état, or events that specifically seek to oust the executive. There is no
doubt that coups are critically important; however, they likely only represent the apex of
military dissatisfaction. Evidence suggests that militaries have many modalities they
utilize to express grievances before launching a fully-realized coup. Specifically,
militaries can signal grievances with smaller-scale military rebellion, or mutinies.
Focusing solely on coups limits scholars’ understanding of the micro-processes of
military rebellion. To this point, scholarship has lacked a complete catalog of smallerscale indiscipline, which prevented the systematic study of such events. The Military
Mutinies and Defections Database (MMDD) introduced here provides scholars with the
necessary tools to explore indiscipline beyond coups. MMDD provides scholars with the
opportunity to examine lower level rebellion that operates through distinct theoretical
channels from coups.
Mutinies are central to the understanding of civil military relations. To illustrate
the importance of lower-level military rebellion, consider Nigeria’s military. Nigeria has
not experienced a coup in the last two decades. The last fully realized-coup occurred in
1993 after the military annulled the outcome of a presidential election and stepped into
power. As such, observers might conclude that civil-military relations in Nigeria have
been relatively placid over the course of the last two decades, especially if they relied on
extant data to capture civil military relations (e.g., Powell and Thyne 2011). This
conclusion is far from the truth.
8

Nigeria’s military is frequently entangled in civilian politics. Soldiers displeased
with the state’s policies often use unauthorized tactics or refuse to participate in combat.
As recently as July 2008, nearly 30 Nigerian soldiers serving in a United Nations mission
in Liberia protested low pay during deployment (BBC Monitoring Africa 2009).
Similarly, Nigerian soldiers mutinied on several occasions in 2014, refusing to fight Boko
Haram because they felt under-resourced (Daily Nation 2014). While such acts are
clearly not coup activities, they are still a threat to the state. As Parsons (2003: 3) writes,
“Mutiny is usually a capital offense because it represents a direct challenge to lawful civil
authority over the armed forces. Without civil control, soldiers can easily devolve into a
predatory threat to the very societies they are charged to protect.” The predatory threat
posed by military mutinies is critically important to enhancing scholars’ understanding of
civil military relations.
Contributions
The contributions of this project are threefold. First, there are no longitudinal datasets
that systematically code military mutinies across all regions. This dataset represents the
first attempt to capture events that do not directly seek to oust the executive but still
represent serious forms of military indiscipline. The existing work on military mutinies
typically explores case studies that select cases non-randomly upon the dependent
variable, making it increasingly difficult to draw inferences about the causes and effects
of military mutinies (e.g., Osboune 2014). This dataset will move scholarship forward by
introducing a systematic, cross-sectional catalog of military mutinies, which will allow
scholars to test expectations about why militaries rebel and how such rebellions influence
other conflict processes.
9

A second contribution MMDD makes is allowing scholars to consider the impact
of military disloyalty through domestic perspectives. The military is a critically important
actor in transitioning societies, such as those that are democratizing, concluding a civil
war, or experiencing domestic dissent. Successful democratization processes must
incorporate the military, as we know that the military is an important veto player in
fledgling democracies (Mansfield and Snyder 2002). Military cohesion is also essential
for quick and decisive civil war termination (Cunningham 2006). If the military is
fractured, civil conflict may drag on as a result of disunity that creates parity between
rebel groups and state forces. Likewise, scholars have demonstrated that military loyalty
also impacts the success of protest movements. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show,
military defections enhance the success of protest movements. While their study only
considers the impact of very large-scale defections, MMDD gives scholars the
opportunity to examine military rebellion on a smaller scale. Clearly there are many
domestic phenomena that are likely impacted by dimensions of military loyalty. MMDD
will allow scholars to examine these links across space and time for the first time.
Third, dimensions of military loyalty also impact international phenomena.
Military mutinies undoubtedly have an impact on battlefield effectiveness. However, it
remains unclear if mutinies should enhance fighting capabilities or weaken them. On the
one hand, mutinies might result in a policy change or strategy shift. This divergence from
previous policies might enhance a state’s fighting capabilities. On the other hand,
mutinies represent a splintering within the military and may result in a slapdash,
disjointed war effort. MMDD will enable scholars to pursue such questions and test
theoretical mechanisms that enhance or diminish fighting effectiveness. Alliance
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formation might also be impacted by mutinies. States may hesitate to form alliances with
mutiny-prone states, recognizing that their military is prone to fracture. This fracture
could make the ally a weak or unreliable partner, thus impacting decisions made at the
formation stage. While these are primary suggestions for future work that would consider
dimensions of military loyalty, there are many other areas of the intra- and interstate
conflict literatures in which MMDD will prove useful.
What are Mutinies? A Conceptual Definition
I define military mutinies as observable acts committed by military actors with intent to
display indiscipline towards leadership in an effort to revise the status quo.2 I require that
mutiny events surpass a minimum threshold of 12 soldiers for an event to be considered a
mutiny.3 This threshold is in line with the existing understanding that mutinies are
defined in large part by their collective nature (Dwyer 2015). In other words, a single
rouge soldier or a few renegade combatants does not represent the conceptual equivalent
of a mutiny.

The definition put forward here departs existing narrow definition of mutinies. The most
commonly used definitions is “an act of collective insubordination, in which troops revolt
against lawfully constituted authority” (Dwyer 2015). One exceedingly important caveat
is that this thin conceptualization of mutinies excludes events such as desertion, evading
orders purposefully, or military defection. Theoretically, there are a number of ways for
soldiers to display grievances, and one particularly effective way might be to remove
themselves from the military apparatus altogether or join the other side in a conflict.
Therefore, I include desertions and defections in MMDD, but code them accordingly so
that users may drop such cases if they do not find them theoretically useful for their
project.
2

3

While this threshold might seem arbitrary, 12-15 individuals the average size of a squad
in the U.S. context. Clearly, the size of squads may vary between countries, but this is at
least a full unit of soldiers in most contexts and provides a theoretical justification for this
threshold.
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The key components of the MMDD definition of mutiny require elaboration.
First, mutiny events must be purposeful, not accidental. Simply misunderstanding orders
does not constitute a military mutiny. Mutineers must clearly share a grievance, and as a
result, attempt to change the status quo by defying the chain of command in some
observable, collective way. Mutinies may occur domestically or abroad when troops are
deployed.4 Below I will outline who perpetrates mutinies, who mutineers target, and the
goals of mutinies.
Military actors must perpetrate military mutinies. MMDD does not code events of
rebellion carried out by those in civilian positions, rebel groups, or military reserves.5
Early work on civil military relations largely argued “soldiers mutiny, while officers
stage coups” (Nordlinger 1977). While this statement contains an attractive element of
simplicity, the rough dichotomy does not hold up in reality. There are many cases of
mutiny that are initiated and orchestrated by junior officers, officers, or generals. For
example, junior officers perpetrated the 2011 Libyan mutiny by rebelling inside the home
of Al-Qadhafi (BBC Monitoring Middle East 2011). These junior officers were quickly
opposed by Al-Qadhafi’s paramilitary. They were clearly not seeking to harm or oust AlQadhafi himself, but instead were using intimidation tactics to promote their interests.
This case highlights that while mutinies are generally carried out by the rank-and-file,
higher ranking military officials can also perpetrate them. For this reason, MMDD

4

When troops are deployed, mutinies are coded in respect to which state’s forces
mutinied. For example, the German mutiny in February 1945 occurred in Copenhagen.
Because German troops mutinied, this is coded as a German mutiny, rather than a Danish
mutiny.
5
Espionage events are not coded in MMDD, although they are often labeled
“defections.”
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includes a variable that codes whether or not mutinies are perpetrated by foot-soldiers or
are spearheaded by military leaders. I define military leaders as commissioned ranks as
opposed to non-commissioned ranks. However, MMDD does not set out to distinguish
mutinies from coups based upon the perpetrators. I allow for military leadership to
mutiny, just like foot soldiers. Instead, what separates coups and mutinies is the goal.
Events that have the explicit goal to oust the executive are coups, while event that have a
goal short of regime change are mutinies.
Mutinies can have two potential targets: military leadership (e.g., various
commissioned officers, such as Lieutenant Colonels) or the executive. Similar to
perpetrators, I do not categorize mutinies based upon the target. In my extensive reading
of cases, I learned that mutinies often target the executive, just like coups. As the unusual
2011 Libyan mutiny illustrates, sometimes mutinies can, in fact, target the executive.
Because mutinies may target the executive, they can be difficult to distinguish from
coups. Fortunately, coup scholars have spent a great deal of time considering the ultimate
goal of coup-plotters. As Powell and Thyne (2011: 249) state, coups are “illegal and overt
attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting
executive.” Thus MMDD only codes events that begin with no clear intent to oust the
executive. However, there are times that this intent to oust the executive develops as
events progress. Below I will describe the process for handling such escalating events.
Mutinies may be one early step in a larger, escalating process of contentious in
politics. As Rose (1982: 572) suggests, mutinies can be “the first step in a much larger
upheaval and the catalyst through which discontents in other sectors of society are
activated.” In reality, a series of mutinies will often proceed coup activity. Therefore, it is
13

critical to establish when the dissent moves from mutiny territory and into coup activity.
In an order to capture this escalation effect, I have coded two variables that capture
escalation. These variables are coded 1 if a coup occurs within two temporal thresholds
of a mutiny (1 month and 6 months). These variables will allow users to carefully
consider the relationship between these distinct forms of military rebellion. In addition,
Powell and Thyne’s (2011) coup dataset was cross-referenced to ensure that no coup
attempts were coded as mutinies unless the event clearly began as a mutiny that escalated
to a coup. Each mutiny’s source document was assessed to confirm that the perpetrators
were seeking to change military policy or to signal grievances to observers, rather than
explicitly seeking to oust the executive.
Failed coups present a unique challenge. Because failed coups do not result in the
ousting of the executive, they can be hard to distinguish from mutinies. Singh (2014: 37)
calls coup attempts lead by foot soldiers “coups from the bottom.” He writes that a “coup
from the bottom” is “…a mutiny intent to overthrow the government.” While I recognize
that there are a handful of coup attempts that are led by the foot soldiers, they are vastly
outnumbered by coup attempts organized by military leaders. Coups from the bottom and
mutinies should not be conceptually conflated, as these are two distinct processes that can
be differentiated from one another. As outlined previously, a coup, even those led by foot
soldiers, will be observable because they are overt attempts to unseat the executive.
Mutineers have a goal short of unseating the executive. Thus, MMDD is not coding
“coups from the bottom,” as they are conceptually distinct from mutinies.
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Data Collection
MMDD was coded using Lexis-Nexis Uni (formerly known as Lexis-Nexis Academic)
and the Historical New York Times. Lexis-Nexis Uni searches beyond major English news
wire sources, making it extremely useful for this project. The New York Times was also
used due to its widespread accessibility and enhanced temporal coverage. The search was
performed with the following terms: “mutiny,” “military mutiny,” “military sedition,”
“military defection,” “military desertion,” “military rebellion,” “soldier mutiny,” “soldier
defection,” “soldier desertion,” “soldier rebellion,” “troop mutiny,” “troop rebellion,”
“troop desertion,” “troop defection.” In some instances, news sources did not report
specifics about the mutiny event, such as the number of soldiers involved or the duration.
In these instances, consulting books and region-specific academic journals clarified these
specifics.6 If reliable information could not be located, those variables were marked as
missing in the dataset for that case.
Other datasets were consulted to identify candidate cases. Powell and Thyne’s
(2011) full coup candidate dataset includes events that were initially considered for
inclusion in their coup dataset but were excluded because there was no overt attempt
made to oust the executive. I reviewed each of these cases, and many of them were
mutinies rather than coups.7,8 The Social Political and Economic Events Dataset
(SPEED), Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), and the Armed Conflict Location,
and Event Data Project (ACLED) code events of mutiny (Nardulli et al. 2014; Salehyan

6

Outside sources are reported in the dataset files.
22 cases were identified from Powell and Thyne (2011) using the “no_exec” variable in
their full candidate case dataset.
8
Counter coups are not included in MMDD.
7
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et al. 2012; Raleigh et al. 2010). I also used these datasets to help identify candidate
cases; however, it is important to note that the primary objective of these projects is not
to produce a comprehensive catalog of mutinies. As such, I find that many mutinies are
not coded in these datasets and some of the events that are coded do not fit the formal
definition of mutinies. Indeed, many of the events coded as mutinies in these datasets do
not even roughly resemble mutinies.9 Similarly, I consult Dwyer (2015) to explore her
sample of mutinies in Western Africa. Likewise, I find that many of the events coded
here do not meet MMDD’s formal definition of mutinies. Some events in this research
could not be verified by primary or secondary sources, and thus are not included in
MMDD. It is likely that these existing data sources have been miscoding mutinies, thus
inhibiting scholars’ ability to draw accurate inferences about the effects and determinants
of mutinies. MMDD addresses this issue by coding only events that meet a formal
conceptual and empirical definition of mutiny.
Beyond coding the occurrence of mutiny, MMDD also codes several pieces of
specific information about each event. Each mutiny event is geocoded. For the majority
of events, the specific sub-national latitude and longitude of the location of the mutiny is
reported.10 This geocoding will provide users with the unique ability to examine

9

For example, there are events in SPEED that are coded as mutinies (or they take on the
value of 18 on the “stat-act” variable). However, many of these events are clearly not
mutinies. There are several events from the integration era in America that are coded as
mutinies. News articles for some of these events are titled, “New Flare up in Nashville”
(1968), “Columbus, Ga., Mayor Asks People to Keep off Streets” (1971), and “Louisville
Bussing Resumes as More Students Enroll” (1975). Given the high level of certainty in
the American context that these are not mutinies, users should also seriously question the
accuracy of this coding scheme in lower information environments.
10
For most events, these coordinates are coded for the specific location of the mutiny
within a city. However, some news reports are less specific than others. For less specific
articles, the coordinates of the city in which the mutiny occurred are reported.
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dynamics of spatial contagion and subnational considerations of military rebellion.
Characteristics of each mutiny event are also coded, such as: estimated number of
mutineers, estimated duration of mutiny in days, the occurrence of civilian deaths, and
the occurrence of violence. I have also coded particular characteristics on which users can
eliminate particular types of events. For example, I have coded whether or not junior
officers led the mutiny. If users are only concerned about foot soldier mutinies, this
variable will allow them to drop all events that military leadership influenced. Likewise, I
have coded two escalation variables that code if a mutiny escalated to a coup within 1
month or 6 months. Thus, if users want to only examine cases of escalation or exclude
cases of escalation, this variable facilitates such adjustments.
A dichotomous variable is coded to capture whether or not an event involved
defection. Defection can be conceptually tricky. In order for an event to involve
defection, the state must be actively countering either an internal threat (e.g., rebel group,
terrorist organization, secessionist movement, etc.) or an external threat. Defection only
occurs if there is evidence or suggestion in the source document that the soldiers not only
left the military apparatus, but then joined forces with this internal or external threat.
Defections are theoretically important because they are events that shift the balance of
power between state militaries and their opponents.
MMDD users might be concerned with the reliability of the data. As with any
measure in social science, there are likely errors associated with the measurement of
indicators (Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). However, it is unlikely that these errors are
systematic, thus introducing noise into the data but not systematically biasing them in one
direction. While most errors are likely random, there may be some systematic biases in
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MMDD. There are fewer events occurring in Asia and in closed regimes, likely due to a
gap in reporting and media restraints. Non-democracies are able to suppress the media in
ways that constrain the reporting of any form of state weakness. For example, the
managing editor of L’Observateur, a weekly newspaper in Chad, was detained and held
in police custody after reporting on a 2013 mutiny in the Bardai region of Chad (BBC
Monitoring Africa 2013). Events like this might result in a systematic underreporting in
non-democracies.
In order to partially address this issue, users should always include a control
variable for regime type and consider using regional fixed effects. Additionally, MMDD
users might consider estimating models on a limited sample to see if findings hold (e.g.,
limiting the sample to only Western democracies where there is little reporting gap). As a
final robustness check, users might consider including a control variable in the estimation
that holds constant the total number of news articles from each country in a specific year.
While it would be nice to be able to overcome such systematic biases in more satisfying
ways, many events datasets suffer from similar biases (e.g., human rights data). However,
these potential biases should not deter scholars from attempting to examine critically
important topics that can have dire consequences for civilians. As we know, similar
reporting biases exist across many commonly used data sources. Regime type and media
openness is likely the only systematic bias in these data. All other bias will be random,
thus not threatening our ability to draw inferences with these new data.
Validity of the measure is another concern. While a measure might be reliable, it
could still lack conceptual validity, meaning that it does not adequately capture the
concept being operationalized. As mentioned previously, the literature has conceived of
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mutinies in various ways. Some conceive of mutinies only occurring within the military
apparatus while others equate mutinies with defection events. In order to address this
conceptual confusion, there is a variable that indicates defections, allowing users to
decide whether or not they want to include these events in their study of mutinies.
MMDD has reassuring face validity. I find 460 mutiny events over this time series, which
is about what we should expect to see given that there are roughly the same number of
coups attempts in this time period (Powell and Thyne 2011).11 Perhaps face validity
would be challenged if MMDD found a drastically different number, but indeed, MMDD
yields roughly the same number of events. In compiling MMDD, I have made every
attempt to make a user-friendly dataset that can be manipulated depending on the user’s
research question and goals.
Exploring MMDD
Presented below are a number of descriptive and exploratory figures that seek to
find general patterns and identify possible determinants of mutinies. Figure 2.1 presents
military mutinies across space. Unsurprisingly, the Global South experiences more
mutinies than the North. This pattern is likely driven by regime type, given that the
majority of anocracies and autocracies are located in the Global South. Another important
observation to make from this figure is that mutinies are occurring in every region. There
are no regions that are “mutiny-proofed”.

11

They code 475 events.
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Figure 2.1: Military Mutinies across Space, 1945-2018
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Table 2.1 summarizes the frequencies of mutinies across regions. Africa stands
out as not only the most mutiny prone region. Given that mutinies occur, they are more
like to be violent if they occur in Asia. Not surprisingly, the fewest violent mutinies occur
in Europe where democracies tend to be more consolidated and other levels of political
violence are lower.
Table 2.1: Frequency of Mutinies across Regions, 1945-2017
Region

Name

Count of Mutinies

1
2
3
4
5

Europe
Middle East
Asia
Africa
Americas

51
61
102
199
47

Count of Violent
Mutinies (% of mutinies
associated with violence)

12 (23.5%)
19 (31.1%)
50 (49%)
82 (41.2%)
15 (31.9%)

21

Figure 2.2: Mutinies by Region

Figure 2.2 displays the number of mutinies across region graphically. This figure
also displays the portion of mutinies that involved defection. Remember, defections are
coded when the source document indicates that soldiers left the state’s military apparatus
and joined cohorts with an internal or external threat. We see that defections follow the
same general pattern as the total count of mutinies. Defections occur most often in Africa,
likely due to the strong presence of both internal and external threats and the weakness of
state institutions. This state weakness creates opportunity structures that incentivize
defection. Furthermore, threats (most specifically internal threats) are often designed to
be competitors of the state and offer an alternative to disgruntled soldiers. In contrast,
defections occur least often in Europe. Figure 2.3 displays defections across space. In this
22

figure, X’s are events that involved defection. Black circles are mutinies that were not
associated with defection.
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Figure 2.3: Mutinies with Defections 1945-2018
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Next, Figure 2.4 presents military mutinies and coups d’état across time. An
interesting pattern emerges from this exercise. This figure demonstrates that in the postCold War era, militaries have shown an increased propensity for mutinous activity. At the
same time, the number of military coups is dwindling. This pattern firmly justifies the
continued exploration of mutinies. Mutinies often disastrous implications for human
security, and they are happening more often than military coups at present. These two
observations motivate the remainder of this dissertation. Given that mutinies happen
more now than in previous decades, they have outpaced coups, and they can impact
civilians, we must understand why they happen.
Figure 2.4: Mutinies and Coups d’état over Time
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Next, I explore the relationship between regime type and mutinies. Figure 2.5
shows military mutinies across different regime types using Polity IV measures of regime
type (Marshall and Gurr 2009).12 Interestingly, the figure suggests that there is a nonmonotonic relationship between regime type and the mutiny proneness of a country.
Semi-democracies appear to be the most susceptible polities to military disloyalty.13 This
pattern in the data makes sense when considering that militaries in democracies are likely
to have institutional avenues to secure their organizational preferences, making the option
of mutiny less appealing and necessary in the first place. In contrast, militaries in
completely autocratic states are unlikely to rebel because the heavy-handed, repressive
nature of the regime is likely to enhance loyalty even if it is not sincere. Militaries in
semi-open regimes are likely to face circumstances that make them unsatisfied with the
status quo. Furthermore, militaries in semi-open regimes are more likely than their
democratic and autocratic counterparts to carry out violent mutinies. This figure also
demonstrates that semi-democracies are more likely to experience violent mutinies than
other regime types. Figure 2.6 displays violent mutinies across space. In this figure,
triangles represent mutinies that were associated with violence. Circles represent peaceful
mutinies. About half of all mutinies are associated with violence.

Autocracies are indicated by regimes that score a -6 or lower, while democracies must
score a 6 or higher. Semi-democracies are regimes that fall somewhere between these cut
points.
13
Returning to the idea of reporting bias, this pattern offers an interesting insight. If
reporting bias was pervasive in these data we would expect to see that democracies have
the most events, semi-democracies the second most, and dictatorships the least. Instead,
we see that semi-democracies have the most events and dictatorships the least. While this
pattern does not go a long way to assuage concerns about the autocracy category, this
pattern should alleviate fears that MMDD is only picking up events in transparent
democracies.
12
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Figure 2.5: Mutinies by Regime Type 1945-2016
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Figure 2.6: Violent Mutinies 1945-2018

28
Non-Violent
Violent

Figure 2.7 explores the relationship between regime type and the duration of
mutinies. Duration is captured by the estimated number of days a mutiny lasted. The
round symbols in the figure are proportional representation symbols. Larger circles
represent longer lasting mutinies whereas smaller circles represent shorter mutinies. This
figure demonstrates that while autocracies and democracies experience mutinies less
often than anocracies, the nature of the mutinies they do experience is qualitatively
different. Autocracies experience protracted mutinies that endure longer. Democracies
tend to have short-lived mutinies. There is no coherent pattern for semi-democracies.
Some mutinies in these regimes are very long while others are short. Figure 2.8 displays
the relative duration of mutinies spatially.
Figure 2.7: Proportional Duration of Mutinies by Regime Time
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Figure 2.8: Proportional Duration of Mutinies 1945-2018
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Mutinies vary dramatically by size. Figure 2.9 displays the relative size of
mutinies spatially. The size variable is coded as the estimated number of individuals
involved in a mutiny event. This variable is only coded if the source document
provides an estimate. This variable ranges from 1-25,000 individuals.14 The largest
mutiny in the dataset took place in Egypt in 1986 after conscripts of the CSF
(paramilitary organization) staged a protest in Cairo in response to a rumor that
conscription terms were going to be lengthened from 3 years to 4 years of service.
The second largest event in MMDD occurred in Iraq in 2004. The Iraqi army was
ordered to deploy to Fallujah in an effort to assist U.S. Marines who were actively
fighting in this region. The troops refused these orders and an estimated 15,000
soldiers and military police officers deserted their posts. This forced the U.S. to
reevaluate military recruiting and retention strategies in Iraq. Despite these dramatic
outliers, the average size of a mutiny event in MMDD is 88 soldiers.
Six percent of mutinies are associated with civilian deaths. Figure 2.9 displays
these events spatially. Squares represent mutinies that are associated with civilian deaths.
Circles represent mutinies that did not kill civilians. It is possible that this variable is an
underestimate of reality. This dichotomous variable was only coded if the source
document explicitly mentioned the death of a civilian. Therefore, it is likely that there are
events in which civilians were killed but the source document did not explicitly state this,
resulting in a false negative. Even with this possible bias, we still see that 1 out of every

14

Size is only coded for 260 mutiny events (56.5% of MMDD). Many source documents
do not mention size estimates. Thus, this information is only available for some events.
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20 mutinies results in the death of a civilian, proving that these events have a direct and
immediate impact on human security.
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Figure 2.9: Mutinies Associated with Civilian Deaths 1945-2018
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Some mutinies are led by commissioned ranks while others are conducted entirely
by foot soldiers. This reality may be of interest to scholars seeking to understand the
impacts of mutinies. It is theoretically plausible that foot soldier mutinies have distinct
outcomes when compared to those that involve military leaders. For example, foot soldier
mutinies may likely be more violent in nature than mutinies in which commissioned
ranks are involved. When foot soldiers lead mutinies, they are likely less concerned with
legitimacy and more concerned with securing their preferences as quickly as possible by
any means necessary. Generally, these foot soldier mutinies are staged over resources.
One particularly effective way to secure resources is to exploit the civilian population
through the use of violence to facilitate looting. In contrast, commissioned ranks
understand that the use of violence may spoil their movement (similar to Stephan and
Chenoweth’s argument mentioned earlier). Commissioned officers will be more hesitant
to use violence, understanding that it may in fact detract from the effectiveness of their
campaign.
Using a simple contingency analysis, Table 2.2 demonstrates preliminary
evidence that foot soldier mutinies may be more dangerous than mutinies led by lowranking military officers. 45.2% of all foot soldier mutinies are associated with violence
while only 27.1% of mutinies led by commissioned ranks are associated with violence
(chi-squared = 14.7, p<0.001). Figure 10 displays whether a mutiny was led by
commissioned officers or foot soldiers. Stars represent events that were initiated by
commissioned ranks while circles represent foot soldier mutinies.
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Table 2.2: Mutinies and Civil Conflict, 1945-2008
Foot Soldier
Not Violent
161 (54.7%)
Violent
133 (45.2%)
Total
294
Pearson chi2(2) = 14.7002, p< 0.001

Low Rank
121 (72.9%)
45 (27.1%)
166
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Total
282
178
460

Figure 2.10: Mutinies lead by Commissioned Officers 1945-2018
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Avenues for Future Research
Beyond the enticing empirical relationships explored above, there are several theoretical
and policy-oriented areas for further research on mutinies. First, there is an emerging
reality that the international community is beginning to punish coup activity more harshly
and consistently than in previous decades. Specifically, in the post-Cold War era, coups
are generally condemned by democratic leaders in the international system as well as in
international organizations. Consider the recent July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey.
Despite Erdogan’s tenuous leadership, President Obama was swift in his condemning
response. President Obama urged all parties to “support the democratically elected
government of Turkey,” seeking to discourage such upheaval (Politico 2016).
Furthermore, international organizations are also likely to respond negatively to coup
activity. The 2009 Honduran coup resulted in immediate expulsion of the state from the
Organization of American States (OAS), revoking all membership contingent benefits
(OAS Press Release 2009). As the cost of coup plotting continues to rise, it is likely that
the incidence of mutinies will continue to increase as military actors recognize that this is
a less costly alternative to coup plotting.
Beyond the rising cost of coups, there is strong evidence that the incidence of
coups is waning (Lindberg and Clark 2008). Thyne and his colleagues (2016)
demonstrate that negative international reactions to coups decrease the time that a coup
plotter will remain in power after they stage a successful coup. These findings suggest
that the post-coup state is often treacherous for the putschist. Given the rising costs
associated with launching a coup, it seems likely that militaries will pivot to new
modalities of rebellion that are less costly but are still likely to change the status quo. It
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seems reasonable to expect coups to continue to decline and lower levels of indiscipline
to become the new normal, especially given the large difference in costs.
Third, not only do mutinies seem to be an increasingly popular form of dissent,
but they also continue to shape the face of civil conflict in the 21st century. Consider the
current Syrian civil war. As Arab Spring protests reached Syria in late March of 2011,
tens of thousands of protesters joined the movement across several of the state’s largest
cities. The Assad regime was clear in its intention to repress, ordering the military to
squelch contention as effectively as possible, even ordering soldiers to fire and kill
peaceful dissidents where necessary. However, portions of the military refused to comply
with the regime’s orders. Sunni portions of the military mutinied at remarkable rates.
Some of these disloyal combatants sought political asylum, some were executed, and
many joined the rebel forces (Nepstad 2013). It is still unclear the degree to which some
of these defecting soldiers supported, sympathized with, and ultimately joined non-state
actors operating in Syria. While spurred by generations of sectarian divides, the defection
of Sunni combatants has undoubtedly contributed to Syria’s bloody civil war by leveling
the playing field between the state forces and rebel forces. The lack of state forces and
fighting capacity in particular regions facilitated ISIS’s growth and its ability to
consolidate grip on swaths of territory, including Raqqa and Deir al-Zour.
Syria is not alone in demonstrating how military mutinies contribute to prolonged
civil conflict. For nearly two decades, conflict has plagued the Central African Republic
(CAR). It is clear that this conflict is at least partially rooted in the state’s inability to
ward off protracted military mutinies. In 1996, portions of the Central African Armed
Forces (FACA) mutinied over low wages and concerns of equity. President Patasse was
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unable to appease the mutineers, which resulted in a lack of fighting capacity for the
state. Local militias and rebel groups were able to successfully recruit, generate revenue,
and engage in guerilla tactics because of this vacuum of state military power. In an act of
improvisation, President Patasse formed a new security force that would later commit
wide-scale human rights violation in the name of the state (U.S. Department of State
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, February 23, 2000). Much like the current
Syrian case, mutinies provided the kindling needed to spark civil conflict and sustain the
fire for nearly two decades in CAR. These two examples of the impact of military
mutinies on the stability of states and on the severity of intrastate war call attention to the
need for systematic understanding of this unique phenomenon.
Fourth, military mutinies also have direct implications for the study of interstate
conflict and traditional measures of power. Scholars who examine military power
generally use measures such as Composite Index of National Capabilities, or CINC
scores (Small and Singer 1982). However, such measures do not consider military
loyalty, a dimension of power that has a direct and measurable impact on the state’s
ability to wage war. There is an implicit assumption behind the use of CINC scores that
every state will be able to leverage proportional resources in the CINC index in the event
of a conflict. However, simply because a state has a large military does not mean that it
will translate directly into fighting power. A large military may be plagued with
ideological divides, ethnic cleavages, grievances due to under resourcing, etc. Any one of
these factors may result in a large military being ineffective at fighting if rifts generate
mutinies — meaning the total number of military personnel never make it to the
battlefield because they decide to walk off their post. States are only as strong as their
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military is cohesive. MMDD will allow scholars to critically examine how much
dimensions of military disloyalty influence traditional conceptions of power.
Conclusion
This chapter introduces MMDD, a unique dataset that codes events of military rebellion.
This new tool will allow scholars to test theoretical expectations about the determinants
and effects of mutinies. The chapter also explored a handful of empirical relationships
and discussed implications of MMDD for a variety of research areas. Regarding mutinies
as a future research agenda, there are a number of directions for investigation. The next
obvious step would be to predict mutinies. As seen in the exploratory portion of the
paper, I have presented preliminary ideas about what other social processes are likely
driving soldiers’ decisions to defect. A second goal would be to explore multinomial
outcomes of military unrest. For example, why does the military decide to launch a coup
in some cases, while in other scenarios they simply mutiny? Beyond exploring why
mutinies occur, MMDD will now allow scholars to consider questions about the effects
of mutinies. Scholars might explore how mutinies affect the outcome and duration of
civil wars by introducing more spoilers or veto payers. Or perhaps there are theoretical
reasons to suspect that mutinies weaken battlefield effectiveness. MMDD provides
scholars with numerous avenues of inquiry that will likely provide timely policy
recommendations.
In sum, military mutinies are a topic worthy of further investigation. Mutinies
have the ability to affect a number of larger conflict processes both in the inter- and
intrastate context. This dataset represents a strong contribution to the literature by
allowing conflict scholars to consider elements of military loyalty longitudinally to
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enhance our broader understanding of conflict processes. While this chapter offered a
broad exploratory overview of MMDD, the next chapter will dive into the central
research question of this dissertation, seeking to provide scholars an explanation for why
mutinies occur. In the next chapter I outline the theoretical framework that will guide
subsequent empirical chapters.
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018
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Chapter 3
Why Mutinies Occur: A Theoretical Framework
Military mutinies have occurred more frequently in the last 30 years than ever
before. Figure 1 presents a moving average of military mutinies from 1945-present day
using the new MMDD dataset presented in the previous chapter.
Figure 3.1: Temporal Trends of Military Mutinies

Not only are mutinies occurring more often at the systemic level, but mutinies
have also become a persistent and pervasive problems over the last two decades for
particular states. For example, the Ivory Coast experienced its first mutiny in 1990. Since
then, the state has experienced nearly a dozen mutinies, many of which have been violent
and disrupting to state stability. Most of these mutinies occurred along the lines of former
rebel groups that were integrated back into the state’s military after the conclusion of the
Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war. Likewise, since 2011 Syria has experienced 12 mutinies during
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a civil conflict that proved to have disastrous implications for the stability of the entire
region. Beyond these two examples there are many states, especially in Africa, Asia, and
the Middle East, that have seen a recent and dramatic upticks in the incidences of
mutinies.
Given this notable observation, the goal of this chapter is to provide a theoretical
framework that explains when states are likely to experience mutinies. I argue that
mutinies are likely to arise due to divergent preferences and risk aversion on behalf of
military agents. Using a nested principal agent framework, I describe why agents might
have strong incentives to shirk, resulting in military rebellion. I begin by reviewing extant
explanations of mutinies. Next, I describe the actors involved in this complex interaction
and what we know about their preferences. Finally, I describe how principal-agent
problems are likely to arise in the civil-military context, allowing for various types of
mutinies in a nested structure.
Extant Explanations of Mutinies
Much of the work considering why soldiers choose to rebel has been conducted through
qualitative case studies. This work is rich in anecdotal evidence and theoretical nuance,
focusing largely on the impact of having an ethnically-divided military. For example,
Osborne (2014) examines how ethnicity in East Africa affected military loyalty during
colonial periods. Colonizers recognized the Kamba ethnic group in Kenya as a “martial
race,” or superior fighters, when compared to other ethnic groups. Colonizers believed
that this particular group had a genetic makeup that made them more advanced military
men with enhanced senses of loyalty and duty. However, this reputation was largely used
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instrumentally by the Kamba to get favorable treatment from the colonial powers, while
other ethnic groups tended to display disloyalty towards the colonizers.
This work emphasizes the reality that the decision to remain loyal or step away
from the military apparatus is largely an instrumental choice. In events of mutiny, unlike
most coup activity, soldiers step away from the state and very clearly articulate demands
like higher pay or better resources. In contrast to coup activity, the demands often come
prior to the putsch or rebellion, making mutinies distinct because observers know
precisely what soldiers want and why they have chosen to rebel. While this work gets at
the interesting idea that rebellion and the inverse, loyalty, are largely instrumental and
can be driven by ethnic divisions, it offers few explanations for the proximate causes of
military mutinies.
Scholars have also considered the effect of grievances due to having a colonial
power control the military apparatus, a condition that usually goes hand in hand with
having an ethnically fragmented army. This camp of scholars largely agrees that
militaries that are run by a colonial powers are prone to waning loyalty. Some of the most
explored cases of this phenomenon include East Africa 1964, Kenya 1945, India 1857,
and Singapore 1915. The Singaporean case is particularly interesting. As World War I
was devastating mainland Europe, trouble was brewing away from home in Singapore.
Indian troops, under the colonial rule of the British, were plotting a mutiny spurred by a
number of grievances. First, the brigade deployed in Singapore (Malay at the time), the
5th Light Infantry, was largely made up of Muslim Indians who were influenced by the
Ghadar Party. The Ghadar Party actively encouraged Indian nationalism and resistance of
Western forces. After predicting a small mutiny in Mumbai in January of 1915 and
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reassigning soldiers to new outposts to prevent sedition, the British military overlooked
the swelling discontent in the 5th Light Brigade. Second, there were rumors that this
brigade would be commanded to fight in Turkey against a largely Muslim military.
The rank-and-file soldiers of the 5th Light Brigade pointed out that they had only
been ordered and contracted for service in the Federated Malay States originally, not in
Turkey against religious kin. The officers of the brigade largely sided with the rank-andfile soldiers on this issue, not wanting to deploy to the Middle East or Africa (Kuwajima
2009). For these reasons (inter alia), several companies in the 5th Light Brigade staged a
massive mutiny in February of 1915 with estimates suggesting that up to 800 men were
involved in the violent sedition. This case demonstrates that rank-and-file soldiers are apt
to rebel when they experience widespread grievances. However, one can look anecdotally
and find many cases where militaries were under colonial rule, yet maintained loyalty.
Also, colonization is a condition that persists and endures over decades. Therefore, while
colonization can certainly spur grievances, colonization remains an unsatisfying answer
to why we see military mutinies at particular moments and not at others. Furthermore,
these explanations do not offer any power to help explain why the incidence of mutinies
is increasing rather dramatically in recent periods. They also do not explain why
particular states, like the Ivory Coast or Syria, have experienced many more mutinies
lately than ever before.
Actors and Interests
Though previous research has suggested that ethnic fragmentation and colonial control
might spur disloyalty, we continue to lack an explanation of the proximate causes of
mutinies. Thus, in this section, I will lay out the actors and their specific interests to
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explore strategic interactions that might spur mutinies. To begin, I will review the
preferences and strategies beginning with the executive then moving to the military
leadership.
As depicted below in Figure 2, the executive serves as the principal of the military
leadership. The chief concern of the executive is to remain in power (e.g., Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2004). Leaders will secure their tenure through many strategies that I label
“regime-securing strategies.” Scholars have focused on many regime securing strategies
including institutions (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), the generation of
audience costs (Weeks 2008), and even the presence of particular resources, like oil
(Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2015). For this analysis, I will focus squarely on repression,
diversionary tactics, and coup proofing, as these particular regime securing strategies
place a burden of responsibility on the military apparatus and apply to both democracies
and non-democracies.
Executives may utilize repressive tactics when they feel their tenure is being
threatened. Repression has the explicit goal of limiting the dissidents’ ability to overturn
institutions of the state or the current leadership (Davenport 1995). Repressive techniques
can range in severity from limiting civil liberties to direct physical integrity violations.
Repression can be costly because at times it is sanctioned by the international
community, or it can backfire and spur increased mobility among existing dissidents
(Davenport 1995). For this reason, executives may consider other tactics, such as
divisionary conflict or coup proofing.
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Figure 3.2: Military Leadership as an Agent of the Executive

Diversionary tactics may also be used as regime-securing strategies. To maintain
adequate levels of approval and legitimacy, the leader may initiate conflict abroad to
enjoy a boost in public opinion and enhance loyalty within the military by enhancing a
sense of nationalism (Levy 1989; Andreski 1968). While diversionary theory has been
largely applied to democracies, Miller (1995), Mitchell and Prins (2004), and Powell
(2012) demonstrate that autocrats may also engage in diversionary tactics to secure their
tenure. In the face of elevated coup risk, there is strong evidence that the likelihood of
militarized interstate dispute (MID) initiation increases dramatically (Miller and Elgun
2010). Leaders who are fearful of losing their grip on power, even in autocratic contexts,
may initiate conflict to secure tenure and divert the attention of the public and military.
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Coup proofing is a regime-securing strategy used by executives to ward off
putsches. Of all the strategies outlined15 (repression, divisionary tactics, and coup
proofing), coup proofing at initial glance appears to be the least costly because coup
proofing is a completely domestic process, and leaders do not risk angering the
international community as they might by using heavy repression or divisionary tactics.
Most non-democracies will experience irregular regime change through a coup (Decalo
1990). In response to this threat, leaders may choose to counterbalance the military by
disaggregating horizontally to make mutually suspicious factions, thus making
coordination challenges steeper and decreasing the probability of a coup attempt. Beyond
counterbalancing, leaders can utilize paramilitaries, militias, and secret police to protect
their tenure (Feaver 1999). Purges may also be used when leaders suspect that the
military has become too intertwined in political processes (Young and Turner 1985).
Scholars have already demonstrated that coup proofing directly diminishes the ability of
militaries to coordinate, weakening fighting capacity (Durell-Young 1997) and the
quality of individual soldiers (e.g., Pilester and Bohmelt 2011; Roesseler 2011). As we
will see, coup proofing likely has an additional unintended consequence that executives
rarely consider. By introducing coordination challenges, coup proofing diminishes coup
risk but may simultaneously enhance mutiny risk.
Moving from the executive, the next actor I analyze is the military leadership. As
an agent of the executive, the military leadership has a number of divergent preferences
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It is unlikely that leaders will use coup proofing and diversionary tactics
simultaneously. As Powell (2012) demonstrates, coup proofing measures and
diversionary incentives are inversely related. In other words, as a leader imposes steeper
coup proofing measures, they are less likely to undertake divisionary tactics. However,
repression may be used jointly with other regime-securing tactics.
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and strategies to secure these preferences. Scholars possess a significant amount of
information regarding the preferences of the military leadership because of the vast coup
literature. A fruitful practice is to consider the disposition and ability of the military
leadership to intervene in politics (Powell 2012). At this point in the theoretical
framework, I will focus largely on aspects of disposition, leaving dimensions of ability to
be explored later. According to dispositional arguments, military leadership will
intervene, specifically by staging a coup when they are dissatisfied with the status quo.
Scholars in this area emphasize the importance of legitimacy, arguing that military
leadership will be dissatisfied when the government is experiencing a decline in public
support due to a perception of poor performance (Finer 1962; Welch 1970; Belkin and
Schofer 2003; Casper and Tyson 2014; Johnson and Thyne 2016). Moving forward in
time, the corporate grievance model argues that military leaders’ dispositions respond to
the amount of institutional “goodies” the military receives (Thompson 1973). When
militaries are well armed and well paid, dispositional factors for intervention are likely to
fade. However, when militaries are under-resourced, military leaders might recalibrate
their disposition and coordinate efforts to launch a coup. I will return to this argument
later by adding complexity to this notion of disposition.
Scholars have also spent time exploring the individual characteristics of military
personnel. Huntington (1957) explores what he calls the “military mind.” He argues that
the military mind sees war as a political instrument. As such, total war and absolute war
are to be avoided at all costs as they “…produce the mutual devastation of combatants”
(Huntington 1957: 65). By extension, I assume that military leadership would prefer to
fight short and decisive conflicts as opposed to enduring wars of attrition. Huntington
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also argues that because of the way the military mind views the world and the
competition among sovereign states, they will continue to urge bureaucrats to enlarge and
strengthen the military. This idea falls in line with the corporate grievance model of
military preferences that argues that militaries essentially want institutional rewards. The
military mind also sees that expertise is a prerequisite for competency. In other words,
“professional training and experience is necessary for decision and action.” (Huntington
71). Based on this notion that the military mind realizes that competency is based on
professional training, I expect that military leadership would prefer a meritocracy, where
promotions are based on ability rather than loyalty to the executive.
To this point, scholars know a lot about how executive tactics and the preferences
of military leadership interact to influence many forms of unrest. Coup proofing has been
shown to decrease the likelihood of a coup (Powell 2012). Likewise, well-funded
militaries have been demonstrated to have lower coup risk (Powell 2012). We know that
repression can cause backlash, specifically in the form of protest movements (Davenport
1995, 2007; Moore 1998), but can also help secure the executive’s tenure. Scholars have
also shown that protests, which may be a response to repression, are likely to spur coups
(Casper and Tyson 2014; Johnson and Thyne 2016). However, the existing literature has
not examined how mutinies might play a role, which is an important gap to fill for many
reasons.
First, mutinies are important outcomes in themselves. We have seen that mutinies
can quickly change the dynamics of a conflict, as seen in the recent example of Syria.
What is more, mutinies are happening at an increasing rate. Finally, it is hard to
understand executive decisions about things like resource allocation, military purges,
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diversionary war, and coup proofing without bringing the possibility of military mutinies
into the picture. In order to develop a theory about mutinies, I will introduce a new actor
into the principal agent structure to demonstrate how foot soldier preferences can add
new avenues of disagreement between the executive and military leadership.
A Nested Principal Agent Model of Military Mutinies
Canonical Principal Agent theory (hereinafter referred to as P-A theory) has been used to
explain various political processes, from IO behavior to domestic governance. In a
traditional setting, principals give instructions and demands and can sanction agents if
those orders are not followed. Agents are supposed to do the bidding of the principal, but
as we will explore below, in some circumstances agents have stronger incentives to
defect and not comply with the principals’ orders. These suboptimal outcomes are called
shirking. Militaries can shirk in a number of ways, but here I will focus exclusively on
shirking as a result of military mutinies. A nested principal agent problem is simply an
expansion of canonical P-A theory, allowing for more than one principal and more than
one agent in an interaction.16 Figure 3 presents the nested structure of the various
principals and agents in a military organization.

16

See Mitnick (1992) and Waterman and Meier (1998) for discussion of the need to move
beyond dyads when exploring principal agent theory. These works argue that very few
interactions are simply dyadic in nature. It is more realistic to think of various principals
and many agents.
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Figure 3.3: Nested Principal Agent Structure of Military

There is strong precedent in the civil-military relations literature to apply a
principal-agent framework to interactions within the military. Feaver (2009) lays out
what he calls the “civil-military problematique.” The inherent tension in civil-military
relations is that “… the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient
power to become a threat to the polity.” (2009 : 4). Thus, he presents a principal-agent
framework in which civilian principals must contract military agents to protect society.
However, these civilian principals must then worry about how the agents behave. Agents
may behave inappropriately by either inadequately protecting society or becoming a
predatory institution. Because this context provides a strategic interaction and a clear
hierarchical order, Feaver argues that a principal-agent model is appropriate when
considering the civil-military relations. As an extension of Feaver (2009), I argue that
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there is not only one principal and one agent, but rather there are many principals and
many agents. In his model, military agents shirk against civilian principals. While this
type of shirking may occur in my model, I also allow for military agents to shirk against
military principals.
Next, I borrow simple assumptions from P-A theory about the behavior of each
actor in this nested structure. I assume that principals can monitor the behavior of agents
(Pollack 1997). This ex-post monitoring is an attempt to overcome the steep information
advantages that favor agents (Waterman and Meier 1998). In this context, foot soldiers
know more about the everyday realities of being a soldier than military leadership.
Likewise, military leadership knows more about the reality of conflict and details about
the fighting capacity of the opponent than the executive. In general P-A models, this
information asymmetry is what drives shirking. Here, I will not focus exclusively on
information asymmetries, but add a parameter of risk aversion, which will drive shirking
by introducing goal conflict between the principal and the agent. Relaxing a few
assumptions of the canonical setting will introduce friction into the model, creating
strong incentives for agents to shirk. Shirking in the context of this nested structure
would mean staging a coup attempt or a mutiny, based on which actor shirks.
Inefficient outcomes in this nested principal agent situation can arise due to fear.
Sappington (1991) demonstrates that by considering risk aversion displayed by agents,
we can expect shirking to be more likely. That is, when agents are asked to carry out
tasks that impose steep risks onto them, they are less likely to follow through with the
demands of the principal. Risk aversion is particularly salient when applied to the
military context. Mutinies and coups are likely to occur because agents will shirk when
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they are asked to undertake risky activities like facing an opponent without appropriate
resources or repressing peaceful protestors. Such risk aversion creates a conflict of goals
between the principal and the agents.
One might note that in this framework shirking is highly observable. Indeed, the
purpose of a mutiny is to notify observers of grievances in an effort to change the status
quo. This sets shirking in this framework apart from the canonical principal agent
scenarios where shirking involves hidden action and is therefore not observable. This
inability to observe shirking is what classifies these models as “moral hazard models.”
However, there are many recent applications of P-A theory in which shirking is not outright observable. In other words, these recent iterations are not moral hazard models. For
example, one seminal P-A application by Brehm and Gates (1999) examines strikes by
police officers. Similar to my application, shirking in this context is highly observable.
Thus, while it is a step away from tradition in the P-A literature, it is appropriate to apply
principal agent theory in scenarios of observable shirking. Below I will outline various
scenarios that are likely to create risky situations for agents in the various nests presented
above. This exercise will allow me to introduce and test many novel hypotheses.
Foot Soldiers as Agents of Military Leadership (Type 1 Mutinies)
The first nested structure in Figure 3.4 considers the foot soldiers serving as
agents of the military leadership. For a moment, I will exclude the executive from the
interaction. This nest represents one of the most conventional pathways to a military
mutiny. In most cases, the executive determines broad military policy, such as total
military expenditure and opponents, while the military leadership oversees specific
military policy, such as how resources are distributed among battalions and specific
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fighting strategies. Thus, there is a distinct possibility that soldiers may be pleased with
the executive, but feel that the military leadership is not promoting the interests of the
individual soldiers or is asking soldiers to carry out particularly risky activities.
Figure 3.4 Foot Soldiers as Agents of Military Leadership

In this nest, we are unlikely to see a coup because the grievance is spurred by
military leadership rather than the executive, and by definition, coups must be pointed at
the executive. Furthermore, the vast majority of coups are perpetrated by military
leadership or at least require military leadership coordination (Thyne and Powell 2011).
There are several situations that might create strong incentives for foot soldiers to shirk
their duties as an agent of military leadership.
First, high military spending and low soldier pay presents a situation that might
lead to a disagreement between military leadership and foot soldiers. In this scenario, the
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executive funnels significant resources to the military, but this does not improve the
soldiers’ individual pay, which suggests that military leadership is squandering or
stealing the money. High military spending with low individual pay presents a situation
where soldiers are not adequately rewarded for undertaking the risks associated with
serving in the forces. The 2012 Yemeni mutiny illustrates this type of grievance where
nearly 600 rank-and-file soldiers rebelled against former President Saleh’s half-brother,
General Mohamed Saleh al-Ahmar. Soldiers organized a sit-in at the al-Dalaimi air force
base and reported that military leadership was largely dishonest and stealing portions of
soldiers’ salaries. One soldier was quoted saying, “We are tired of being ruled by an
unjust and corrupt man who steals portions of our salaries and confiscates our food and
clothes allowances for his own benefit” (Bikya News 2012). Even though this is a clear
scenario that would result in shirking in this nest, because of a lack of micro-level data
regarding soldiers’ individual pay, it is nearly impossible to examine soldiers’ pay as a
portion of total military expenditure. Thus, we turn to a second situation where soldiers
are satisfied with the executive and simultaneously unhappy with the officers to derive
the first testable hypothesis.
Particularly bloody conflict is also likely to spur mutinies in this particular nest.
The executive is responsible for picking opponents and the decision to enter war, but the
military leadership is responsible for fighting strategies. As such, war specifics, such as
strategy, that go wrong are likely to be blamed on the military leadership rather than the
executive. Battle deaths are likely to be a result of poor strategy. As Biddle (2010)
argues, gross numerical figures of military power are not adequate in explaining war
outcomes. It is necessary to look at strategy and tactics, which are decisions made by
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military leadership, not the executive.17 Therefore, bloody battle is likely to generate
incentives for foot soldiers to shirk as they recognize that doing their job has become
increasingly risky.
Nigeria provides an illustrative example of soldiers blaming military leadership
for battle losses. Nigerian troops have continued to face the insurgent threat in the Northeastern province of their state against Boko Haram. Recently, the insurgent threat has
swelled and soldiers have taken notice of how well-equipped and -resourced Boko Haram
combatants are compared to state forces. This has created a sense among soldiers that
they are sent into a completely hostile battlefield simply to be sacrificed in the name of
the state. As such, there have been a series of mutinies where soldiers refuse to go into
the field to face Boko Haram. An unnamed soldier told BBC that, “Soldiers are dying
like fowl. The Nigerian army is not ready to fight Boko Haram. Boko Haram are inside
the bush, everywhere. They [senior commanders] are sacrificing soldiers” (BBC News
2014). As illustrated by this quotation, soldiers in Nigeria blamed commanders for their
losses against Boko Haram rather than the executive. This discussion generates my first
hypothesis:
H1: As battle deaths increase, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.
Another factor that is likely to spur mutinies in this nest is the duration of conflict.
Soldiers prefer to fight short and decisive wars over long and bloody wars. While the
decisions to enter the war rests in the hands of the executive, the decisiveness of the war
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This may not be the case for military regimes. I will control for military regimes, or
regimes in which the executive is synonymous with military leadership, in the empirical
model.
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is directly related to strategy, which is determined by the military leadership. If the
military leadership is adequately resourced, soldiers expect them to levy these resources
from the executive in order to fight short wars leading to victory. If wars drag on, soldiers
are likely to blame the military leadership for not using better strategy or allocating
resources better. As such, long wars are likely to generate rifts between soldiers and
military leadership.
Syria provides an alarming example of this relationship between conflict duration
and mutinies. Prior to the onset of Syria’s civil war in 2011, the state had only
experienced a total of three mutinies. In 2011, at the onset of civil war, there were three
mutinies. In 2012, the number of mutinies more than doubled, resulting in seven
mutinies. While this rough count of mutinies might not entirely capture the relationship
between conflict and mutinies, anecdotal evidence suggests mutinies often occur because
soldiers are demanding demobilization. For example, during the Angolan civil war, two
mutinies occurred in 1992, after decades of fighting. In both of these instances, soldiers
were demanding immediate demobilization and a return to civilian life. The primary
source documents indicate that soldiers were experiencing fatigue and simply wanted a
conclusion to the conflict (BBC 1992). While conflict duration and intensity work
through similar theoretical mechanisms, I intend to explore their independent and joint
effects on the likelihood of mutinies. This discussion yields the second hypothesis
regarding the relationship between long lasting conflict and mutinies:
H2: As the duration of war increases, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.
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Foot Soldiers as Agents of the Executive (Type 2 Mutinies)
A second nested structure in Figure 3.5 shows foot soldiers serving as agents of
the executive. Shirking is likely to happen because soldiers are unhappy with the
mandates of the executive. It is important to note that military leadership are not included
in this nest, and therefore it is assumed that they are generally pleased with the policies of
the executive and remain loyal. Because the military leadership is still aligned with the
executive, a coup attempt is not an option because this would require defection of the
military leadership, as nearly all coup attempts require high ranking military leadership
involvement (Thyne and Powell 2014).
Figure 3.5 Foot Soldiers as Agents of the Executive

The most common route to a mutiny in this particular nest is the presence of a
military regime. A military regime provides a context where the executive and military
leadership are essentially the same actor. As such, anything the executive does that spurs
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discontent among the soldiers can only be met with a munity because the military
leadership is not likely to side with the soldiers, as their interests are directly represented
in the regime. Early work on military regimes emphasized their inability to negotiate
outcomes between societal actors that may have conflicting aims (Finer 1976: 12-14).
Geddes (1999) points out that military regimes are surprisingly fragile and rarely survive
longer than democracies or other types of autocracies. What is more, Frantz and Ezrow
(2011) demonstrate that leaders of military regimes are the most likely to get ousted
despite the extensive training and expected discipline within these regimes. I expect this
logic to extend to dimensions of military loyalty. I anticipate military regimes to be more
mutiny prone than other regime types due to their relative inflexibility and the
superimposition of military leadership on the executive position.
After a coup in December of 2000 in the Cote D’Ivoire, foot soldiers took the
streets of Abidjan in protest. Soldiers were demanding compensation from the ruling
junta for the critical part they played in the December coup that resulted in the junta’s
new found power. The soldiers were displeased with both the military leadership and the
executive, as these two actors are superimposed in a military regime. The Ivory Coast is
not alone in experiencing mutinies during the reign of a military regime. Indeed,
Argentina experienced many mutinies at the end of the military junta and immediately
after the junta fell. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced mutinies in
the context of a military regime, such as: Niger, Gambia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone,
among many others. This anecdotal evidence paired with theoretical expectations yields
the following hypothesis about the effect of military regimes on military mutinies:
H3: Military regimes are more likely to experience mutinies than other types of regimes.
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Other pathways to mutinies in this nest occur when events place steeper costs on
foot soldiers than the military leadership or the executive. In these situations, the soldiers
are likely to blame the executive as he or she is at the helm of the ship and can mitigate
the costs paid by the soldiers, but fail to do so. Military leadership is unlikely to side with
the soldiers because they experience smaller costs than the soldiers. For military
leadership, siding with foot soldiers may result in the loss of their elite status, a severely
high cost.
Protests facilitate mutinies in this particular nest. Protests create situations where
foot soldiers pay steeper costs than the military leadership and executive. When dissent
arises, the executive can choose to use repressive tactics or simply try to monitor and
contain the situation without the use of repression. In either scenario, foot soldiers pay
steep costs. These high costs paid by foot soldiers are a result of their closeness to the
civilian population. In contrast, military leadership and the executive are more removed
from civilian populations. In the absence of repression, soldiers are often used to monitor
dissent. This means being in the street, exposing themselves to the potential dangers
associated with unrest. When protests are met with repression, I expect that the difference
in cost paid by these actors will be even more intense.
While executives order repression, they are the most insulated and thus pay the
lowest cost for repressing, and yet stand the most to gain by maintaining their elite status.
Even if protests are particularly successful and spur coup activity (Casper and Tyson
2014, Johnson and Thyne 2016), coups are rarely bloody and generally end in exile.
Clearly this is not a preferred outcome for the executive, but it is not rarely a deadly
outcome. The benefits associated with repression for the executive are ample. He or she
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can secure their own tenure through the use of heavily repressive tactics that discourage
dissent. A similar pattern emerges when examining costs and benefits of using repressive
strategies for military leadership. There is a strong benefit associated with repression for
military elite, as it will in most scenarios help secure their tenure. The costs are minimal
because the military leadership supervises repression, but they will not carry it out with
their own hands.
When examining the costs and benefits associated with repression for foot
soldiers, a different pattern emerges. Soldiers are generally not life-long military
professionals. Most soldiers, particularly conscripts, want to return to the civilian
population after their service. The IDF of Israel provides an illustrative example of
conscripts wanting to return to civilian life after duty. After conscription in the IDF, foot
soldiers are given the choice of remaining in the active reserves. In 2013, only 1/3 of past
conscripts chose to maintain an “active” reservationist status. This number fell in 2015 to
26% of all conscripts (The Times of Israel 2016). Recognizing that the clear majority of
foot soldiers want to return to civilian life, they do not want to commit atrocities that
would distance them from the civilian population. Repression is almost always
committed by the hands of foot soldiers. Therefore, the costs of repression is dramatically
steeper than the cost for the executive or military leadership. Because of this difference in
the costs incurred, protests are likely to spur mutinies.
Yugoslavia saw protests lead directly to mutiny activity in 1999. Women’s
protests sparked in Krusevac and Aleksandrovac after the bodies of seven slain soldiers
were returned home. Mothers, sisters, and wives of soldiers began protesting demanding
the return of their sons, brothers, and husbands (New York Times 1999). The women
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blew whistles (a common tactic in many pro-democracy campaigns that these anti-war
protestors borrowed) and threw eggs at the Town Hall building. Even though this dissent
was technically under the emergency military rule put in place during the NATO air
campaign, the protestors remained committed to their decision. In response to the
women’s protests, nearly 2,000 soldiers deployed to Istok deserted their posts and
returned to their home cities of Krusevac and Aleksandrovac. But this anecdote is among
many others help illustrate how protests can spur mutinies. Romanian soldiers mutinied
in response to General Chirac’s orders to shoot protestors in February of 1990. In
response to these orders, 48 officers joined nearly 3,000 soldiers and student protestors in
the streets and demanded that Defense Minster and the Internal Security Minister be
ousted. This example highlights the cost argument made earlier. Protests that are met
with extreme repression are likely to encourage mutinies by imposing steep costs on
soldiers.
H4: As a state experiences more protests, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.
The nature of the protest will also influence the likelihood of mutinies. Returning
to the cost argument, the cost of repression for individual soldiers will also change
depending upon whether the protest is peaceful or violent. Repression is easily justified
when protests are violent. One of the primary objectives of the military is to maintain law
and order, which is directly challenged by violent protests. However, peaceful protests do
not pose a similar threat. Firing on peaceful protestors is likely to engender negative
feelings towards soldiers among the civilian population (Johnson and Thyne 2016).
The recent Syria example provides an illustration of repressive orders challenging
troop loyalty. As Assad ordered decisive repression, including firing on and even killing
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protesters, in largely Sunni populated regions of the state, Sunni factions of the military
had a decision to make. They could either demonstrate complete loyalty to the regime or
follow orders – an endeavor that was costly on many levels (e.g., firing on their own
ethnic-religious kin) or they could resist the orders of the Assad regime and mutiny.
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that nonviolent campaigns are particularly likely to
test troop loyalty when compared to their violent counterparts. 18 Returning to the cost
argument, it is much easier to follow repressive orders when protesters are using violent
means, whereas firing on peaceful protesters is associated with a much higher set of costs
(Johnson and Thyne 2016).
Another recent example highlights this causal process. Burmese troops in
September of 2007 declared that they supported Buddhist monks that were leading mass
protests against the regime. A group of dissatisfied soldiers formed a group called the
Public Patriotic Army Association and drafted a formal letter declaring their support for
the dissenters. They wrote, “On behalf of the armed forces, we declare our support for the
non-violent action of the Buddhist Monks and members of the public and their peaceful
expression” (The Guardian 2007). The soldiers carefully point out that their support for
this movement was largely conditioned on the nature of the protests. Had these protests
been violent, it seems much less likely that the soldiers would have signaled their strong
support. This discussion yields a secondary hypothesis about the effect of protests on
Nest C mutinies.
H5: Peaceful protests are more likely to spur mutinies than violent protests.

18

They examine very large-scale military defections that are indicative of a massive
systemic break down with a dichotomous variable. The dependent variable used in my
analysis will be capturing smaller breakdowns in troop loyalty.
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Diversionary war also creates an avenue for disagreement between the three
actors. Diversionary war is likely to generate grievances among individual soldiers that
must do the bidding of the executive even if they realize that the conflict was not started
on legitimate grounds, but rather only an effort to help the executive maintain his or her
elite status. Foot soldiers are those that must serve on the front lines and are therefore
most likely to be killed or injured by conflict. The military leadership is likely to side
with the executive in such a situation because their elite status is directly tied to the fate
of the leader. If the leader suffers from a rapid decline in public opinion, the military
leadership is also likely to suffer similarly. Even more dramatically, if the leader is facing
the possibility of full scale revolution, military leadership recognizes that such an event
would completely jeopardize their position. Foot soldiers will pay the steepest costs for
diversionary conflict as they are the ones in the field. This discussion leads to the
following hypothesis:
H6: Divisionary war should increase the likelihood of mutinies.
Purges are a final avenue of disagreement between soldiers and the executive.
Purging is a scenario where the executive rids their military apparatus of elites that are
likely to oppose their policy preferences or are seen as potential coup plotters (Sudduth
2015).19 Purges are likely to create a situation where leaders are promoted based upon
loyalty rather than competency (Quinlivan 1999). As such, the newly promoted leaders
are likely to be aligned with the executive because they recognize that they have been

19

Clearly purges are likely to generate grievances among the military leadership that is
purged. However, because they are no longer part of the military apparatus, they cannot
stage a mutiny or a coup. They have simply returned to civilian status. If they were to act
against the government, it would be a form of civilian dissent (e.g., protests, rebellion).
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promoted not necessarily because of skill, but because of allegiance to the executive.
However, soldiers are likely to be angry because they now have relatively ineffective
leaders, as soldiers would prefer a meritocracy than a system of promotion based on
ideology and allegiance. It is hard to know whether promotions are based upon merit or
not, but purges offer a strong indications that the military apparatus is no longer a
meritocracy. As such, I expect that there is a positive relationship between purges and
mutinies.
Cambodia provides an illustrative example of how purges encourage mutinies.
During the later years of the Pol Pot regime, several purges were initiated from 19761978. These purges specifically targeted Hanoi-trained communists and the Sihanouk
supporters within the Royal Government of National Unit of Kampuchea (GRUNK)
(Jackson 1979: 77). Phenom Penh consistently purged the military of higher ranking
officials that presented a threat to the Pol Pot regime. In October of 1978, Cambodian
troops joined various anti-government organizations in different parts of the country to
revolt against the central government in Phenom Penh. Soldiers largely cited that purges
against military officials as a primary grievance (The Globe and Mail 1978). A more
recent example can be seen in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland Somalia.
Mutineers staged a revolt in a garrison near the Galgala Mountains. Soldiers were
protesting months of unpaid salaries, but the mutiny did not pick up until immediately
after Puntland president Abdiweli Muhammad Ali fired a top military commander,
paramilitary members, and other security forces (BBC Monitoring Africa 2015).
A similar dynamic played out in South Sudan in 2014. Air force and military
officers defected from the military and joined the rebels. They stated that their defection
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was a result of lack of diversity and promotion in the military. The officers accused
President Salva Kiir Mayardiit of tribalism and promotion based only loyalty rather than
competency. In a press conference, the defected soldiers said that the state had “… poor
promotion policies. Officers who joined the Air Force in 2007 have never been promoted
and in some situations promotions are based on ethnicity…” and “… training
opportunities for South Sudanese joining the Air Force does not reflect diversity; for
instance, the first batch comprised of 32 pilots, 21 of which were from the Dinka Tribe,
the remaining 63 tribes were represented by just 11 pilots” (Southern Sudan News
Agency 2014). While there were no purges in this scenario, purges create situations of
perceived inequality like the complaints of these soldiers highlight. This logic leads to the
final expectation in this nested structure, which is that purges will spur mutinies.
H7: As an executive orders more purges, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.
Foot Soldiers and Military Leadership as Agents of the Executive (Type 3 Mutinies)
The final nest that will be examined organizes the foot soldiers and military
leadership as collective agents of the executive. This relationship is presented in Figure
3.6 below. This is the most complex nested structure considered. In this nest, I
incorporate all the military actors and a civilian principal. The civilian principal, or the
executive, has an interesting tight rope to walk. The executive needs to maintain power,
but one of the most effective regime securing strategies might encourage mutinies.
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Figure 3.6 Foot Soldiers and Leadership as Agents of Executive

In order to develop expectations about this final nested structure, I return to the
coup literature that examines disposition and ability of military leaders (Powell 2012).
Remember, disposition is essentially asking, “Are military leaders satisfied with the
status quo?” Here, I will focus more squarely on dimensions of ability. Ability asks,
“Even if military leaders are unsatisfied, are they able to coordinate in order to launch a
putsch?” This question is exceedingly relevant in this nested structure. In this nested
structure, shirking can come by way of mutiny or coup, unlike the previous structures
where the only possible outcome was mutiny. The first theoretical expectation put
forward here is that attempts to increase coordination challenges, specifically through the
use of coup proofing, will have a direct unintended consequence. While a leader may
effectively ward of coup attempts by limiting the military’s ability to work across
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branches horizontally, they may accidentally spur mutinies. Through the process of
disaggregation and instilling a general sense of suspension between branches, the leader
increases the odds that soldiers will shirk due to perceptions of unfairness or relative
depravation. Often times, executives create “multiple, overlapping security forces, which
report to the executive through different chains of command” (De Bruin 2017). Such
divisions will spur dissent. Coup proofing measures increase the likelihood that battalions
feel that the executive is showing favoritism to other groups or basing promotion off of
loyalty, rather than competency. Thus, the first expectation I will test in this final nest is
the direct impact that coup proofing measures have on the likelihood of mutinies.
H8: As coup proofing measures increase, the likelihood of a mutiny should
increase.
Coup proofing will not only have a direct linear effect on mutinies. I expect that
under conditions in which scholars have demonstrated coups are more likely, we will see
mutinies given that coordination challenges are too steep to realize a coup. As executives
are likely to take measures to limit the ability of military leaders to launch a coup, the
likelihood of a mutiny will be conditional on the level of coup proofing an executive has
in place. When the entire military apparatus is dissatisfied, we should expect a coup.
However, there may be situations in which the entire military is unsatisfied, but because
the leader has anticipated a coup and implemented preventative measures to safeguard
her tenure, the unsatisfied actors are unable to coordinate. In this scenario, a mutiny is
likely to occur as a result of the coup’s coordination failure. The grievance is still present
and agents are still shirking, but due to coup proofing measures, they cannot successfully
target the executive. There are a number of conditions that are likely to cause wide spread
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grievances in the military apparatus. These conditions are only likely to result in a mutiny
in the face of steep coordination challenges that are a result of coup proofing measures.
Democratization can spur mutinies in this final nested structure. Democratization
presents a unique commitment problem for the executive. Recent democratization makes
it nearly impossible for the executive to credibly commit policies that are favorable for
the military. Because of the introduction of elections, while an executive may be
supportive of the military, there is no way of ensuring that the next executive will be
equally committed to policies that favor the military as an institution. Furthermore, when
the military organization is unsatisfied, it understands that the costs for perpetrating a
coup have been updated in the wake of recent democratization. The military is not apt to
stage a coup recognizing that the international community will respond negatively and
immediately, imposing steep costs for reversing democratization. As Feaver (1999: 215)
writes, “…in a democracy, the hierarchy of de jure authority favors civilians over the
military, even in cases where the underlying distribution of de facto power favors the
military.” As such, the military recognizes that democratization generally means
relinquishing de jure authority, and thus is counter to their institutional interests.
Niger’s path to democratization provides a descriptive example of the dynamics I
outline above. Prior to democratization, the military of Niger was intimately involved in
politics and officers found this relationship to benefit their personal financial status
greatly (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). However, after democratization, the military
budget was constricted to under 1% of the GDP, which left the military replete of the
necessary resources and the individual luxury of side payments (Bratton and Van de
Walle 1997). Not only did this diminished budget effect the individual benefits of
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military officers, it also left them uncertain about the future and concerned about the
potential of an even less supportive executive and legislature. In January 1996,
immediately following this budgetary reduction, the military ousted President Ousmane.
While this event resulted in a coup d’état, I argue that not all patterns of democratization
will result in the apex of military disloyalty due to counterbalancing efforts made by a
forward thinking executive. When levels of coup proofing are high, instead of a coup we
will see a mutiny but for similar dynamics as presented in Niger’s path to
democratization.
Dwyer (2015) argues that democratization in Africa will likely decrease the
probability of military mutinies because of a democracies pluralistic nature that allows
military actors to express their preferences. I counter her claims by arguing that
democratization actually makes the military more uneasy as a result of this commitment
problem. Military leadership does not benefit from the pluralistic nature of democracy in
the same way that other actors in a society might because military leadership already
holds elite status prior to democratization. This discussions yields my next hypothesis:
H9: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences democratization, the
likelihood of a mutiny should also increase.
Human rights violations may also generate rifts between the executive and the
military leadership and foot soldiers. Militaries are challenged by the changing norms of
the international human rights regime. While executives often order repression and
human rights violations, soldiers carry out the bidding of the executive on this matter
(Carey 2006). It is relatively easy for the executive to blame repression on the military,
eliminating their own personal responsibility in the matter. When rights violations come
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to light, it is often military actors that are used as “scapegoats” when in reality they were
simply following orders that were handed down from the executive through military
leadership. As such, when executives order soldiers to commit human rights violations,
the soldiers are uncertain whether the executive will defend their actions should the
violations come to light. This presents a challenging commitment problem that poses a
steep threat to troop loyalty. Although the actors can agree to cooperate today, there is no
guarantee that the executive will not be quick to blame the atrocities on soldiers should
they become public.
Argentina provides an illustrative case of how human rights violations might spur
military disloyalty. In 1987, there were a series of military mutinies under the leadership
of President Raul Alfonsin. General Hector Rios stepped down from his position of
leadership after not being able to put down a series of military rebellions. These
rebellions were motivated by the accused officers who violated human rights under the
previous regime. The soldiers desired blanket amnesty for these officers that were simply
following the bidding of the regime. This tug-of-war between the executive’s desire of
appearing to comply with international norms of human rights standards and the
temptation to betray soldiers that were following orders presents a challenge to military
loyalty, specifically through increasing the likelihood of mutinies.
H10: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences more human rights
violations, the likelihood of a mutiny should also increase.
Overall, this chapter presents a novel theoretical framework that allows scholars
to anticipate mutinies. Unlike past scholarship that uses rather constant conditions (e.g.,
ethnic fragmentation and colonial control) to explain mutinies, this chapter focuses on
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making proximate arguments using highly variable conditions (e.g., democratization,
protests, and purges). By presenting a nested principal agent structure, I creat a typology
of different interactions that lead to different kinds of mutinies. The main contribution of
this chapter is to provide new, parsimonious explanations for why mutinies happen. The
next chapters will examine the expectations presented here empirically. The following
chapter will begin by testing the first set of theoretical expectations. These expectations
are the ones associated with type 1 mutinies, which involve foot soldiers rebelling against
the military leadership.
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018
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Chapter 4: Type 1 Mutinies
This chapter sets out to test the first set of theoretical expectations put forward in
the previous chapter. I will examine the proximate causes of military mutinies that occur
when foot soldiers are serving as agents of the military leadership (see Figure 4.1).
However, because this chapter represents the first effort to systematically predict military
mutinies, I must first spend time exploring contextual factors that likely explain the onset
of mutinies. Thus, I will begin this chapter by exploring a number of covariates that will
be used as control variables for the remaining empirical tests included in this dissertation.
In this chapter, I will first develop a general, baseline model of mutinies. Then I will
conduct the first set of empirical tests of theoretical expectations presented in the
previous chapter.
Figure 4.1: Nest 1, Foot Soldiers as Agents of Military Leadership
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Dependent Variable
To capture the dependent variable, mutiny, I utilize the data collected and described in
Chapter 2. MMDD defines mutiny as observable acts committed by military actors with
the intent to display indiscipline towards leadership in an effort to revise the status quo.
MMDD codes 460 number of mutinies from 1945 – present day, with the majority of
these events occurring in the latter half of this time series.
Covariates of Mutinies
As emphasized previously, there exist no attempts to predict mutinies across space and
time. As a result, I must begin by outlining potential covariates that likely help explain a
state’s propensity for experiencing a mutiny. These covariates will be state level and
military-level factors that influence the general levels of satisfaction among military
personnel.
The first covariate I will hold constant a state’s legacy of military coups. This
variable is called Coups and is a dichotomous indicator of whether a state experienced a
coup attempt in the previous year or not (Powell 2012).20 If a state has experienced
military coups in its past, this signifies that the military has grievances and is willing to
act on them. Such activity indicates a propensity towards disobedience and rebellion.
Coups are generally conducted by commissioned officers of high rank. Similar
indiscipline is likely to be observed and learned by lower-ranking enlisted soldiers.

As a robustness check, I will also run the baseline model examining the impact of
having had a coup in the last 5 years or not.

20
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Because lower ranking soldiers are often unable to launch coups, this learned indiscipline
is likely to only manifest itself in mutiny activity. There is also a strong argument to be
made that coups and mutinies are part of one single, interrelated process. As such, by
controlling for coup activity, we are presenting a confusing illustration of reality. Because
both the arguments for and against controlling for coups are compelling, I will estimate
all models with and without this control variable. I generally find that results are robust to
both specifications, as well as alternate temporal specifications of the coup variable.
The second covariate I will control for is a country’s level of development. In
more traditional civil-military relations work, wealth is known to have a “coupinhibiting” influence (Londregan and Poole 1990; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell
2012). The causal mechanism put forth by these authors is that a strong economy can
strengthen the legitimacy of leadership and thus secure the tenure of the executive. I
expect that a similar logic applies when the outcome of interest is mutinies rather than
coups. As Mantle (2006:32) writes, one way to enhance obedience within the military is
for leadership to develop a strong sense of legitimacy specifically through enhancing
formal authority. One way to enhance formal authority is to offer rewards for good
behavior. Clearly, the ability to offer rewards depends almost entirely on the strength of
the state’s economy and its ability to invest in such measures. Therefore, I anticipate that
a strong economy will have a neutralizing effect on the military either through a direct or
indirect legitimizing mechanism. Thus, GDP (Gleditsch 2002) per capita, logged is
included as a control variable to hold constant the pacifying impact of a strong economy
on the likelihood of mutinies.
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Regime type is another state-level factor that is likely to predict the general
likelihood of mutiny activity. I expect an inverted-U shaped relationship between regime
type and mutinies. Democracies will have few mutinies as will autocracies, while hybrid
regimes will have the most. Militaries in strong democracies are less likely to have
grievances that will lead to indiscipline because there are strong, consolidated
institutional channels for these militaries to secure their corporate interests. Instead of
mutinying, these militaries will turn to legislative bodies with strong legislative processes
to secure their preferences (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002).
On the other side of the spectrum, I anticipate that staunchly authoritarian regimes
also less likely to experience mutinies. Such rigid regimes are often associated with
strong repressive apparatuses that can respond quickly and decisively to such rebellion
(e.g., Escriba-Folch 2013, Frantz and Kindall-Taylor 2014, Bove and Rivera 2015). As
militaries are often complicit in the repressive actions of an executive, these actors know
from firsthand experience that the regime can and will repress (Risee and Skkink 1999).
Thus, military actors in this environment are less likely to test the resolve and ability of
the regime to repress.
Hybrid regimes are likely to experience the most mutinies. As Gandhi and
Przeworksi (2007) argue, in less-staunchly authoritarian regimes, or hybrid-regimes, one
way the executive can ward off rebellion is to rely on partisan legislatures to solicit
cooperation from outsiders. While these nominally democratic institutions shore up
opposition cooperation, they are likely to be ineffectual legislative bodies that exist as a
regime survival mechanism rather than a policy making chamber. Thus, I expect that
militaries in this category have the most to gain by mutinying as institutions do not
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actually exist to serve their intended purpose. For these reasons, I include two variables
Democracy and Autocracy. Democracy takes on the value of 1 if the state has a Polity IV
score of +5 or higher. In contrast, Autocracy takes on the value of 1 if the state has a
Polity IV score of -5 or lower. The excluded category for the analysis is Anocracy which
ranges from Polity IV score of -4 to +4.
In an effort to control for temporal trends, I hold constant Cold War. This variable
is simply a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 during Cold War years and 0
otherwise. As depicted in Chapter 3, mutinies seem to occur more in the post-Cold War
period. While there are many plausible explanations for this rise in mutiny activity, it is
essential to account for empirically. One such explanation is that during the Cold War
period, the rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR held many militaries in the developing
world together as a result of the involvement of these major powers in the developing
world. Additionally, in the post-Cold War era, there are increasingly punitive measures
taken against coup plotters, which might incentivize mutinies versus alternative forms of
military resistance.
Finally, I control for military size which is a military-level factor which likely
helps predict mutinies. Large militaries will have more opportunities for splintering and
divergent preferences. In contrast, small forces will have enhanced cohesion and strongly
aligned preferences among actors. Military Size logged is captured by the total number of
military personnel from the Correlates of War project.21 In order to address temporal
dependence, I control for years since last mutiny, years2, and years3.

21

Military size and military spending are highly correlated (0.68). I include military size
in the baseline model and remaining models as opposed to spending because military size
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Theoretical Expectations to Test
As laid out in Chapter 2, I anticipate that mutinies are likely to arise due to a principal
agent problem between military leadership and foot soldiers. Foot soldiers are likely to
shirk in this particular nest when they feel that military leaders are not securing strategies
that mitigate risk for foot soldiers. Military leadership is largely in charge of battlefield
specific; thus, failures on the battlefield that create dangerous situations for foot soldiers
and increase risk are likely to result in observable shirking. In this chapter, I focus largely
on the failure to secure successful strategy in the context of civil wars. However, these
expectations hold for interstate conflicts as well.
H1: As the intensity of war increases, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.
H2: As the duration of war increases, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.
Research Design
The unit of analysis for this chapter is the country-year. In order to test the
hypotheses above, I again draw my dependent variable from MMDD. This is a
dichotomous measure indicating whether or not a mutiny occurred in a given year. There
are 460 mutiny events in the dataset, but only 392 that fall within the time series of this
analysis, 1946-2015.
The first independent variable I examine is Civil War Intensity. This variable is
drawn from the UCDP/PRIO civil war onset and duration dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002;

has a larger substantive effect than spending. Both variables are significant in the
baseline model. Military spending (p<=.086) has a miniscule effect size. While military
size (P<=.002) has a larger, yet still very small effect size.
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Strand 2006). This is an ordinal variable that is coded 0 if no significant conflict is
occurring in a country-year. Civil War Intensity is coded 1 if there are 25-999 battle
deaths. I label this category “moderate conflict.” Civil War Intensity takes on the value of
2 if there are more than 999 battle deaths in a given country year. I label this category
“intense conflict.” This variable is zero inflated with most country-year observations not
experiencing any significant level of conflict (85%). 10.6% of country-year observations
experience moderately intense conflict. Only 4.4% of country-year observations
experience intense civil conflict.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Civil War Intensity

The next explanatory variable considered in the analysis is Civil War Duration.
This variable is again drawn from the UCDP/PRIO civil war onset and duration dataset
(Gleditsch et al. 2002; Strand 2006). I have created this variable by coding how many
years a particular conflict lasts. This variable can range from 0-67. The maximum value
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of 67 represents the longest lasting conflict in these data which occurred in Myanmar.
This conflict started in 1949 and persisted through 2015. Again, this variable is largely
zero inflated, with 83% of the observations taking on this value.22

Figure 4.3

Baseline Model Results
I begin by evaluating the impact of a number of covariates on the likelihood of
mutinies. All coefficients can be interpreted in the same way, with a positive coefficient
indicating that the likelihood of a mutiny increases as the independent variables increases

22

As a robustness check, I will transform this variable many ways due to the heavy skew.
I will examine the log of this variable and also ordinalize the variable so that one or two
cases are not making it hard to find results. These results will be reported in a separate
robustness table.
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in value. The baseline model largely behaves as anticipated. Figure 4.4 illustrates the
results of the baseline model substantively. This figure displays the change in predicted
probability when considering a change in a given independent variable. The diamonds
represent the point estimate of the predicted probability surrounded by a 95% confidence
interval. To begin, focus on the baseline model (enclosed in box). This represents the
predicted probability of a mutiny given that all continuous independent variables are held
at their means and all dichotomous variables are held at their minimum.
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Results Table 4.1

Baseline
Model

Intensity Model

Duration Model

Full Model

Main Results
Primary Independent
Variables
CW Intensity

0.488***(0.105)

CW Duration

0.445***(0.115)
0.020***(0.007)

0.005(0.010)

State-Level Controls
Coups

0.529**(0.210)

0.443**(0.210)

0.525**(0.215)

0.450**(0.211)

-0.196***(0.071)

-0.158**(0.071)

-0.184***(0.068)

-0.158**(0.070)

0.000**(.000)

0.000**(.000)

0.000**(.000)

0.000**(.000)

Democracy

-0.598***(0.200)

-0.519**(0.217)

-0.599***(0.204)

-0.526**(0.212)

Autocracy

-0.377*(0.220)

-0.318(0.218)

-0.380*(0.225)

-0.323(0.220)

Cold War

-0.624***(0.198)

-0.581***(0.196)

-0.534***(0.201)

-0.564***(0.2)

Years

-0.417***(0.044)

-0.403***(0.044)

-0.411***(0.044)

-0.403***(0.044)

Years2

0.017***(0.003)

0.016***(0.002)

0.017***(0.002)

0.016***(0.002)

Years3

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

GDPPC
Military Size
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Temporal Controls

Table 4.1 continued
Constant
Observations

0.496
(0.483)

-0.0868
(0.531)

0.249
(0.492)

-0.0923
(0.531)

8,156

8,156

8,156

8,156

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
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Figure 4.4

Moving to the left of the baseline prediction, there are three factors that are seen
to increase the likelihood of a mutiny. The variable that increases the likelihood of a
mutiny most dramatically is a history of military coups. If a state moves from
experiencing no coups in a given year to experiencing one additional coup, this increases
the likelihood of a military mutiny by 65% over the baseline predicted probability. This is
likely because coups are capturing a state’s military’s underling predisposition to get
involved in politics and act in indiscipline. The next most important factor that increases
a state’s propensity for mutinies is its overall wealth. Falling in the 5th percentile of
GDPPC increases the states likelihood of experiencing a mutiny by 54% over the
baseline predicted probability. This finding makes sense because often militaries mutiny
when they are concerned with corporate interests or resources. Richer states are better
able to alleviate these types of grievances than poor states. The next factor that increases
the probability of a mutiny is the state’s military size. However, this effect is smaller than
the other two previously discussed. Falling in the 95th percentile of military size
increases the likelihood of a state experiencing a mutiny by 16% over the baseline
predicted probability.
All point estimates to the right of the baseline predicted probability (highlighted
by box) are factors that are associated with a diminished likelihood of a state
experiencing a mutiny. Having a small military decreases the predicted probability of a
mutiny. Dictatorships are less likely to experience mutinies than semi-democratic regions
which is the baseline scenario presented here. Rich countries are less likely to experience
mutinies. By falling in the 95% of GDPPC, a state can reduce its likelihood of
experiencing a mutiny by 39% compared to the baseline predicted probability.
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Democracies are less likely to experience mutinies than semi-democracies. As mentioned
previously, this result is driven by the fact that democracies have consolidated
institutional avenues for militaries to secure their interests. Finally, the Cold War era saw
fewer mutinies than the post-Cold War era.
Intensity and Duration Results
In the subsequent models, I test the independent and additive effects of civil war
intensity and duration on the likelihood of mutinies. First, the Intensity model seeks to
uncover the relationship between intense conflict and the likelihood of foot soldiers
shirking by way of a mutiny. The positive and significant coefficient in Results Table 4.1
indicates strong support for this expectation that particularly bloody conflict will
incentivize shirking.
Figure 4.5 displays the substantive results from the Intensity model. This figure
plots the change in predicted probability as the value of the Intensity variable changes.
The first point estimate displayed is the baseline scenario of no conflict. As the Intensity
variable changes from a value of 0 (no conflict) to a value of 1 (moderate conflict), the
likelihood of a mutiny increases by 58%. As the Intensity variable increases in value,
moving from the baseline scenario of no conflict to the most intense conflict with greater
than 999 battle deaths, the probability of a mutiny increases by 156%. These substantive
impacts demonstrate that a state experiencing particularly intense civil war is most
predisposed to mutinies. States experiencing some conflict, but not extremely bloody
conflict, are more likely to experiencing mutinies than states that are experiencing no
conflict at all.
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Figure 4.5

*Predicted probabilities are calculated using Intensity model in Results Table 4.1.

The Duration model explores the relationship between long lasting civil conflicts
and the likelihood of foot soldier shirking in the form of mutinies. The expectation here
was that long lasting conflict will incentivize shirking as foot soldiers blame military
leadership for poor strategy. Due to risk aversion, foot soldiers will protest continued
fighting. Again, in Results table 4.1, I find support for the independent effect of duration
as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient.
Figure 4.6 shows the change in simulated predicted probability as civil war
durations changes value. The figure displays the change in the dependent variable as we
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move from the minimum value of duration through the maximum value (with 25th-75th
percentiles displayed). There seems to be only a mild increase in the likelihood of
mutinies as we move from the minimum value of duration to the 25th and 50th percentile.
However, as duration moves to the other end of the distribution, there is a larger effect.
Moving from the 50th percentile of duration to the 75th percentile of duration, there is a
9% increase in the likelihood of a mutiny. As we move from the 50th percentile to the
maximum duration of civil conflict, there is an 88% increase in the propensity for a state
to experience a mutiny. Thus, a state like Myanmar in 2015 (which holds the maximum
value for civil war duration) is 8 times more likely to experience a mutiny than a state
that only experiences a year of civil war.
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Figure 4.6

*Predicted probabilities calculated from Duration model in Results Table 4.1.
In the full model (see Results Table 4.1) that considers the impact of civil war
intensity and duration simultaneously, I find that the effect for duration disappears. When
considering both of the dimensions at the same time, only intensity appears to have a
statistically significant impact on the likelihood of mutinies. I explored the interactive
effect of these two variables, but found that it is not statistically significant (p-value =
0.843). Due to fears of multicollinearity, I examined the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

90

between duration and intensity. However, upon investigation it appears that they are not
as mulitcollinear as expected.23
Robustness
I included coups as a control variable to hold constant the general state of civil military
relations in a country. However, it is possible that coups are mutinies are closely
interrelated processes, and as such the inclusion of this control variable is problematic. I
re-estimated the model excluding this variable from the analysis to ensure that my results
are robust to this specification. I find that the primary independent of variables behave
exactly the same with or without the coup variable in the model. Likewise, the controls in
the baseline model do not seem to be responsive to the inclusion or exclusion of this
variable. Thus, I conclude that this variable does not seem to be driving my results.
Because there are solid theoretical reasons to suspect that a state’s history of coups
matters for predicting mutinies, I will keep this variable in the baseline model.

23

The VIF is reported to be 1.80. The Square Root VIF is 1.34. The correlation between
the two variables is 0.668.
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Results Table 4.2
No Coup Variable Specification

Baseline Model

Intensity Model

Duration Model

Full Model

Primary Independent Variables
CW Intensity

0.499***(0.105)

CW Duration

0.462***(0.116)
0.020***(0.007)

0.004(0.010)

-0.162**(0.07) -0.189***(0.067)

-0.162**(0.069)

State-Level Controls
GDPPC
Military Size

-0.201***(0.071)
0.000*(.000)

0.000**(.000)

0.000*(.000)

0.000**(.000)
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Democracy

-0.626***(0.195)

-0.539**(0.214) -0.626***(0.199) -0.546***(0.209)

Autocracy

-0.382*(0.219)

-0.319(0.216)

Cold War

-0.597***(0.198)

-0.557***(0.194)

Years

-0.419***(0.044)

-0.404***(0.044) -0.413***(0.044) -0.404***(0.044)

Years2

0.017***(0.003)

0.016***(0.002)

0.017***(0.003)

0.016***(0.002)

Years3

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

-0.384*(0.224)

-0.324(0.218)

Temporal Controls

Constant

0.579
(0.477)

-0.0273
(0.523)

-0.506**(0.2) -0.542***(0.198)

0.331
(0.485)

-0.0313
(0.522)

Table 4.2 continued
Observations

8,156
8,156
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

8,156

8,156
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In an effort to explore the coup variable more thoroughly, I also reestimate the
models using an alternative specification in Results Table 4.3. Instead of looking at the
effect of a coup in the previous year, I explore the impact of having a coup attempt in the
previous two years. When using this specification, all the same findings appear in the
results table. However, the coup variable falls out of significance. The conclusion here is
that coups have a very immediate effect on the likelihood of mutinies. When we consider
a longer timeline, coups no longer help predict mutinies. Thus, for the remainder of this
dissertation, I will include the original coup variable which codes whether or not a coup
occurred in the previous year.
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Results Table 4.3
Alternative Coup Speciation

Baseline Model

Intensity Model

Duration Model

Full Model

Primary Independent Variables
Intensity

0.497***(.105)

Duration

0.460***(.116)
0.02(.007)***

0.004(.01)

State Level Controls
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Coup (within 2 years)

0.127(.17)

0.033(.179)

0.112(.174)

0.038(.179)

GDPPC

-0.197***(.07)

-0.161**(.07)

-0.186***(.067)

-0.161***(.069)

Military Size

0.000*(.000)

0.000**(.000)

0.000**(.000)

0.000**(.000)

Democracy

-0.617***(.2)

-0.538**(.217)

-0.618***(.204)

-0.544**(.212)

Autocracy

-0.382*(.219)

-0.319(.217)

-0.385*(.224)

-0.324(.218)

Cold War

-0.606***(.198)

-0.559***(.195)

-0.515**(.2)

-0.545***(.199)

Years

-0.419***(.044)

-0.404***(.044)

-0.413***(.044)

-0.404***(.044)

Years2

0.017***(.003)

0.016***(.002)

0.017***(.003)

0.016***(.002)

Years3

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

Constant

0.534
(0.475)

-0.0376
(0.520)

0.292
(0.482)

-0.0433
(0.521)

Observations

8,156

8,156

8,156

8,156

Temporal Controls

Table 4.3 Continued
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<
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As an additional robustness check, I estimate the same models including various
dummy variables for regions. It is possible that particular regions are having a strong
influence over these findings. The excluded category for this analysis is Europe. The
results demonstrate that the Middle East is the only statistically significant region when
compared to Europe in the baseline model. In the full model, the Americas are significant
and negative, suggesting that compared to European countries, these states are less likely
to experience mutinies during intense or long lasting civil war. What is particularly
important about this robustness table is that the results of the baseline model do not
change when including regional dummies. Furthermore, I find stronger support for my
primary independent variables of interest when I include the regional dummies. This
suggests that my main findings are not driven by a certain region. My findings are robust
to a specification that considers that regions may have heterogeneous impacts on the
likelihood of mutinies.
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Results Table 4.4
Regional Dummies

Baseline Model

Intensity Model

Duration Model

Full Model

Primary Independent Variables
CW Intensity

0.458***(.114)

CW Duration

0.449***(.124)
0.494**(.218)

0.418**(.211)

State-Level Controls
0.502**(.215)

0.416**(.21)

-0.244***(.08)

-0.202***(.079)

GDPPC

0.253***(.084)

-0.202**(.079)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

Military Size

0.000**(.000)

0.000***(.000)

-0.496***(.19)

-0.428**(.203)

Democracy

-0.47**(.195)

-0.426**(.208)

-0.486**(.215)

-0.431**(.211)

Autocracy

-0.505**(.21)

-0.431**(.211)

0.497***(.189)

-0.532***(.188)

Africa

0.209(.298)

0.288(.278)

-0.108(.295)

-0.03(.285)

Asia

0.026(.296)

-0.024(.284)

0.698**(.297)

0.742**(.308)

Middle East

0.876***(.301)

0.75**(.305)

0.125(.286)

0.204(.281)

Americas

0.173(.281)

0.207(.279)

0.405***(.045)

-0.397***(.045)
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Coup

Regional Controls

Table 4.4 Continued
Temporal Controls
Cold War

0.577***(.185)

0.536***(.185)

0.17(.281)

0.284(.275)

Years

0.411***(.044)

0.397***(.045)

0.016***(.003)

0.016***(.003)

Years2

0.017***(.003)

0.016***(.003)

0.000***(.000)

-0.000***(.000)

Years3

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.017**(.007)

0.001(.01)

Constant

0.587
(0.738)

-0.0668
(0.734)

0.462
(0.703)

-0.0615
(0.721)

8,156

8,156

99

8,156
8,156
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As a final robustness measure, I take a deeper dive into exploring the duration
variable. As presented in Figure 4.3, this variable is zero inflated with a dramatic skew.
In order to ensure that one or two cases is not driving the results, I create an ordinal
variable from the quartiles of the duration variable. The results are presented below in
Results Table 4.5. As presented, the main findings are largely the same. Intensity still has
a positive and significant effect across all models. This new duration variable has a
positive and significant independent effect. However, it falls out of significance when
included in the full model. In this specification the sign flips, but due to the lack of
statistical significance, this is not too alarming. All in all, the main results to hold up to a
number of alternate specifications.
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Results Table 4.5
Quartiles of Duration

Baseline Model

Intensity Model

Duration Model

Full Model

Primary Independent Variables
Intensity

0.488***(.105)

Quartiles of Duration

0.728***(.148)
0.159**(.065)

-0.146(.105)

State Level Controls
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Coup

0.529**(.21)

0.443**(.21)

0.479**(.209)

0.450**(.209)

GDPPC

-0.196***(.071)

-0.158**(.07)

-0.172**(.072)

-0.161**(.072)

Military Size

0.000**(.000)

0.000**(.000)

0.000**(.000)

0.000**(.000)

Democracy

-0.598***(.2)

-0.519**(.217)

-0.570***(.211)

-0.509**(.214)

Autocracy

-0.377*(.22)

-0.318(.218)

-0.343(.223)

-0.321(.219)

Cold War

-0.624***(.198)

-0.581***(.196)

-0.612***(.198)

-0.577***(.196)

Years

-0.417***(.044)

-0.403***(.044)

-0.398***(.044)

-0.411***(.046)

Years2

0.017***(.003)

0.016***(.002)

0.016***(.002)

0.017***(.003)

Years3

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

Constant

0.496
(0.483)

-0.0868
(0.531)

-0.0721
(0.584)

0.148
(0.605)

Temporal Controls

Table 4.5 Continued
Observations

8,156
8,156
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

8,156

8,156
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Directions for Future Research
This chapter presents evidence that militaries are particularly prone to splintering in the
face of long lasting or particularly blood civil war. In conducting the analysis for this
chapter, I developed a number of ideas for future research projects. Recently there has
been a dramatic influx in the number of projects that examine the sub-national
characteristics of civil conflict. There are several datasets that code the sub-national
geographic dispersion of civil conflict intensity (e.g., ACLED and UCDP GED). MMDD
is also geocoded, giving the user the ability to locate precisely where mutiny events are
occurring. In the future, I would like to examine the relationship between intense fighting
in particular sub-national units and the likelihood of a mutiny occurring in a proximate
location. This would lend further evidence to the notion that intense conflict is indeed a
proximate cause of mutinies, rather than just a correlate. By zooming in and examining
the geographic proximity of these two processes, it might even be possible to test specific
causal mechanisms that lead soldiers to mutiny in the face of intense conflict.
I limited this analysis to civil conflict. However, there are no reasons to suspect
these theoretical expectations would not hold for interstate conflict. In the future, I intend
to expand this analysis to interstate conflict. I have considered that MID escalation
captures this idea of “bad strategy” well. If military leaders are utilizing effective
strategy, MIDs should not escalate. However, due to miscalculations or errors, MIDs may
escalate, drawing foot soldiers into conflict. In coding MMDD, I observed that most of
the cases of mutiny in consolidated democracies came during war times. Very rarely do
consolidated democracies experience mutinies without being actively involved in an
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interstate war. Thus, I think this avenue of future research is likely to yield powerful
explanations for when and why consolidated democracies experience military rebellions.
Conclusion
In this chapter I presented a baseline model for predicting mutinies. I found that there are
a number of state-level factors and temporal dynamics that help predict the occurrence of
mutinies. I then set out to test the theoretical expectations that predict Type 1 mutinies, or
mutinies that occur when foot soldiers are displeased with the actions and decisions of
military leadership. I found strong support for my two primary theoretical expectations.
First, I found that particularly bloody civil conflict increases the likelihood of a state
experiencing a mutiny. Second, there is evidence that long lasting civil conflict also spur
type 1 mutinies, although the intensity finding has more support. This chapter confirms
anecdotal evidence that civil war countries, like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, are indeed
more mutiny prone than their peaceful counterparts.

Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018
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Chapter 5: Type 2 Mutinies
Scholars still lack a complete understanding of the determinants of military
mutinies. The goal of this chapter is to explore a particular type of mutinies, specifically
those that arise when foot soldiers and the executive have a divergence of goals. While
the previous chapter focused on mutinies that arise between the military leadership and
foot soldiers, this chapter will examine rifts in preferences between civilian principals
and foot soldier agents, as depicted in figure 5.1. As laid out in Chapter 2, I argue that
mutinies are likely to arise in a nested principal agent model when actors have divergent
preferences or agents are asked to carry out extremely costly and risky endeavors. Below
I will summarize the expectations I derived in Chapter 2 that I will test in this chapter.
Figure 5.1: Nest 2, Foot Soldiers as Agents of the Executive
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Theoretical Expectations to Test
Shirking in this particular nest of the nested principal agent model will come by way of
mutiny, since foot soldiers alone rarely launch a coup (Thyne and Powell 2014). In
chapter 2, I outlined the logic of several testable expectations that flow from this
theoretical framework. Specifically, I am looking for scenarios that will generate a rift
between the goals of the foot soldiers and those of the executive. Below are the
hypotheses I outlined in chapter 2:
H1: Military Regimes are more likely to experience mutinies than other types of regimes.
H2: As expenditures per soldier decrease, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.
H3: As a state experiences more protests, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.
H4: Peaceful Protests are more likely to spur mutinies than violent protests.
H5: Diversionary war should increase the likelihood of mutinies.
H6: Executive ordered purging should increase the likelihood of mutinies.
Research Design
In this analysis, the unit of analysis will be the country-year. The dependent
variable is again drawn from MMDD, and is a dichotomous indicator of annual mutinies.
This variable takes on the value of 1if a mutiny occurred in a given year and 0 otherwise.
Chapter 2 outlines many details about the nature and distribution of this variable.
The independent variables of interest for this chapter are drawn from various
sources. To begin, the military regime variable is drawn from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
(2012). The Military Regime variable is dichotomous with a zero indicating some regime
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type besides a military regime and a value of 1 indicating the presence of a military
regime. Only 7.49% (881 cases of 11,763) of all regime-years are military regimes,
making military regimes a rarity. Table 5.1 displays the distribution of military regimes
across region. The Americas have had more military regimes than other regions, followed
by Asia and Africa.
Table 5.1
Distribution of Military Regime Variable across Regions
% of all
regimes in
region that
are military
regimes

Americas
14.4%

Asia
11.4%

Africa
8.26%

Middle East
4.2%

Europe
.002%

The protest measure comes from The Social, Political, and Economic Events
Database (SPEED) (Nardulli et al. 2014). This dataset codes “destabilizing humaninitiated” events, which include many acts beyond protests. For this reason, I limit the
analysis only to protests events carried out by non-state entities targeted at the state. The
Protest Count variable is a count of the total number of protest events in a given countryyear. This variable can range from 0-214. The maximum value of this variable occurred
in the U.S. in 1971 at the height of anti-Vietnam protests.
The next hypothesis I will evaluate considers the nature of a protest event. I
anticipate that peaceful and violent protests have different effects on the likelihood of
mutinies. I expect that peaceful protests will be more likely to encourage mutinies
because the cost of repressing peaceful protestors is much higher than the cost of
repressing violent protestors. Fortunately, the SPEED data include a variable that codes
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whether or not a protest was violent based upon the use of weapons. This categorical
variable actually codes what specific instrument was used (e.g., gun, improvised
explosive, fire, blunt instruments, etc.). However, because my theory does not suggest
that different weapons should have different effects, I collapse this categorical variable to
capture whether or not a weapons was used in any of the protest events in a given
country-year. I create three categories for the analysis: No Protests, Violent Protests, and
Peaceful Protests.
Next, I examine the effect of executive ordered Purges on military mutinies. I
draw from Sudduth (2015). These data make a large contribution to the field by allowing
scholars to examine purges empirically. However, the dataset has somewhat limited
temporal coverage (1969-2003) when compared to the full time series in my analysis
(1946-2015). Despite the limited temporal coverage, I leverage these data as they are the
best opportunity to examine executive ordered purges. Sudduth imposes a rule that states
that in order for an event to be a purge it must meet one of the following criteria: the
executive eliminates rival elites (1) who have support from other elites (2) who have
different policy preferences than the executive (3) who been suspected to plot the
overthrown of the executive (Sudduth 2015:18). Figure 5.2 displays the distribution of
purges across regions. African executives appear to be utilizing this regime securing
mechanism more than executives in other regions, followed by those in the Middle East
and Asia.
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Figure 5.2: Purges by Region

My final expectation is that divisionary conflict will spur military mutinies
because they present scenarios where the executive benefits from conflict by
experiencing a boost in public opinion, but the foot soldiers do not experience a benefit.
In contrast, the foot soldiers experience steep costs as conflict imposes risk on them. In
order to proxy for diversionary conflict, I follow Mitchell and Thyne (2010).24 I create an
interaction term using dispute initiation and an indicator for poor domestic, economic
conditions. The basic intuition here is that an executive initiating conflict during
economic downturns is likely trying to distract domestic constituencies from the present
economic failures through the use of divisionary tactics.

24

Their unit of analysis is directed dyads. Here I simplify and maintain the country-year unit of analysis.
This means that a MID will only be coded for the initiator state.
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The MID variable is coded 1 if a state initiates a dispute in a given year (Jones et
al. 1996). In order to measure domestic turmoil, the CPI variable captures the percentage
change in a state’s World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Mitchell and Prins 2004;
Mitchell and Powell 2010). This measure is a common proxy for domestic economic
conditions and offers better data availability than more direct measures, like
unemployment or investment (e.g., Mitchell and Thyne 2010; Ostrom and Job 1986;
James and O’Neal 1991). I then interact these two terms together to get a proxy for
diversionary conflict. This measure has limited temporal coverage compared to the other
primary independent variables of interests.
I estimate a logistic regression with standard errors clustered by country. All
independent variables are lagged. I include time since last mutiny, time since last
mutiny2, and time since last mutiny3 to account for temporal dependency (Carter and
Signorino 2010). I use all same control variables that are outlined in Chapter 4. These
are: Coups, GDPPC, Military Size, Cold War.
Results
Results Table 5.1 shows the effect of the primary independent variables of
interest. This table excludes the final hypotheses regarding divisionary conflict due to the
fact that this variable is temporally limited. The results for the final hypothesis can be
found in Results table 5.2. The first hypothesis I set out to test was whether or not
military regimes are more mutiny prone. The results suggest that military regimes are not
more mutiny prone than other regime types. In the final full model, military regimes
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become marginally significant but work in the opposite direction as expected. Thus, I do
not find support for the expectation that military regimes will be most predisposed to
mutinies.
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Results Table 5.2

Military
Regime

Protest Count

Protest Nature

Purges

Full Model
with Protest
Count

Full Model
with Protest
Nature

Primary Independent
Variables
Military Regime

-0.473(0.324)

Protest Count

-0.804**(.382) -0.908**(.387)
0.016***(.005)

Violent Protests

0.019***(.005)
0.831***(.233)

0.739***(.248)
Prob
> chi2
= =0.463
0.299
Prob
> chi2

Prob > chi2 =0.362

Peaceful Protests

0.552**(.258)
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Military Purges

0.391(.274)
0.411(.398)

0.604(.429)

0.279(.381)

0.355(.232)

0.264(.326)

0.258(.325)

State Level Controls
Coups
GDPPC
Military Size

0.414(.260)

0.482**(.24)

0.418(.258)

0.197***(.073) 0.232***(.073) -0.256***(.073) 0.249***(.082) 0.273***(.084) 0.265***(.083)
0.000***(.000)

0.000(.000)

0.000***(.000) 0.001***(.000)

0.000(.000)

0.000**(.000)

Democracy

-0.698**(.278) -0.738**(.297) -0.655**(.329)

-0.519(.322)

-0.639*(0.35)

-0.593**(.359)

Autocracy

-0.55**(.225)

-0.409(.254)

-0.216(.25)

-0.216(.255)

-0.471(.292)

-0.472*(.265)

-0.408*(.225)

-0.486**(.233)

Temporal Controls
Cold War

-0.518**(.205) 0.763***(.218) -0.623***(.215) -0.425**(.244)

Table 5.2 Continued
Years

0.438***(.047) 0.418***(.049) 0.433***(.053)) 0.412***(.053) 0.421***(.054) 0.427***(.061)

Years2

0.02***(.003) 0.018***(.003) 0.020***(.003) 0.018***(.003) 0.018***(.003) 0.020***(.003)

Years3

0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000)

113

Constant

0.463
(0.464)

Observations

11,872

0.699
(0.467)

0.334
(0.516)

0.487
(0.547)

12,878
11,619
9,778
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.824
(0.539)

0.461
(0.578)

9,090

8,646

Protests do increase the likelihood of a state experiencing mutinies, as
hypothesized. The positive and significant coefficient indicates support for my second
hypothesis. Figure 5.3 displays the substantive effects. Here, using simulated predicted
probabilities obtained through clarify, I plot the change in predicted probabilities given a
change in the number of protests a state experiences in a given year. There is a 7.8%
change in the predicted probability of a mutiny given that a state moves from
experiencing no protests to experiencing 5 protest a year. Moving from the baseline of no
protests to 10 additional protests, there is an 18.4% change in the predicted probability of
a mutiny. If a state moves from experiencing no protests to experiencing 25 additional
protests, the likelihood of a mutiny jumps by 48.3%. Finally, moving from the baseline of
no protests to 50 protests, the predicted probability of a mutiny changes by a dramatic
126.8%.
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Figure 5.3

*Predicted probabilities calculated from protest count model in Results Table 5.1.

I theorized that different types of protests would encourage mutinies more than
others. Specifically, I expected that peaceful protests would encourage mutinies due to
the high costs associated with repressing peaceful dissenters. However, the results
suggest that both peaceful and violent protests predict mutinies and one is not a better
predictor than the other (Probability chi2 = 0.362).25 I do not include Protest Count,
Peaceful Protests, and Violent Protests in the same model due to issues of collinearity. I
present full models, one which includes the protest count variable and one which includes

25

This reports the chi2 of β for each variable.
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the two protest nature variables. In the full model considering protest nature, we see that
the difference between violent protests and peaceful protests is indistinguishable from
zero. Thus, there is no evidence that peaceful protests encourage mutinies over violent
protests. Both types predict mutinies, but one no more than the other.
Military purges fail to achieve statistical significance. The coefficient is positive
as expected, but the effect is indistinguishable from zero. There a few possible
explanations for this null finding. First, it is possible that the effect of purging is
immediate. In other words, there is not temporal lag and the mutiny occurs immediately
after the purge. However, upon investigating this, I do not find support even when
estimating the model with no lag of the independent variable, although the p-value does
get closer to reaching statistical significance. Second, it is important to note that these
data are temporally restricted. The dataset only covers 1969-2003. This limited coverage
may be making it challenging to find results. I estimated this model for each region to see
if there are heterogeneous effects across different that are washing out results (reported in
Results Table 5.3). Interestingly, the coefficient is only positive and significant in the
Americas. For every other region there is no statistical significance, although Africa and
the Middle East are close to achieving significance.
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Results Table 5.3

(1)
Europe

(2)
Africa

(3)
Middle East

(4)
Asia

(5)
Americas

Military Purges

0.158(.794)

-1.00(.622)

-0.755(.462)

0.368(1.082)

1.774**(.804)

Coup

0.687(1.735)

0.063(.388)

-0.390(.962)

0.535(.596)

1.026(.684)

GDPPC

-0.508(.369)

-0.248(.224)

-0.5(.31)

-0.538**(.24)

-0.455(.306)

Military Size

0.002***(.001)

0.005(.004)

-0.001(.002)

0.000*(.000)

0.001*(.000)

Democracy

-0.872(.693)

-0.346(.334)

1.919(1.477)

-1.293(.833)

0.592(.986)

Autocracy

-0.276(.850)

0.439(.386)

0.531(.82)

-0.634(.407)

-1.298*(.709)

Cold War

-1.668**(.676)

-1.724***(.477)

-1.349*(.744)

1.182***(.337)

0.689(.461)

Years

-0.361*(.209)

-0.463***(.01)

-0.456***(.095)

-0.324***(.099)

-0.390**(.18)

Years2

0.016**(.008)

0.023***(.006)

0.025***(.007)

0.011**(.005)

0.020**(.01)

Years3

-0.000**(.000)

-0.000***(.000)

-0.000***(.000)

-0.000*(.000)

-0.000*(.000)

Constant

1.782
(2.364)

0.576
(1.349)

2.501
(2.056)

1.199
(1.616)

-0.117
(2.553)

Observations

2,153

1,155

3,480

1,898
1,092
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.

In Results Table 5.4, I display the results for the diversionary theory hypothesis. I
find support for the expectation that divisionary conflict will incentivize mutinies by
creating scenarios where executives benefit from conflict while soldiers suffer. Figure 5.4
presents the substantive results from this model. I have split the results by two
dimensions. Each point estimate represents a maximum or minimum value of a
constitutive term (e.g., maximum or minimum value on MID variable and maximum or
minimum value on CPI variable). The figure is split so point estimates on the left side of
the figure represent the minimum values on the CPI variable, or situations of economic
downturn. Point estimates on the right of the figure represent scenarios of a strong
domestic economy or the maximum value on the CPI variable. The X-axis alters the
value on the MID variable, creating scenarios of conflict and no conflict. As the figure
displays, scenarios of conflict during economic downturns are associated with the highest
predicted probabilities of military mutinies. Good economic conditions seem to ward off
mutinies. However, in the context of a strong domestic economy, states that experience
conflict are more likely to experience mutinies than those that do not. What is most
important in figure 5.4 is that the interaction of conflict and an economic downturn spurs
mutinies.
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Interaction

Full Model w/
Protest Count

Full Model w/
Protest Nature

-0.402*(.227)

-0.427*(.221)

-0.457*(.234)

0.655(.517)

0.970**(.472)

0.811(.513)

-0.075(.055)

-0.095(.058)

-0.01(.07)

Military Regime

-2.050**(.874)

-1.943**(.887)

Protest Count

0.024***(.007)

Results Table 5.4

MIDs

% ΔCPI

Primary Independent
Variables
Diversionary Conflict
MID Initiated

-0.112(.378)
-0.083(.056)

% ΔCPI
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Peaceful Protests

0.456(.710)

Violent Protests

0.989*(.588)

Military Purges

1.660**(.74)

1.247*(.691)

State Level Controls
Coups

0.812(.543)

0.724(.521)

0.698(.532)

0.764(.544)

0.841(.527)

GDPPC

-0.404(.279)

-0.442(.276)

-0.433(.274)

-0.388(.276)

-0.530*(.295)

Military Size

0.001***(.000)

0.001***(.000)

0.001***(.000)

-0.000(.001)

0.001**(.000)

Democracy

-0.447(.678)

-0.426(.709)

-0.433(.719)

-0.264(.77)

-0.058(.762)

Table 5.4 Continued
Autocracy

-1.333***(.458)

-1.42***(.482)

-1.435***(.496)

-1.470***(.448)

-1.302***(.471)

Cold War

-0.751*(.39)

-1.139***(.404)

-1.170***(.406)

-1.144***(.385)

-0.993***(.381)

Years

-0.537***(.116)

-0.552***(.12)

-0.555***(.121)

-0.544***(.128)

-0.480***(.135)

Years2

0.027***(.007)

0.027***(.008)

0.027***(.008)

0.026***(.007)

0.0239***(.008)

Years3

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000***(.000)

0.000**(.000)

Constant

1.782
(2.144)

2.679
(2.353)

2.611
(2.357)

2.434
(2.270)

2.495
(2.510)

Observations

5,587

5,424

5,424

Temporal Controls
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5,587
5,587
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 5.4
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*Predicted probabilities calculated from Interaction model in Results table 5.3.

Ideas for Future Research
In this chapter I consider the impact of protests on mutinies. I theorized that
peaceful protests will be more likely to spur mutinies than violent protests because the
cost of repression will be steeper. There are other ways to measure the varying cost of
repression for soldiers and the executive. I would like to carry out an analysis that
examines the impact of having ethnic kin of soldiers protesting. For example, in Syria in
2011, Sunni soldiers refused orders to repress dissenters because they identified
ethnically and culturally with these protesters. Anecdotally, there are many cases of
mutiny that are spurred by ethnic considerations (e.g., Nigeria 1967, Uganda 1977, CAR
1996, Niger 1997). I hope to explore this relationship between shared ethnic identity
between soldiers and civilians and the likelihood of mutinies when repressive strategies
are deployed.
I found support for my expectation about divisionary conflicts spurring mutinies.
However, there are many proxies for diversionary conflict. I would like to expand this
analysis to include several more types of diversion. For example, diversion might happen
during economic downturns, but it may also happen during scandals – which are easily
observed by soldiers – making the diversion perhaps more obvious. With diversion being
more obvious, the costs imposed on soldiers should be more obvious, thus making
military rebellion more likely.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the determinants of type 2 mutinies, or those that occur when foot
soldiers experience high costs and point their discontent at the executive. I theorized that
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scenarios that benefit the executive and impose steep costs on the soldiers are likely to
spur this type of mutiny. I found evidence that protests (both violent and peaceful)
increase the likelihood of mutinies. I also found evidence that military purges in the
Americas drives mutinies, but do not seem to matter in other regions. Finally, I found
evidence that diversionary tactics used by the executive encourage foot soldiers to
mutiny.
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018
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Chapter 6: Type 3 Mutinies
This chapter will present the final empirical tests of the last set of theoretical
expectations, which considers an interesting strategic calculation for the executive. As
Feaver (2003) established, the central issue with civil military relations is that executives
need strong militaries to ward off both domestic and international threats. However, in
strengthening their military, they increase the chances that a strong, capable military will
turn against the executive and use its new-found power to usurp the civilian power. This
final nest (Figure 6.1) includes all the actors in the military apparatus. Because military
leadership are included in the interaction, coup plotting is a realistic option for
disgruntled military actors who may seek to oust civilian principals. However, executives
are forward thinking and will act in an effort to limit this type of conspiratorial behavior.
In seeking to introduce new coordination challenges, the executive may be spurring a
new type of dissent: mutinies.
Figure 6.1: Foot Soldiers and Leadership as Agents of Executive
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It is well established that executives are concerned with the military’s ability to
coordinate against them, and thus take measures to limit the military’s ability to
coordinate (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011, Powell 2012). It is also well established that coup
proofing can limit military effectiveness (e.g., Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Brooks 2006;
Pilster and Bohmelt 2011). I expect that there is yet another unintended consequence of
coup proofing. Given that the inherent purpose of coup proofing is to factionalize the
military to raise coordination obstacles, I expect that these measures will increase the
military’s likelihood of experiencing a mutiny. I also expect that in the context of high
coup proofing, situations that are known to spur widespread military dissatisfaction,
should instead predispose a state to suffering from mutinies rather than coups. While this
type of pervasive and general dissatisfaction should traditionaly result in coup activity,
the regime-securing strategy of coup proofing will prevent such coordination. Instead of
large scale conspiracy, we will observe lower level military rebellions in the context of
high coup proofing.
Theoretical Expectations to Test
The expectations I set out to test in this chapter are:
H8: As coup proofing measures increase, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.
H9: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences democratization, the
likelihood of a mutiny will also increase.
H10: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences more human rights
violations, the likelihood of a mutiny will also increase.
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Research Design
The dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomous indicator of mutinies. As
with previous chapters, the unit of analysis is country-year. The first expectation I set out
to test is the impact of coup proofing on military rebellions. The coup proofing literature
presents various measures for coup proofing. Most of them are temporally limited and
difficult to interpret. The shortcomings of these measures are recognized by other
scholars (e.g., De Bruin 2017, Reiter working paper). The authors point out that while
coup proofing is conceptually clear, it can be a very challenging concept to capture
empirically and quantitatively. However, despite these shortcomings, I will utilize extant
coup proofing measures. Below I will describe each measure that I include in Results
Table 6.1.
The first coup proofing measure I include in the analysis is CB Count. This
variable is a count of the counterweight forces in a given year within a single country that
fulfill these criteria: “(1) it is independent from military command. (2) the force is
deployed within 60 miles of the capital which ensures it has at least to possibility to
intercept a coup.” Balancing is simply the natural log transformation of the CB Count
variable. New CB is a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a new counterweight was
created in a given year. De Bruin (2017) uses 1,200 primary and secondary sources in the
coding of these data. One major drawback of these measures is that they are only
available for 65 randomly selected states between 1960-2010. While the sample is
random and representative, users may still be worried that there is something
systematically different about this sample from the population. However, the advantages
of these data far outweigh the drawbacks.
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The most established and commonly used coup proofing measures were
developed by Pilster and Bohmelt (2011). By expanding Belkin and Schofer’s (2003)
coup proofing measure, Pilster and Bohmelt develop a measure called counterbalancing,
which is the ratio of military to paramilitary organizations. The second measure
developed by Pilster a Bohmelt includes a count of ground capable organizations, or
those that could theoretically be expected to combat a coup or deter a coup attempt. This
variable is called Effective Organization. Finally, they develop a ratio that measures the
total number of military personnel relative to the total number of paramilitary
organizations. A relatively high number of paramilitaries indicates an army that has more
structural coup proofing in place. All of these measures cover 1970-1999, which is
improved temporal coverage from Belkin and Schofer’s original measures which only
covered 1966-1986. However, the dependent variable drawn from MMDD ranges from
1945-present day; thus, there are many years of the dependent variable that are not
covered by these datasets.
The conditional hypotheses involve a number of domestic conditions. These
various measures are drawn from different datasets. The first, democratization, is
calculated using Polity VI scores. This dichotomous variable takes on the value of 1 if a
country has experienced a three point positive shift in polity over the previous 5 years.26 I
draw various measures of human rights violations from the CIRI data project (Cingranelli
and Richards 1999). All of these variables cover 1981-2011. Unfortunately for this
project, there is limited temporal overlap between the CIRI project and the coup proofing

26

I tried a number of thresholds here, and the results are robust to various other specifications.
(e.g., 2 point shift in two years, 5 point shift in five years, etc.)
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measures. As reported in the results section, this means that the total number of
observations for this portion of the analysis drops quite significantly. The first variable I
examine is Political Imprisonment. This is an ordinal variable that is coded 0 if there
were “many individuals imprisoned for political reasons.” 1 if there were “few
individuals imprisoned for political reasons.” and 2 if there were no individuals
imprisoned unjustly. Most of these data are distributed in the “no individuals” category
(47%). The next type of violation considered is Torture. This variable is coded 0 if
torture, or “the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain by government officials,” was
practiced frequently. The variable takes on the value of 1 if torture was deployed
occasionally, and 2 if it did not occur in a given year. The distribution of this variable is
different than political imprisonment. 40% of the observations fall in the “some torture”
category, while 40% fall in the “frequent torture” category, and 20% fall in the “no
torture” group.
The next human rights violation examined is Disappearances. These events are
cases where individuals are disappeared due to political reasons and the victims have not
yet been found. Like the previous variables, this is coded as 0 if disappearances are
frequent, 1 if there are occasional, and 2 if they do not occur. Most countries do not
experience disappearances in a given year (72%). Extrajudicial Killings are the next
category of rights violations. These events are killings carried out by government
officials without due process of law. They are categorized in the same way, 0 if killings
are common, 1 if they are occasional, and 2 if they do not occur. 29% of countries
experience occasional extrajudicial killings in a given year, and 19% experience frequent
killings in a year. Finally, I examine the impact of Physical Integrity violations, which
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are simply an additive index of the aforementioned measures of rights violations. This
variable ranges from 0 which represents no government respect for rights to 8 which
represents full respect for rights. Figure 6.2 presents a histogram of the distribution of
Physical Integrity. Most country-years have moderate to good respect for rights (values
4-8).
Figure 6.2

Results
The results for the first hypothesis, examining the effect of coup proofing on mutinies,
are presented in Results Table 6.1. Of the six measures of coup proofing, four of them are
positively associated with mutinies. In other words, most conventional measures of
counterbalancing increase the propensity of state experiencing mutinies. This finding
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should be included in the dictator’s handbook. Dictators can ward off coups by
counterbalancing, but they should use this regime-securing strategy with extreme caution.
Mutinies may likely be direct result of imposing artificial coordination challenges on a
military. Anecdotally, we know that mutinies can have disastrous impacts, perhaps just as
consequential to the tenure of a dictator as a coup (e.g., the formation of rebel groups as
seen in the DRC with the formation of the M23 rebel group). Leaders should use extreme
caution when implementing such coup proofing strategies as they may likely be a double
edged-sword.
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Results Table 6.1
Coup Proofing and
Mutinies

Measure 1

Measure 2

Measure 3

Measure 4

Measure 5

Measure 6

Independent Variables
of Interest
CB Count (De Bruin)

0.224***(.062)

Balancing (De Bruin)

0.504**(.249)

New CB (De Bruin)

0.162(.718)

Counter Bal (P&B)

0.292**(.143)
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Effective Number (P&B)

0.291**(.148)
0.044(.104)

Paramilitary (P&B)
State Level Controls
Coup

0.51(.323)

0.459(.323)

0.384(.314)

0.143(.64)

0.094(.435)

0.271(.459)

GDPPC

-0.199(.146)

-0.139(.131)

-0.092(.132)

0.078(.19)

-0.166*(.099)

-0.181(.114)

Democracy

-0.355(.415)

-0.488(.398)

-0.705*(.428)

-0.804(.811)

-0.437(.395)

-0.361(.579)

Autocracy

-0.452*(.273)

-0.523*(.272)

-0.508*(.277)

-0.931*(.487)

-0.212(.275)

-0.359(.333)

-0.083(.308)

-0.148(.282)

-0.347(.291)

-0.452(.287)

-0.625**(.315)

Temporal Controls
Cold War

Table 6.1 Continued
Years

0.489***(.069) 0.508***(.065) -0.52***(.06) 0.524**(.233) 0.502***(.069) 0.462***(.112)

Years2

0.023***(.004) 0.024***(.004) 0.024***(.004) 0.034*(.018) 0.023***(.004) 0.023***(.007)

Years3

0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000) -0.000(.000) 0.000***(.000) 0.000***(.000)

Constant

0.0637
(0.977)

Observations

4,531

-0.220
(0.946)

0.0322
(0.889)

-2.659
(1.746)

4,531
4,531
3,704
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.150
(0.797)

0.445
(0.798)

7,090

5,065
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The next expectation I examine is the impact of democratization in the context of
high coup proofing. I expected that when democratization occurs during periods of heavy
counterbalancing, the military might have the dispositional factors required to stage a
coup. However, the coup proofing measures will limit the ability of the military to
intervene. Thus, instead of experiencing a coup, the military will experience a mutiny.
The results in Results Table 6.2 do not support my initial expectation. Instead, the
negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates the opposite. In the context of high
coup proofing, democratization decreases the likelihood of a mutiny. I present the
marginal impact of the interaction on the likelihood of mutinies in Figure 6.3.
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Results Table 6.2
Interaction 1

Democratization

Coup Proof

Interactive

Independent Variables of Interests
INTERACTION

-0.940***(.309)

Constitutive Terms
Democratization

0.027(.201)

Counter Balance (P&B)

-0.924(.738)
0.292**(.143)

0.325**(.145)

0.189(.243)

0.143(.640)

0.123(.604)

GDPPC

-0.212***(.665)

0.078(.19)

0.075(.196)

Democracy

-0.619**(.259)

-0.804(.811)

-0.843(.823)

Autocracy

-0.604***(.216)

-0.931*(.487)

-1.066**(.502)

Years

-0.427***(.047)

-0.524**(.233)

-0.514**(.235)

Years2

0.017***(.003)

0.034*(.018)

0.033*(.018)

Years3

-0.000***(.000)

-0.001(.000)

-0.001(.000)

Constant

0.687(.463)

-2.659(1.746)

-2.527(1.8)

State Level Controls
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Coup

Temporal Controls

Table 6.2 Continued
Observations

12,957
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3,704

3,697
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Figure 6.3

Due to this null finding, I returned to my theoretical expectations in order to see if
perhaps there was a misstep here. Theoretically speaking, any institutional shift, either
towards democratization or away from it, should present similar circumstances that
threaten the military’s ability to secure its corporate interests. When moving from a
positive high value on the polity scale to a lower or perhaps even negative value, we
should expect that the military feels its institutional avenues for securing preferences are
shrinking. In other words, the way resources are secured today may not be the way that
resources are secured tomorrow. This type of commitment problem should spur the
military to mutiny against the executive.
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Given this observation, both democratization and “autocratization” should cause
mutinies in the context of high coup proofing. Thus, I created a new independent
variable, regime shifts, which captures any three-point shift in absolute value on the
Polity scale within five years. I re-estimate this model and with the regime shift variable
instead of the democratization variable. However, my results do not change significantly.
I still find that the interaction term is negative and significant, which is the opposite of
what was expected (see Results Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4). These results are a bit
disappointing but not all together surprising given the state of measures for coup
proofing. I am not convinced that these results are actually representative of reality.
Instead, I believe that the results might be a driven by poor measures with limited
temporal coverage. I am not ready to recant my theoretical expectations but will continue
to seek out better coup proofing measures in the future.
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Results Table 6.3
Interaction 2

Regime Shift

Coup Proof

Interactive

Independent Variables of Interest
INTERACTION

-0.535**(.251)

Constitutive Terms
Regime Shift

-0.097(.202)

Counter Balance (P&B)

0.195(.561)
0.292**(.143)

0.354**(.144)

State Level Controls
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Coup

0.325(.244)

0.143(.64)

0.038(.63)

GDPPC

-0.191***(.067)

0.078(.19)

0.082(.187)

Democracy

-0.631**(.25)

-0.804(.811)

-0.684(.801)

Autocracy

-0.506**(.221)

-0.931*(.487)

-0.928**(.462)

Temporal Controls
Cold War

-0.497**(.208)

Years

-0.41***(.049)

-0.524**(.233)

-0.515**(.236)

Years2

0.017***(.003)

0.034*(.018)

0.033*(.018)

Years3

0.000***(.000)

-0.001(.000)

-0.001(.000)

Table 6.3 Continued
Constant
Observations

0.694
(0.496)

-2.659
(1.746)

12,957
3,704
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-2.770
(1.746)
3,697
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Figure 6.4

The next expectation I examine is the conditional impact of human rights
violations and coup proofing on the likelihood of mutinies. To revisit the basic intuition, I
expected that human rights violations that are ordered by the executive but carried out by
the military will cause widespread grievances in the military apparatus. Often times, even
though the executive orders the repression, he or she will blame the act on military
leadership and foot soldiers. Thus, in this instance, we should expect to see a widely
dissatisfied military. However, the use coup proofing tactics will limit the dissatisfied
military’s ability to coordinate. Thus we will only observe a mutiny instead of a coup.
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Results Table 6.4

Interaction 1
(Political Prison)

Political Prison * Counterbal

0.436**(.21)

Political Prison

-0.340(.603)

Interaction 2
(Torture)

Torture * Counterbal

0.01(.022)

Torture

0.009(.016)

Interaction 3
(Disappearances)

Disappear * Counterbal

0.022(.026)

Disappearances

-0.002(.004)

Interaction 4
(Killings)
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Killings * Counterbal

0.042(.089)

Killings

0.006(.009)

Interaction 5
(Phys Integ)

Phys Integ * Counterbal

0.087(.069)

Phys Integ

-0.201(.207)

Counterbalance

0.038(.191)

0.234(.207)

0.304(.21)

0.201(.198)

0.043(.2)

GDPPC

0.075(.313)

0.026(.335)

-0.092(.341)

0.009(.344)

-0.082(.325)

Democracy

-2.733(1.721)

-3.119*(1.694)

-2.847*(1.651)

-3.073*(1.715)

-2.35(1.521)

Autocracy

-0.625(.693)

-0.559(.73)

-0.827(.777)

-0.57(.724)

-0.578(.661)

Years

-0.560*(.294)

-0.504*(.278)

-0.417(.295)

-0.511*(.279)

-0.376(.331)

Table 6.4 Continued
Years2

0.029(.018)

0.027(.017)

0.023(.018)

0.027(.017)

0.02(.02)

Years3

0.000(.000)

0.000(.000)

0.000(.000)

0.000(.000)

0.000(.000)

Constant

-2.359
(1.984)

-2.377
(2.000)

-1.987
(2.014)

-2.220
(2.090)

-1.569
(2.041)

Observations

1,236

1,252

1,226

1,252
1,252
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 6.5
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Results table 6.4 presents the interactive effects of various rights violations and
counterbalancing. The number of observations in these models plummets due to limited
temporal overlap between these two data sources. However, I find evidence that Political
Imprisonment has the expected interactive effect when considered in tandem with coup
proofing. In other words, as a state experiences more political imprisonments and has
extremely high coordination obstacles in place, it is much more likely to experience a
mutiny. Figure 6.5 shows the marginal impact of this interaction on the likelihood of
mutinies. I have split the sample by democracies and non-democracies, expecting that
this effect could be more pronounced in non-democracies. Moving across the x-axis, the
counterbalancing variable moves from its minimum to its maximum. The dark black line
represents country-years that experience a high number of political imprisonments. It is
indeed these non-democratic, imprisonment-prone states with high levels of coup
proofing that are most likely to experience mutinies.
I do not find support for the other various rights violations. This is not all together
surprising, especially considering the theoretical expectations put forward. I made an
implicit assumption that these rights violations would only lead to mutinies if they were
ordered by the executive, yet carried out by military actors. For these other types of rights
violations, such as torture or killings, it is not evident that they are necessarily executive
ordered. Instead, these events could be carried out by rouge soldiers or police without the
directive of the executive all together. However, political imprisonment is the most likely
rights violation to be ordered by higher-up civilian leaders, like the executive or his or her
cronies. Given this observation, it is not surprising that I have only found support for
imprisonment and not the various other types of violations.
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Avenues for Future Research
This chapter presented a number of conditional expectations regarding the effect of coup
proofing and scenarios that are likely to create general military dissatisfaction. I have
several other ideas for scenarios that are likely to generate wide-spread grievances among
foot soldiers and military leaders. In coding cases for MMDD, I came across a number of
cases in which military actors were upset because the legitimacy of the executive branch,
and thus their own institutional legitimacy was called into question. Fraudulent elections
are one avenue by which executive and thus military legitimacy can be questioned. The
1986 snap presidential election in the Philippines demonstrates the tension that a
perceived fraudulent election can introduce to the interaction between military leadership,
rank and file soldiers, and civilian leadership. President Ferdinand Marcos won a snap
election against the opposition candidate Aquino, a wife of an assassinated opposition
senator. Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile stated that his and his troop’s
defection from the Marcos regime was justified because “the mandate of the people does
not belong to the regime…” (Oberdorfer 1986). Clearly, military actors are sensitive to
the notion of legitimacy. Especially in younger democracies, military leaders only want
to operate under an executive with adequate levels of legitimacy and a clear mandate
from the people.
As the example from the Philippines demonstrates, fraudulent elections may
encourage mutinies because the military organization does not want to be associated with
an executive who has a questionable or shaky mandate from the people. Specifically in
the post-Cold War era, the international community has taken a strong stance on
electioneering. International norms have shifted in such a way that fraud, if caught and
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reported, is likely to be associated with punitive measures. One such measure is the
withdrawal of military aid. As such, even if an executive seems to look favorably upon
the military institution, if they are fraudulent, they cannot credibly commit to promoting
the best interests of the military. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the fraudulent
leader will receive so much domestic and international backlash that their tenure is short
lived. Should the military expect the possibility of regime change or popular uprising,
they will likely find strategic benefits in detaching the institution from the executive.
Conclusion
In this chapter I demonstrated that coup proofing tactics have a direct yet unintended
consequence on military loyalty. While leaders can effectively ward off coups through
the use of such tactics, they are simultaneously spurring lower level military rebellions
which can have severe impacts. I also demonstrated that human rights violations,
specifically in the form of political imprisonment, will spur mutinies when executives
have rolled out steep coup proofing measures. I did not find support for regime changes
spurring mutinies in the context of high coup proofing. This chapter’s theoretical
expectations and findings situate my work in the context of the broader civil military
relations literature by considering how the executive’s decisions may spur different types
of dissent.
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This dissertation sets out to develop a foundational framework for understanding (1) what
mutinies are and (2) why mutinies occur. MMDD represents the first cross-sectional
dataset on mutinies. This dataset will be useful for civil-military scholars moving
forwards as there are still many questions to answer about mutinies. This dissertation
focused on the most foundational question, but many others remain, making this research
program promising. Below I will explore some of the policy implications that come out
of this project. Then I will describe where I intend to take the project in the future.
Policy Implications for External Actors, Major Powers, and IOs
In part, I chose to study mutinies due to the policy relevance that this project promised. A
casual reading of current events in major news outlets will clue the reader into the fact
that mutinies are occurring more and more often. Not only are they occurring more often,
but they are becoming a policy tool for major powers. Near the beginning of the Syrian
civil conflict, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pushed strongly for an army mutiny
among the Syrian forces. In an address at a news conference in Morocco, Secretary
Clinton spoke directly to Assad’s forces saying, “The longer you support the regime
campaign of violence against your brothers and sisters, the more it will stain your honor.
If you refuse, however, to prop up the regime or take part in attacks on your fellow
citizens, your countrymen and women will hail you as heroes” (Daily News 2012).
The notion that military rebellions can demoralize and drain an incumbent’s
ability to continue to wage war is not isolated to the Syrian case. NATO encouraged
mutinies in Yugoslavia in 1999. By dropping leaflets of encouragement, NATO sought to
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increase the number of desertions and mutinies against Milosevic (The Guardian 1999).
The leaflets said, “Stay in Kosovo and meet certain death, or abandon your units and your
military equipment and run away as fast as you can. If you decide to stay, NATO will
attack you unfailingly from all sides. The choice is yours. –NATO.” What is most
striking about this use of mutinies as a policy tool is that scholars and policy makers alike
actually have no systematic evidence that such defections and desertions facilitate peace.
The simple calculation being made here is that mutinies will decrease the fighting
capacity of the state. This observation is certainly true, but I am fearful is an
oversimplification of reality.
Mutinies drain the fighting capacity of the state, but can simultaneously increase
the fighting capacity of non-state actors. This enhanced fighting capability of non-state
actors is particularly pronounced when mutinies involve defections. In either scenario, if
mutinies involve defections or do not, state forces and non-state forces move closer to
parity. We know from classic international relations work (e.g., Organski and Kugler
1980) and more recent civil war literature (e.g, Butler, Cunningham, and Gates 2017) that
the distribution of power and resources matter for conflict onset, duration, and intensity.
Specifically, parity or an even distribution of resources (as described in the civil war
literature) is a dangerous condition, increasing the likelihood of conflict onset and
increased intensity. Given this strong empirical evidence that parity is dangerous,
Western powers should use extreme caution in encouraging mutinies in ongoing conflicts
or states that are likely to experience conflict. This policy recommendation is ineffective
at best and inherently dangerous at worst.
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Mutinies that occur organically without outside influence may serve as an
indicator or “warning sign” for other processes. For example, if mutinies could serve as
an effective foreshock for coup activity, they would be an extremely useful clue for
policy makers trying to predict regime change. Coups likely follow mutinies because
mutinies are a signal to military leadership about whether or not strong dispositional
factors are present to launch a successful coup. These smaller rebellions reveal
information about the military’s ability to coordinate on the same signal to oust the
executive. In an effort to explore this notion a bit, I ran a preliminary model to see if
mutinies might be a predictor of coups. In Results table 7.1, I have run a basic model
predicting coups with the standard controls established in the literature. Mutinies do
indeed appear to be a significant predictor of coup activity.
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Results Table 7.1: Mutinies as Predictors of Coups D’état
Coups d’état
Mutiny

0.854***(.203)

GDPPC

-0.1**(.046)

Military Expend

0.000***(.000)

Military Size

0.000(.000)

Democracy

-0.753***(.142)

Autocracy

-0.127(.108)

Cold War

0.283**(.119)

Years

-0.441***(.033)

Years2

0.022***(.003)

Years3

0.000***(.000)

Constant

-0.480
(0.318)

Observations

12,449
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

While preliminary, this finding should be useful to policy makers trying to
ascertain the likelihood of regime change in a given country. In the future, I would like to
spend more time theorizing about this relationship and exploring it further. It is possible
that perhaps there is a non-monotonic relationship between mutinies. In other words,
having a few mutinies might predict coup activity. However, when mutinies happen
extremely frequently, the forces that are left are likely to be incredibly loyal, thus
diminishing the likelihood of a coup after a certain point. This expectation is driven by
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anecdotal evidence from cases like Syria in its recent conflict. While many scholars and
policy makers expected Assad’s tenure to get cut short by a coup, it appears that all the
forces left at this point are loyal, co-ethnics because all battalions that were in question
have defected or deserted at this point. I do not explore this possibility empirically here,
but will in future projects.
Policy Implications for Mutiny-Prone States
The three empirical chapters of this project offer direct policy recommendations for states
that are prone to experiencing mutinies. The first chapter finds strong evidence that civil
war intensity is likely to contribute to military rebellions. Clearly, a leader cannot directly
and unilaterally control the intensity of conflict in his or her state. However, they can
strategically deploy units to particularly locations. As mentioned at the conclusion of
Chapter 4, there is significant sub-national variation in the intensity of civil wars. Thus, if
a leader is worried about the loyalty of a specific sub-population in the military, they may
be well advised to deploy these soldiers to lower-intensity conflict zones. For example,
Assad should be weary of deploying Sunni soldiers to the highest intensity conflict zones
like Raqqa. Instead, he would be wise to deploy these soldiers of questionable loyalty to
low intensity zones where their loyalty will be challenged less.
I find evidence that protest events increase the chances of a mutiny. While leaders
cannot do much to prevent protest events, and indeed there is evidence that in trying to
prevent dissent leaders may actually spur it on (e.g., Davenport 1995), leaders should be
weary of ordering repression in the face of protests. Repression means that soldiers have
to go out and face protestors in the street. This often means harming ethnic-kin which is
where the incentive to mutiny is generated. Leaders can mitigate this risk by keeping
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soldiers quartered during unrest. This is a tricky dynamic though because idle hands and
quartered soldiers might increase the likelihood of coup activity, and unchecked protests
might lead to full scale revolution. For smaller, less threatening protest events, though,
leaders might be well advised to not order repression if they are concerned with mutinies.
One clear policy recommendation offered in Chapter 5 is about the intention of
conflict. Leaders might participate in conflict in order to generate a rally effect and a
boost in public approval through the use of diversionary tactics. My findings suggest that
while leaders might be able to divert the attention of civilians, the military is not as easily
duped. In engaging in diversionary conflict, leaders are gambling on the loyalty of the
military. The military appears to have the ability to gauge a leader’s intention. If the
military perceives that conflict is divisionary in nature, and thus only benefiting the
leader, they are apt to rebel. Thus, leaders should be very cautious when engaging in
insincere conflict.
Finally, the last empirical model offers a strong word of caution to leaders who
are concerned with extra-constitutional regime change. Coup proofing is indeed a double
edged sword. While we know that it can ward off coups effective, it has a lot of
unintended consequences, of which mutinies are just one (e.g., Powell 2012, De Bruin
2017). Leaders who are worried about mutinies should coup proof with extreme caution.
Specifically, the formation of counterbalancing organizations seems to spur mutinies.
This implication returns to Feaver’s (2003) conceptualization of the military
problematique, which is that leaders want a strong military to counter sincere threats but
not so strong that it can usurp civilian leaders. Civilian leaders then, should understand
that coup proofing severely limits the military’s ability to counter threats both directly
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through limiting coordination and indirectly through spurring mutinies. Given this
observation, leaders must weigh the value of introducing coordination challenges to
enhance the chances of regime survival and the drawbacks that such coordination
challenges present.
Avenues for Future Research
This dissertation represents the leading edge in mutiny research, but there is still much
work to be done. I have presented the first quantitative dataset on mutinies across regions
and time, and I have offered evidence that allows scholars and policy makers to make
predictions about when mutinies are likely to occur given certain domestic situations. The
research presented here, however, is just the first step in a much larger research program.
Below I will describe a number of extensions to this project.
Table 7.2 lays out a number of avenues for future research. The first column
presents many of the relationships tested in this dissertation, which are the domestic
causes of mutinies. There is a potential domestic cause that I hope to explore in the future
that I have not included in this project. In my reading of cases during the data collection
process, I found many instances of mutinies that occurred along former rebel lines. As a
peacekeeping measure, many states incorporate former rebel forces into the military
apparatus. The logic behind this policy is that by giving former rebel troops a vocation,
they will not be tempted to revisit rebellion. However, this inclusion of former rebels
seems to make a military more apt to fracture. For example, most of the Cote D’Ivoire’s
mutinies have broken out along the lines of former rebel battalions. Guatemala also
experienced a similar mutiny in 1997 when actors were fearful that a peacekeeping
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measure would strip them of their jobs. While peacekeeping is a common post-conflict
measure, it might actually pose a threat to human security and state security.
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Table 7.2: Future Directions

Mutinies as Dependent Variable
Domestic Causes
• Intense Civil War

Mutinies as Independent Variable

International Causes
• Rivalries

Domestic Effects
• Civil war outcomes
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•

Long civil war

•

MID escalation

•

Rebel group formation

•

Protests

•

Intense conflict

•

•

Divisionary Conflict

•

Long conflict

•

Violence against
civilians
Regime change
(preliminary evidence
presented)

•

Peace Agreements in
Post-conflict
societies

International Effects
• Traditional measures
of power
• Military aid
withdrawal
• Alliance formation
•

International
organizations

While this dissertation largely considers domestic causes of mutinies, there are a
whole host of potential explanations for mutinies that occur from beyond a state’s
borders. For example, Chapter 4 tested the effect of intense and long lasting civil wars on
the likelihood of a mutiny. The theoretical expectations tested in this chapter should
extend to scenarios of interstate war. A natural extension of this project would be to
examine the impact of interstate conflict on mutinies. Returning to the theoretical
argument presented in Chapter 3, bad strategy selected by military leadership should spur
grievances among foot soldiers. Risk aversion will also increase the chances that foot
soldiers will shirk in the form of mutiny. I would like to examine intense interstate
conflict, long-lasting interstate conflict and MID escalation as proxies for bad strategy
selected by military leadership. This analysis can be facilitated quite easily by the
Correlates of War data project (e.g. Ghosn et. al 2004).
Rivalries also present a potential avenue for military mutinies. Rivalries are
similar to divisionary war in that they generate benefits for the executive but impose
steep costs on foot soldiers. As Colaresi (2004) finds, dovish leaders in a rivalry context
are more likely to suffer electorally than hawkish leaders. This finding suggests that in a
rivalry context leaders have strong incentives to engage in unnecessary conflict in order
to generate public support for their tenure. Such engagement in unnecessary conflict will
help the leader maintain his domestic constituency, but will impose greater personal
danger on foot soldiers. This logic leads to the expectation that international rivalries
should spur mutinies.
Beyond examining the causes of mutinies, there is a promising future in
evaluating the effects of military mutinies. In regards to the implications that mutinies
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have for human security, this line of research has the most potential to inform scholars
and policy makers about the dangers of mutinies. Mutinies likely have measurable
impacts on a number of domestic conditions. First, while Chapter 4 considered the impact
of civil wars on the likelihood of mutinies, scholars would be well served to consider how
mutinies during civil conflict effect the outcomes of such conflicts. For example, do
mutinies make rebel victories more likely? Do they make negotiated settlements less
likely? Do mutinies make civil wars last longer? Clearly, there will be issues of reverse
causality that must be addressed here, since I have already demonstrated that long lasting
civil wars spur mutinies. However, this line of research will be critically important to
scholars, policy makers, and international actors alike when considering the best plan of
action in states with protracted civil wars, like Syria and Yemen.
In reading cases of mutinies, I have found strong anecdotal evidence that mutinies
are often followed by rebel group formation. I hope to demonstrate that this relationship
holds up empirically, showing that mutinies indeed have dire downstream effects for the
state. This exact dynamic played out in the DRC and Yemen. I have presented
preliminary evidence in this chapter that mutinies spur extraconstitutional regime change
by way of coups d’état. I would like to expand this preliminary finding into a full analysis
and situate the preliminary findings in a well-grounded theoretical framework. At this
point, I have not put forward adequate theoretical expectations for why this relationship
exists, but I hope to develop this portion of the project in the future. MMDD codes a
number of important variations in mutiny events, such as: were they violent? Did they
kill civilians? All of these variations in mutinies can be predicted. In the future, I hope to

157

ask a number of research questions about these interesting variations in the nature and
quality of mutinies.
Finally, there are a host of international processes that military mutinies might
impact. First, conventional measures of power (e.g., CINC) do not consider dimensions
of loyalty. I hope to undertake a project that modifies extant measures of power by
considering observable dimensions of military loyalty. Next, my reading of cases during
the data collection process highlighted that often times when international actors perceive
militaries as rebellious in nature, they will withdrawal military aid from the mutiny prone
state. However, this policy further limits that receiving state’s ability to appease
mutineers through resources. I intend to estimate the effect that mutinies have on the
likelihood of military aid withdrawal. Then, given that aid is revoked, does this further
increase the likelihood of more military unrest?
Potential alliance partners are likely to consider dimensions of military loyalty
when considering what states to partner with as allies. As we know from the alliance
formation literature, allies want to select strong and resolute allies. Mutinies are an
indication of state weakness. As such, mutiny-prone states are perhaps less likely to be
selected as allies unless they possess some geo-political, strategic advantage. I would also
like to spend more time exploring international organizations’ reactions to mutinies. In
recent decades, IOs have become increasingly punitive in the aftermath of coups. I would
like to examine if responses to mutinies have followed a similar pattern. Due to the
preliminary evidence offered in this chapters that mutinies are an early indicator of coups,
perhaps IOs actually offer support to states experiencing mutinies.
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In sum, this dissertation represents the first deep dive into the empirical,
quantitative study of mutinies. We have learned that mutinies are occurring more often
than ever before, and they mark every region in the world. Indeed, no region is immune
from military rebellions. In fact, most countries have experienced at least one of these
events. From my reading of individual cases, it is clear that mutinies can have long
lasting, downstream effects that inhibit peace. Human security is undoubtedly threatened
by such events. Policy makers often seek to encourage military defections in the
developing world, but this work provides many reasons why this might be a perilous
policy recommendation. I am excited to continue this research program and provide these
data to scholars and policy makers alike so that the broader community can answer
important questions about mutinies.
Copyright © Jaclyn M. Johnson 2018
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Appendix: Case Descriptions
Country

ccode Event
date

violent civilian

Description of Events
(paraphrased from primary source
to maintain meaning)

United
States

2

1/12/1946

0

United
States

2

3/1/1972

0

United
States

2

6/1/1972

0

United
States

2 10/12/1972

1
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0 Troops dissented in
Frankfort and Berlin in an
effort to protest their
continued deployment. The
article indicates that morale
was extremely low among
these battalions.
0 The aircraft carrier USS
midway received orders to
leave the San Francisco Bay
for Vietnam. Anti-war
protests swept the ship. The
crewmen deliberately
destroyed property, spilling
three thousand gallons of oil
into the bay in an attempt to
sabotage the war efforts.
0 The attack carrier USS
Ranger experienced a
mutiny when the ship was
ordered to sail from San
Diego to Vietnam. The
mutineers sabotaged the
ship by destroying gears in
the engine and other parts of
the ship. These damages
delayed the departure of the
ship by 4 months.
0 A mutiny occurred on the
USS Kitty Hawk in the
Subic Bay in the Tonkin
Gulf. The mutiny broke out
along racial lines, black
soldiers were allegedly
holding a meeting to discuss
blatant discrimination. This
meeting was made up of
over 100 black sailors. As
Captain Maryland
Townsend tried to disband
the meeting, confusion
broke out and there was a

United
States

2

11/3/1972

0

United
States

2 10/16/2004

0

Canada

20

2/26/1949

0
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brawl. The fighting left
nearly 50 soldiers injured.
more info here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wik
i/USS_Kitty_Hawk_riot
0 Another racial flare up took
place on the carrier
Constellation. 60 black
soldiers refused to leave the
mess deck and threatened to
"tear up the ship". In order
to avoid a situation like
Kitty Hawk, the captains
decided to return to San
Diego and return the
mutineers to land. 130 men
de-boarded the ship at this
time. The Constellation
returned to pick up the
rebellious soldiers a few
days later but the men
refused to get on the ship.
On Nov. 9 they staged a
defiant strike. More info
here:
https://www.usni.org/magaz
ines/proceedings/197601/uss-constellation-flarewas-it-mutiny
0 17 US American soldiers
mutinied in Basra Iraq,
where they were stationed
to "plug a gap” south of
Baghdad to limit the flow of
supplies to Islamic
insurgents. They refused to
run a fuel convey which
they had labeled a "suicide
mission". All but two of the
men in the 343rd
quartermaster company
refused the orders.
0 Sailors mutinied and locked
themselves in their mess
decks. They refused to
follow orders or come out of

Cuba

40

1/15/1985

0

Haiti

41

4/27/1987

0

Dominican
Republic

42

1/6/1966

0

Mexico

70

9/11/1961

0
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the mess decks until the
captain would agree to hear
their grievances. The
primary mutiny accrued on
the Athabaskan during a
fueling stop at Manzanillo
Mexico. However, other
ships also experienced
mutinies, such as the
Crescent while in port in
Nanjing China. More info
here:
http://www.christopherwilso
n.ca/papers/The_Great_Can
adian_Naval_Mutiny.pdf
0 A senior military officer, Lt.
Col. Joaquin Mourino Perez
defected from Cuba in
Spain after serving
extensively in Africa. He
gave the CIA inside
information about Cuban
operations in Africa. This
counts as a mutiny because
he was a commissioned
officer.
0
0 Rebel soldiers under Col.
Francisco Caamano Deno
were issued a warning by
the OAS not to attempt a
coup. The OAS suggested
that this would be a direct
threat to security and
democracy in the country.
The rebel soldiers seized a
government radio station
and declared there was no
coup attempt. The mutiny
appeared to be in response
to the provisional
government that was put in
place after Trujillo.
0 General Gasca was arrested
in raid because he was

Mexico

70 11/21/1997

1

0

Mexico

70 12/18/1998

0

0

Guatemala

90

11/1/1949

0

0

Guatemala

90

11/1/1950

0

0

Guatemala

90

2/2/1997

0

0

Guatemala

90

2/1/1997

0

0
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leading rebellion and
sedition against the state.
Dissent was also occurring
in many parts of the state
that was attributed to
General Gasca's planning.
Military personnel mutinied
in a 14 hour standoff
because of their alleged
involvement in the torturemurder of 6 young people.
The mutiny was led by Gen.
Jose Lamberto Ponce, head
of the Zorros.
Lt. Col. Hildegardo Bacilio
Gomez led 50 soldiers in a
march down Mexico City's
central street to protest
heavy handed and unfair
treatment of the armed
forces by the justice system.
Mutiny appears to have
been peaceful.
Officers mutiny in response
to Col. Francisco Arana’s
assassination. Not many
details in article.
Not many details in article.
Lt. Col. Alfredo Pedroza
sentenced to death for
assaulting the local military
base in November, 1951.
1000 military police defied
commanders and seized
their compound in the first
army rebellion since the
peace treaty ended the 36
year civil war (signed Dec.
29, 1997). The army police
were concerned about their
severance terms and the
dissolution of their units.
400 armed military police
locked two generals inside
their fortified compound.
The military police were

Nicaragua

93

11/2/1987

0

0

El Salvador

92

1/6/1983

0

0

Costa Rica

94

3/20/1948

0

0

Panama

95

12/4/1990

0

0
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demanding the government
pay them severance when
they lost their jobs under the
terms of the recent peace
accord. About 1,000
military police defied their
commanders and seized
their compound a few
evenings before.
A senior military officer
defected to the U.S. This
was a high ranking officer,
Maj. Roger Miranda
Bengoechea. The officer
took $15,000 of government
funds with him when he
left.
6 day long mutiny led by a
military commander in a
northern province that was
not associated with
violence. The colonel began
the mutiny after being
ordered to a diplomatic post
in Uruguay. It also seems
that the colonel wanted to
see the defense minister
ousted.
The military seems to be
split into two factions: one
group trained by the U.S.
that supported the president
and a second set of
communist troops that
followed Rafael Calderon
Gaurdia in the Bella Vista
Barracks. The president
moved to the artillery
barracks when dissent
started. The president did
not have control over
Guardia's forces.
Rebel soldiers who
separated from government
forces in December elude
capture for over a month.

Venezuela

101

7/22/1958

0

Venezuela

101 12/20/1960

1
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The rebel forces were strong
and well-armed, better
armed than state forces. The
rebels were members of the
army under the former
Panamanian leader gen.
Manuel Antonio Noriega.
The rebels do not seem to
have a coherent ideology
aside from restoring the
military as Panama's
dominant institution.
0 Soldiers went on strike in an
effort to postpone the Nov.
30 elections. They also
sought rule for three years
by a de facto government
and press censorship. The
mutiny was led by Gen.
Jesus Maria Castro Leon.
He left for the U.S. on
"official mission" the day
after the strike ended. This
event clearly began as a
mutiny and escalated to a
coup. It is coded by Powell
and Thyne.
0 A former officer, Lt.
Gonzalo Abreu Molina
recruited a few active
members of the national
guard to join him in a
protest against the state. The
mutineers were on their way
to Caracas to set free a
group of political prisoners
when they were met with
loyal state forces. They
exchanged gun fire and the
mutiny ended. While the Lt.
was no longer part of the
state forces, he was able to
recruit from those that were
still active in state forces,
making this a mutiny. This
is not a coup attempt as no

Venezuela

101

4/1/2017

1

0

Venezuela

101

8/5/2017

1

0

Ecuador

130

5/30/1959

1

0

Ecuador

130

3/31/1971

0

0

166

direct move was made on
the executive.
The article indicates that at
least 123 members of
Venezuela's armed forces
have been detained and
arrested since April of 2017.
The charges against these
individuals range from
treason to rebellion to
desertion.
Captain Juan Caguaripano
led a group of rebel soldiers
(the 41st Armored Brigade)
in a rebellion against
Maduro. The soldiers said
that the event was a
"legitimate rebellion"
against a government that
was destroying the country.
The mutineers took over an
army base in the city of
Valencia.
Draftees are joined by
civilians in mutiny.
Conscripts were protesting
against the harsh discipline
of Galo Quevedo an army
captain. Mutineers handed
out weapons to civilians.
The officer in question was
killed, and his body was
dragged through the streets.
Soldiers mutinied led by an
ousted general (fired the day
prior). They mutinied
because they wanted the
president to fire the defense
minister and the army
commander. 50 officers
supported the ousted general
Jacome Chavez by signing a
statement demanding the
resignations of these
leaders.

Ecuador

130

10/1/2010

1

Peru

135

6/9/1976

1

Brazil

140

3/26/1964

0

Brazil

140

2/4/2017

0
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1 Pres. Rafael Correra claims
this is a coup attempt, but
Powell and Thyne do not
have it coded. Soldiers
mutinied and loyal soldiers
patrolled a number of cities.
This mutiny is associated
with a lot of violence and
many deaths. Mutineers
were protesting a new law
that would strip their
benefits. While this was
largely a police mutiny,
some articles indicate that
soldiers were involved also.
0 Rightist general barricaded
himself in Peru's military
school with armed officers
and students. He felt
strongly that Peru should
adopt more capitalist
policies and as a result was
asked to resign. He staged
the mutiny in defiance.
Shots were exchanged.
0 Rebels of the marine force
(3,000 in total) took over a
building of metallurgical
workers union in Rio de
Janeiro. The enlisted men
yelled that they wanted
reforms and were dying of
hunger. The men were part
of the leftist sailors and
marines association, which
Admiral Mora ordered to
have the leadership of this
group arrested.
0 703 military police went on
strike demanding that the
state invest more in public
security and a salary raise.
The state of Epirito Santo
experienced an upsurge in
violence during this strike.
According to the article, 121

Bolivia

145

6/15/1946

0

0

Bolivia

145

2/1/2003

1

0

Bolivia

145

6/22/2012

1

0

Bolivia

145

4/22/2014

0

0

Paraguay

150

3/14/1947

0

0

Paraguay

150

4/22/1996

0

0
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were murdered, 300 shops
looted, and over 170 cars
stolen during the strike.
Article does not give
specifics.
A revolt over wages
occurred at barracks. Story
does not give many details
at all. This is the same
facility that will experience
a mutiny in 2012.
Commandos protest over
pay. Wives join in their
barracks to protest. Mutiny
breaks out after their wives
are thrown out of the
barracks by the men's
superiors.
Bolivian sergeants from all
services protest through La
Paz against the firing of four
non-commissioned officers
and discrimination by the
military's high command.
Meanwhile, a group of
military wives went on a
hunger strike. Head of the
national association of noncommissioned officers said,
"we are not against the
government... we are
against this system, this
capitalistic, neo-liberal,
colonial model within the
military."
Army troops in Concepcion
were in rebellion. Report
alleges that troops in the
Chaco region also rebelled.
Not many details given
about the event.
225 soldiers were dismissed
in Dec. for their
participation in a barracks
uprising. The men backed
Lino Oviedo, a rebel

Chile

155 10/22/1969

1

Argentina

160

8/8/1962

0

Argentina

160

4/13/1987
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general. Oviedo finally
backed down when the
President offered him a
position of Defense
minister. Once he stepped
down, however, his rank
was stripped and he was
placed on trial. This was not
a coup attempt and is not
coded by Powell and Thyne.
0 Soldiers mutinied for higher
pay. This appears to be a
military strike. Some said it
was a coup attempt, but
clearly it is just a lowerlevel of military rebellion. It
did turn violent (14 people
injured by gunfire). The
President very clearly called
this a coup attempt, but
there was no attempt to
seize executive power.
0 Major General Federico
Toranzo Montero set up
rebel headquarters in
Northern Argentina. He sent
communication to all army
establishments saying that
he was taking over as
commander in chief "in
accordance with the opinion
of a majority of generals".
This forced Gen. Juan
Bautista Loza to resign as
Argentina's Secretary of
War and Commander in
chief.
0 Soldiers mutiny because
they are demanding amnesty
for accused officers in
human rights allegations.
Mutiny was peaceful and
only lasted one day. Rebel
officers occupied the
infantry school at Campo
die Mayo and criticized
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General Rios Erenu for not
protecting the army from
"injustices and
humiliations".
150 officers mutiny
demanding that Gen. Rios
Erenu be replaced. He made
many officers angry when
he ordered them to testify in
court because of human
rights abuses during military
rule from 1976-83.
Not much information is
given by article but there is
evidence that there was a
second mutiny occurring on
this same date in Las Lajas,
a southwestern Neuquen
Province. Commander Gen.
Antonio Balsa, commented
on the second event of
unrest on 1/17/1988 and
said that order had been
restored.
A violent mutiny takes
place at Monte Caseros
camp in Northeastern
Argentina. Troops loyal to
the civilian government
encircled a northern army
compound after a rebel
officer and about 100
sympathizers had seized
control of the building.
Seems that rebels were led
by Colonel Rico. Officers
were demanding an end to
the prosecution of officials
in previous military
dictatorships, according to
NYT article.
Mutiny occurs at Villa
Martelli arsenal and is led
by Col. Mohammad Ali
Seineldin. There was a
street battle between rebel
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soldiers and protesters that
resulted in 3 deaths and
many injuries. Rebels
demanded an end to the
prosecution of officers for
human rights abuses in the
1976-83 dictatorship. They
also sought a new military
hierarchy and better pay and
equipment. This event
escalated to a coup attempt
that is coded by Powell and
Thyne.
0 There is a lot of uncertainty
surrounding this event. It
seems that the mutineers
were probably in support of
previous mutineers that
resented punishment for
human rights violations.
However, it remains
unclear. Some proposed that
these mutineers had been in
hiding since the previous
December mutiny.
0 Right wing rebels take hold
of a number of military
buildings and depots. They
stated that were not trying to
stage a coup or disrupt
democratic institutions but
that they wanted to see
changes in the army
hierarch and pledged their
loyalty to Colonel
Mohamed Ali Seineldin
who was cashiered after
launching a similar mutiny
against ex-president Raul
Alfonsin 2 years prior.
There were at least 6 deaths
associated with this mutiny
but it's unclear if they were
civilian deaths.
0 The army rebels against the
defense minister. This looks
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a lot like a coup and in fact
is coded by Powell and
Thyne, but the attempt to
oust president Bordaberry
did not come till 2/12. He
had to negotiate with the
armed forces to continue his
presidency. However, the
unrest was not initially
pointed at the president.
Instead the unrest is pointed
to the Minister of National
Defense, Antonio Francese.
Therefore, until this
escalated to a coup attempt,
it was simply a mutiny.
More information can be
found here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wik
i/1973_Uruguayan_coup_d
%27%C3%A9tat.
0 Soldiers mutinied upon
arriving in Malay because
of "shocking conditions".
They refused to obey orders
to parade. Charges were
ultimately dropped against
most, although this was
undoubtedly a mutiny. More
info here:
http://archives.chicagotribun
e.com/1946/12/01/page/86/a
rticle/englands-heroicmalaya-mutineers
0 This is the largest military
mutiny since WW11 for the
UK. 16 soldiers sat down
during a military training
operation in Kenya. They
were protesting poor
leadership- they said they
were being led by
"Muppets" and complained
that officers were hung
over. More info here:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
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news/uknews/defence/1050
5987/Group-of-soldiersmutinied-over-hungoverbosses-court-martialhears.html
Article doesn't give many
details but suggests that
there was a mutiny of at
least 200 soldiers in
Sumatra. It is unclear
whether the rebel soldiers
were Dutch nationals or
Indonesians that were
rebelling against the
colonial power.
Renegade Dutch officer
Capt. R. R. P. Westerling
defected from the Royal
army while deployed in
Indonesia. He formed a
guerrilla operation called
"Forces of the Queen of
Justice". This group was not
only made up of Dutch
soldiers but they also
recruited and trained
Indonesian airborne units
and commandos. The
guerrilla forces captured the
town of Chamahi in the
mountains of West Java.
They were approximately
600 individuals strong.
400 soldiers mutinied in
order to hide the individuals
that were guilty of torturing,
mutilating, and killing
individuals that were proFrance. Occurred in "indochina", no specific location
given. The mutineers were
chased out of the barracks
by gas.
400 Indo-Chinese soldiers
mutinied due to anti-French
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feelings. Similar to previous
mutiny.
Army chief of staff of the
Caodai sect of South
Vietnam, Trinh Minh Tay,
defected. He and 2500
troops fled to Cambodia
from the Tayninh area.
There was not a specific
reason cited for the mutiny.
The story is confusing, but
French soldiers (conscripts)
in Algeria rebel against
officers because they
disagree with the officers
that aided in staging a
mutiny among Algerian
soldiers to help keep
Algeria under French
control. The French soldiers
refused to march with the
Algerian mutineers.
18 conscripts mutinied and
protested the rough
treatment from instructors
on the Island of Majorca.
The conscripts accused
leadership of physical and
psychological abuse.
Soldiers refused to partake
in a parade celebrating
Armed Forces Day because
of the conscription policy.
The article indicated that at
this point, the government
was hoping to end
conscription within 6 years
and transform Spain's
military to a purely
professional force.
Mutiny occurred in a leftist
artillery garrison. This
mutiny lasted for 8 days
after general Carlos Fabiano
acted on his own to offer
concessions to the rebellious
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artillery regiment in Oporto.
Many sources indicated that
General Fabiano did not
clear the terms of the
agreement with the
President. Many felt that his
offer would not help restore
military discipline.
German troops in Norway
mutinied when ordered to
go to the Eastern Front.
They fired on their officers
and refused orders. The
mutiny was suppressed
quickly.
German soldiers mutinied in
barracks in Copenhagen.
This lead to a battle that
lasted two hours at night
between German soldiers
from Norway in route to the
Eastern front and Nazi elite
guard troops. This battle
caused 300 causalities. All
of the mutineers were
executed by firing squad.
Article is brief but indicates
that Austrian troops in the
German military mutinied in
Copenhagen and fought in
the streets with military
police.
German troops comprised of
Russian and Polish soldiers
mutinied and "batches" of
soldiers defected to a
Quebec Armored Regiment.
This lead to fighting
between German Loyal
troops and Russian/Polish
troops.
Article is extremely brief. A
mutiny occurred in the
German navy and it
included events of
desertion. Hitler was
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informed of the event by a
group of Nazi generals.
There was no information
about size or duration of
mutiny.
Several hundred soldiers
defected and regrouped in
the forests of Silesia. They
went on to form an active
resistance unit.
General Antonin Bohumil
Hasal defected to the U.S.
zone in Germany and
signaled an important rift in
the "iron curtain". This
defection was particularly
notable because Hasal was a
high ranking military
commander and a top
military aid to the president.
The article indicates that he
likely knew a number of
details about strategy and
military structure in
Czechoslovakia, which
would be of great interests
to military intelligence
officers.
Maj. General Jan Sejna
defected to the United
States because he was more
right leaning than the
executive and the military
leadership. He kept warning
of the Soviet threat.
Article does not give many
details, but indicates that
Western diplomats reported
widespread military
mutinies among conscripts
of the Albanian military.
This was likely a result of
their dissatisfaction with
President Berisha. More
info can be found here:
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http://www.nato.int/docu/re
view/1998/9802-07.htm
Macedonian commanding
officer and his troops
refused to follow orders and
fight against a four month
old Albanian insurgency.
The leader of the troops
complained that they did not
have enough resources and
that the conscripts were
poorly trained. There
seemed to be no end in sight
to the insurgency.
Army soldiers disobeyed
their orders and moved an
armored column from
Belgrade towards Croat
territory. More columns
were reported to be on the
move to BosniaHerzegovina. These were
not orders handed down
from the President, but
rouge troops taking matters
into their own hands.
Army appears to be losing
command structure and
hierarchy. Article says that
at least 250 rank and file
deserted in Slovenia. The
article mentions that officers
are also being rebellious.
Mutiny occurred among
Serb forces when 3
battalions (2,000 soldiers
mentioned in second article)
mutinied at Istok, in
Western Kosovo. They stole
vehicles and left with their
weapons still in their
possession. They fired
weapons in the air. The
mutiny was in response to
protests in the troops' home
towns of Krusevac and
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Aleksandrovac lead by
soldiers' mothers who took
to the streets to call their
sons home.
The military elite troops
mutinied in order to display
their disdain for Milosevic.
The mutineers were at least
100 strong and staged the
mutiny inside and outside of
the parliament building.
Soldiers mutinied in
response to perceived
corruption. Specifically, the
article notes that the state
has used its influence to
take from minorities that are
already economically
disadvantaged. The
mutineers were led by
Captain Dragovan Babic.
They fired weapons into
empty stalls at a market
where black market goods
were often sold.
2,500 soldiers defected to
the rebel forces in the Bihac
district. At least five people
died in this incident.
Navy men mutinied on a
destroyer that was off the
coast of Fiumicino Italy.
They were said to be
protesting the military
government. The mutineers
were said to be fewer than
15, but included Capt.
Nicholas Pappos and several
other officers. They were
arrested before they had
time to return to Athens and
carry out further plans.
Soldiers mutinied after a
blast in July killed 13
soldiers and injured 60
more. The conscripts
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demanded that they were let
off the national guard. They
were asked to sign a
statement saying where they
wanted to be posted but they
refused to do so. They
blocked the base with their
cars and proceeded to leave
the camp, against orders.
0 A mutiny occurred at
Georgi S. Rakovski military
academy in protest of pay.
Officers were disgruntled
because their pay did not
correspond with new
legislation and contracts
they had signed with the
defense minister. The
officers refused monthly
pay as a sign of protest
against deception.
0 This mutiny was largely a
result of soldiers resisting
repressive orders from
General Chirac, who
ordered soldiers to shoot at
protesters. In response, 48
officers joined by nearly
3,000 soldiers and students
protested and demanded the
ousting of Defense minister
Gen. Nicolae Military and
the Minister of Internal
Security General Mihai
Chitac. This represented a
large threat to the
provisional, interim
government that came to
power after the Ceausecu
Government. This interim
government was considered
to be one of the most
repressive regimes in the
Eastern Bloc.
0 14 Russian soldiers defected
to the side of Muslim rebels
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in Afghanistan. They
declared that they were also
Muslims from the Tajik
republic and could not
follow the heartless Kremlin
policies in Afghanistan.
They did not want to kill
religious kin.
121 soldiers defected and
sought asylum in Germany.
The defectors were placed
mostly in former East
Germany with the right to
temporary residence.
Four top generals were fired
because they refused orders
in Chechnya. A leading
general, advancing on
Grozny halted his forces
and said that they would not
shoot at local people. The
Kremlin responded by
saying that this general was
fired for "Indecisiveness
and inaction."
An elite unit mutinied in
Chechnya in response to
"inhumane and chaotic
conditions". The mutiny
was carried out by a 100
strong unit that disagreed
with Yeltsin's crackdown in
Chechnya. They were not
punished for their sedition.
Article states that 230
conscripts have defected in
the last week. It points to a
larger military crises, where
an estimated 4,000 soldiers
have defected from 19921997. This crises was a
result of the country's larger
economic crises. Soldiers
were not receiving adequate
pay or resources.

Russia

365

9/11/2002

0

Estonia

366

7/30/1993

0

Lithuania

368

9/22/1993

0

Ukraine

369

7/24/1992

0

Ukraine

369

3/1/2014

0

181

0 54 soldiers mutinied by
deserting in masse from the
motorized infantry division.
They were protesting
brutality by one of their
commanders.
0 Soldiers mutinied in
response to a lack of food
and poor working and living
conditions. The article
indicates that the mutiny
may have also been in
response to the controversial
Mr. Rabas, a controversial
choice for defense minister
because he was actually a
Swedish citizen.
0 60 mutineers fled the
barracks to hide in a forest,
taking 130 automatic
weapons along. The
mutineers wanted higher
wages and better living
conditions. Eventually they
returned from the forest
near Kaunas.
0 The Black Sea Fleet was
ordered by both President
Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and
Leonid Kravchuk (Ukraine)
to not declare allegiance to
either country as they were
patiently working out a deal.
However, despite these
orders, a ship with a crew of
about 60 soldiers mutinied
and declared allegiance to
Ukraine and set off from a
naval base in the Crimea to
a Ukrainian port of Odessa.
Other warships chased the
mutineers.
0 This event is distinct from
the 2014 Feb. Ukrainian
coup. Ukrainian troops were
defecting in large numbers
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in Crimea. While the
Ukrainian defense minister
denied and denounced the
assertion of defections, the
information seems to be
true. The soldiers continued
to face pro-Russian soldiers.
Over the next several weeks
there are various, specific
reports of defections that
have all been coded as this
single event.
300 Ukrainian soldiers
defected over the course of
a few days due to shelling at
the Donetsk airport. This
event is similar in nature to
other mutinies that occurred
in Ukraine in 2014.
27 Ukrainian soldiers
defected to the pro-Russian
group in Eastern Ukraine
after being held captive in
Donbass.
Mutinous soldiers took
hostages and clashed with
government forces. There
were soldier deaths
associated with this mutiny.
The mutiny was led by
military commander who
supported the late president
Gamsakhurdia who died
because of mysterious
circumstances after being
ousted in 1994.
65 conscripts of the Kodjor
Training Facility deserted
their post due to bad living
conditions and inadequate
food supplies. After 24
hours, 30 of them returned
but the rest remained at
large.
Troops took over an interior
ministry base in a mutiny
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over pay. They were
demanding overdue wages.
Article does not give details
about the size and nature of
the military protest. More
info here:
http://www.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/europe/05/26/geor
gia.army.02/
0 A mutiny occurred as a
wave of protest surged
through the Georgian army.
The Adjara government (a
semi-autonomous region)
was accused of trying to
carry out a coup. However,
this does not appear to be a
coup attempt and is not
coded by Powell and Thyne.
0 Russia backed a mutiny in
Tbilisi in order to disrupt
major NATO exercises in
Georgia that were due to
start on this day. Originally
Georgian officials were
saying that Russia was
sponsoring a coup against
the President. However,
they later dropped these
allegations. This was clearly
not a coup attempt and is
not coded by Powell and
Thyne. This mutiny was
peaceful.
0 3,000 cadets at the most
prestigious military
academy in Azerbaijan
mutinied and deserted
without leave. Many
returned the next day but
some did not. The mutiny
was a response to senior
officers demanding bribes
from cadets and cancelling
their leave.
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0 Danish soldiers mutinied at
Bornholm by straining.
They were protesting
against the extension of the
draft period from 12 to 18
months. The soldiers
reportedly beat other
soldiers that were not
joining the protest. The idea
of the protest started a day
prior in Copenhagen.
However, this planned
protest was anticipated and
squelched by military
leaders.
0 Article does not give many
specifics. Danish Navy men
staged a mutiny in July of
1957 in Groennedal
Greenland. The Danish
Chief Naval Prosecutor flew
to investigate the ordeal.
Officials would not give
specific details of the event.
0 Article doesn't give many
details, but Major Robalo,
was shot and killed at the
FIR barracks in Alto de
Bandim. Soldiers were
disgruntled about not
receiving back pay.
0 600 soldiers mutinied citing
poor living conditions in
barracks, rampant
corruption in the high
command, and a pay
dispute. The mutineers were
very explicit that this was
not a coup attempt and
indeed, it is not coded by
Powell and Thyne as there
was no attempt to oust the
executive.
0 This event is clearly a
mutiny that escalates to a
coup attempt. Rank and file
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soldiers began a mutiny
after returning from a tour
in Liberia serving with
ECOMOG. The mutineers
were protesting back pay of
allowances. While this
event started as a pay
mutiny, it escalated when
military leadership became
involved.
0 6 mutineers (including
commissioned officers)
attacked the State House.
They were Led by Lt. Col.
Sarjo Jarju and various
other Lts. And Capts. This
is not a coup attempt and is
not coded by Powell and
Thyne
0 Lt. Col. Hassan Sagaga led
the mutineers which were
made up of former Tuareg
rebels. The mutineers took
control of two main military
camps of Kidal town.
Civilians seemed very
fearful of the mutineers,
although there were no
civilian deaths.
0 This event very clearly
begins as a mutiny and later
escalates to a coup attempt.
The mutiny began at a
military camp in Bamako
during a visit by the
Defense Minister Gen.
Sadio Gassama. The
Defense minister did not
assuage mutineers’
grievances over the
governments mishandling of
the rebellion by Tuareg
separatists in the Northern
part of the country. Many
soldiers were killed fighting
the rebels and were sent to
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battle without sufficient
supplies. The mutineers
fired weapons into the air.
Later, it seems that officers
get involved and this event
escalates to a coup event
(coded by Powell and
Thyne).
Paratroopers mutiny in
Bamako in response to
disciplinary measure taken
against some of the unit's
members. This mutiny was
violent.
"Several dozen" soldiers
deserted their posts in
Diably. The deserters fired
shots into the air and
demanded that they receive
their deployment bonuses
because it was "a right"
guaranteed by the state.
Mutineers lead by Col.
Youssou Traore, stormed an
office at the Kati camp and
shot an army colonel and
held him hostage for hours.
This occurred at the same
camp where a coup began
the year prior (2012).
Capt. Tawes led mutineers
in taking control of the town
and the military camp in
Natitingou. 45 mutineers
were captured when the
govt. forces regained
control. The motivation is
unclear from the story.
Mutiny is led by unpaid
soldiers. The mutiny caused
local business and traffic to
a dramatic halt. Mutineers
briefly seized the state
broadcasting center. Other
soldiers called this a coup
attempt although no plot
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was directed at the
executive and this event is
not coded by Powell and
Thyne. Soldiers fired
weapons into the air while
driving around the city.
Civilians marched in protest
against the military.
"Dozens" of soldiers
mutinied in Zinder barracks
demanding three months of
back pay.
A mutiny occurred after an
attack on an army supply
truck. The attack was
blamed on an ethnic
Tuaregs. The mutiny then
occurred, demanding the
departure of leadership
because they were ethnic
Tuaregs.
Troops revolted and were
driving around firing in the
air. It appears they were
upset over late payment of
salaries. Story does not give
many details.
Mutiny occurred in Maradi
as soldiers were protesting
unpaid salaries. Mutineers
took several local
administrators hostages and
drove through the streets
firing shots into the air.
100 soldier mutinied due to
not receiving their salary for
8-12 months. Mutineers
fired on officers. This
mutiny may also have been
an effort to protest rape
allegations against two
soldiers.
5 day long mutiny sparked
because of unpaid salaries.
A simultaneous mutiny
occurred in Diffa. Mutineers
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join each other as those in
Diffa were fleeing east to
join comrades.
Troops took over airport
and protested pay in the
capital city. They were
largely upset that they were
not allowed to stay on after
their terms of conscription
in the military and receive
pay. They fired weapons
into the air, but this act
seemed largely symbolic.
They were easily convinced
to end their mutiny by
higher military officials.
More info on all Ivory Coast
mutinies here:
https://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/afsp/article
/view/1051/1058
A two-day occupation of the
Ivory Coast's presidential
palace occurred because of
low pay and living
conditions. Story doesn't
give many details. President
Felix Houphouet-Boigny
was guarded by loyalists at
his private residence. Does
not appear to be coup
attempt and is not coded by
Powell and Thyne.
Troops protest in Abidjan
over pay. This event clearly
begins as a mutiny. During
the process of mutiny,
Robert Guei used this
moment of opportunity to
launch a coup.
Article doesn't give many
specifics but there was a
mutiny in Daloa that
appeared to be over issues
of pay. More info (although
not much) can be found

Ivory Coast

437

7/5/2000

1

0

Ivory Coast

437

9/17/2002

1

0

Ivory Coast

437

6/28/2008

1

0

Ivory Coast

437

1/6/2017

1

0

Ivory Coast

437

5/13/2017

1

1

189

here:
http://uca.edu/politicalscien
ce/dadm-project/subsaharan-africa-region/ivorycoast-1960-present/
Mutineers were protesting
in the capital city, Abidjan,
demanding money from the
ruling junta for their role in
the Dec. coup that brought
the current leaders to power.
Soldiers fired weapons into
the air. Soldiers tore through
Abidjan and terrorized
civilians by commandeering
hundreds of private cars.
Soldiers mutinied in order
to protest demobilization.
This event clearly started as
a mutiny with foot soldiers
expressing a grievance then
escalated to a coup.
Soldiers loyal to the former
rebel chief Zacharia Kone
attacked military
headquarters in Vavoua and
Seguela. This mutiny was in
response to Kone being
sacked after not responding
to and taking part in a
demobilizing event.
Mutiny is spurred by
concerns of pay. Mutineers
fired Kalashnikovs into air
outside local government
offices. The mutiny spread
to other major cities. The
mutiny was spearheaded by
ex-rebels that were
incorporated into the
military as part of
peacekeeping measures
after the civil war.
Mutiny is spurred because
soldiers claim they never
received bonuses that were
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promised to them after the
Jan. mutiny. This mutiny
follows a very similar
pattern to the Jan. mutiny.
At least three civilians were
killed when they were being
denied access to Bouake.
The article indicates that the
bonuses likely weren't paid
as a result of a down turn in
to cocoa market (the IC's
main export).
0 Three soldiers were killed
during a mutiny that
involved infighting in a
barrack at Korhogo. It
seems that the mutiny also
spread to the capital city
Abidjan with similar
violence.
0 Mutiny begins May 26 over
unpaid back wages. Soldiers
fire into air in Kouyate. The
mutiny occurred at one of
the country's largest military
bases. Mutiny appears to be
led by foot soldiers, who
targeted Defense Minister
General Mamdou Baillo
Diallo, looting his house.
0 The President (Blaise
Compaore's) personal guard
mutinied and soldiers ran
riot for two days. The
mutiny began in the
barracks, including one in
the compound of
Compaore's residence in
Ouagadougou. This does
not appear to be a coup
attempt and is not coded by
Powell and Thyne. Soldiers
are upset about housing
conditions and food
allowances. They said they
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do not want "to work for
them (leaders) to get rich."
Soldiers from the second
largest military base took to
the streets of the country's
economic capital and fired
shots into the air. About 80100 soldiers mutinied. The
state said there was no
looting associated with the
event, but it might be the
case the state wants to
appear strong. Despite the
fact that the military has
been offered a range of
benefits over the previous
months, there remains a
high level of discontent with
working conditions and pay.
A mutiny at a military base
near Monrovia ended after
the president threatened to
send troops to crush the
rebellion. The article doesn't
give many details about
why the mutiny occurred in
the first place. A battalion
of artillery troops had
mutinied on the ground and
3/4 of supplies for common
mess had been stolen by the
officers.
300 soldiers defected at the
Tubman military barracks in
Gbarnga, Bong County. The
defections were a result of
low morale among soldiers
who had entered the service
"with high expectations,
amongst them
[expectations] were foreign
training and scholarship
with accompanying
benefits."
Soldiers and their wives
protested by marching from

Sierra
Leone

451

4/29/1992

1

Sierra
Leone

451

2/5/1998

0

192

the Edward Binyan Kessely
Military Barracks to the
Robertsfield highway and
erected a roadblock on the
highway leading from the
airport to the capital city of
Monrovia. The soldiers
were dressed in civilian
clothing. They were
demanding money that was
deducted from their salary
but the Ministry of Defense.
They claimed that each
month the military
leadership was deducting
$20 (USD) from their
salaries, amounting to
thousands of dollars in their
pockets.
0 This event began as a pay
mutiny and escalated to a
coup within 24 hours.
Truckloads of soldiers drove
into Freetown firing
machine guns into the air
and demanding back pay
and better working
conditions. Later, the
mutineers surrounded the
State House but were
opposed by soldiers sent
from the military
headquarters.
0 70 soldiers from Sierra
Leone defected and joined
the Nigerian-led West
African Peacekeeping force
(ECOMOG). The leader of
ECOMOG stated that the
defectors would be
integrated into the
peacekeeping forces and
will form their own Sierra
Leonean contingent.
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0 Army soldiers defected to
rebels operating in the north
and east of the state.
0 The news stories were only
published once the case was
pending trial. There aren't
many details about the
actual event. It is clear that
the soldiers were violating
the chain of command.
Junior officers were leading
the charge.
0 Article does not give many
details but says that three
Ghanaian soldiers are being
sentenced for their
involvement in a mutiny
involving 100 mutineers.
This mutiny occurred in
Congo during a UN
peacekeeping mission.
0 Soldiers refused to take part
in a parade that celebrated
President Jerry John
Rawlings successful coup
that occurred on December
31, 1981. The mutineers
indicated that they got the
idea to mutiny from soldier
in the Ivory Coast.
0 50 soldiers form the air
force mutinied in the
Northern most region of
Cameroon. The mutineers
were demanding back pay
from up to two years prior.
They said that officials
owed them this back pay as
well as various other
expenses. They set up a
road block and stopped
traffic. Mutiny does not
appear violent.
0 A mutiny occurred amongst
Ibo (ethnic minority)
soldiers in the Eastern
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region of Nigeria. This
mutiny was largely over a
federalism-regionalism
issue. Specifically, the
soldiers did not want to
repress their ethnic kin.
0 28 Nigerian soldiers
mutinied and demonstrated
in the streets of Akure, the
Ondo State Capital over
allowances and pay. The
state officials said that
soldiers that have a
"monopoly of all kinds of
weapons provided by the
state" should not enjoy the
same right to go on strike as
civilian counterparts. The
news article comes t the
point of trial, where
soldiers’ convictions are
downgraded from life in
prison to only 7 years in jail.
News report says that the
mutiny was violent.
0 Soldiers deserted their posts
in N. Nigeria due to being
heavily outnumbered by
Boko Haram. Because of
their desertion, Boko Haram
was able to launch
extremely aggressive
attacks that killed 33
civilians.
0 Soldiers mutinied and shot
at the vehicle of the General
Officer Commander in
Borno State. Soldiers in the
Barracks initially thought
the attack was from
insurgents, rather than from
soldiers within the barracks.
The attack followed the
killing of 12 soldiers who
were reportedly ambushed
by members of Boko Haram
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while on their way to
Maiduguri from Kala-Balge
area.
0 News story comes at the
point of sentencing for 54
soldiers that refused to
deploy for an operation
against Boko Haram
Islamists. After Boko
Haram captured a series of
town in the North East
earlier in the year, the
military vowed to retake all
lost territory back from the
insurgent group. However,
soldiers report that they are
unhappy with pay,
resources, and strategy.
1 400 soldiers demanded their
paychecks and mutinied.
This mutiny was
exceptionally violent and
involved the mistreatment
of civilians. Soldiers looted
and released hundreds of
criminals after breaking into
Bangui's largest prison.
Mutineers also broke into
homes of business leaders
and demanded money,
beating those that did not
cooperate. Soldiers that
remained loyal clashed with
mutineers right outside the
presidential palace. 9
people, 5 civilians and 4
presidential guards were
killed and at least 50
civilians were wounded.
0 The mutiny began May 18.
There were an estimated
200 soldiers that rebelled.
They did not agree to end
their dissent until French
military forces essentially
offered them protection and
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helped them return to the
barracks. The mutiny
included looting. Four
hostages were taken by the
mutineers, including a
government minister and
parliamentary speaker.
1 Mutineers were protesting
low pay and the army's
diminished role under
President Ange-Felix
Patasse, whose election in
1993 ended 12 years of
military rule. The rebellious
soldiers fired mortars at a
French-owned hotel in the
capital and a 2 hour firefight
with presidential guards and
French troops. Rebel
soldiers abducted a former
government minister and his
son and shot them dead.
Some stories suggest that
the mutiny broke out along
ethnic fragmentation. The
Yakoma ethnic group is the
group that most mutineers
belonged to. The mutineers
also beheaded a regional
prefect and his daughter
who were related to
president Patasse and served
a districted that has a
Yakoma majority
constituency.
0 Troops mutinied against
president Patasse. Specific
reason not outlined in
article. The mutiny was
violent, killing two French
soldiers.
1 Mutinous soldiers were met
by opposing peacekeeping
troops, as reported on by the
Red Cross. Thousands of
civilians had to flee the
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capital of CAR, Bangui.
Camp Kasai military base
represented the mutineers’
headquarters since
November of the prior year.
Peacekeepers from
neighboring African states
and French troops were able
to re-gain control over the
city's southwest region after
the mutineers had captured
it over the weekend.
However, they were
unsuccessful in breaking up
the mutineers’ control of
Camp Kasai.
0 This case is interesting.
Frankly, it is hard to
determine if this is a mutiny
or not. However, since
Dwyer (2015) includes this
case in her dataset, I also do
on account of precedent. 20
military officers write and
publish a letter to the
president stating their
grievances. They ignore the
typical hierarchy and chain
of command and make these
grievances known publicly.
0 Officers and soldiers
mutinied in Ndjamena but
the mutiny was quickly put
down. The mutineers were
responding to an executive
order that froze military pay
and bonuses for two months
and arrested several
officers. This came after an
investigation that suggested
that officers were pocketing
salaries that were being paid
to military battalions that
did not actually exist. The
President seems to think this
was a coup attempt, but
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there is no clear attempt to
oust or assassinate the
executive. This event is not
included in Powell and
Thyne's coup dataset.
"Tens of soldiers" defected
in the Adre region. The
mutineers were upset with
internal dynamics of the
military, such as
appointments and
promotions. The article
indicates that these
mutineers likely have ties to
the 2004 mutineers.
56 soldiers and two colonels
defected to join the rebels in
the East.
35 armed soldiers and
Major Abakar Al Bechir
defected from the Chadian
army and joined a group of
resistance fighters led by
Ahmat Hassballah.
Soldiers, acting under the
orders of the army high
command, demand the
resignation of Milongo
(PM) and his interim
government. Mutineers took
over radio and TV
buildings. At least 3
civilians were killed in
street fighting with rebel
soldiers. Milongo went into
hiding, although the state
officials continued to state
that his government was
still in charge. This does not
appear to be a coup attempt
and is not coded by Powell
and Thyne. The soldiers
report to have been seeking
back pay and higher wages.
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0 Congolese soldiers rebelled
against Belgian officers. 3
Congolese soldiers were
killed by rockets from a
Belgian military plane. This
caused Congolese troops to
mutiny at Camp Hardy in
Thysville. The troops took
control of the military camp
and jailed all white officers.
They held hostages 48
whites but later released
them. Lots of threats, but it
does not appear that the
mutineers used direct
violence.
0 This almost appears to be a
counter coup but the
mutineers to not overtly try
to oust Mobutu who had just
come to power through a
coup. Instead, they surround
his house and protest pay.
There is clearly no attempt
to take his life or kick him
out of power. After soldiers
were reassured that there
was no truth in reports about
pay increases to officers,
they stopped their rebellion.
0 Mutiny started in Thysvill
garrison over pay. Several
officers and men were
arrested by military police.
Mr. Lumumba, the deposed
president and opposition
leader, was said to have
been released from prison
by mutineers, thus
threatening the leadership of
President Kasavubu and
Col. Mobutu. However, the
reports seem to be
overstated, according to the
article.

Democratic
Republic of
Congo

490

1/13/1961

0

Democratic
Republic of
Congo

490

6/4/1963

1

Democratic
Republic of
Congo

490

3/29/1963

1

200

0 Rebellious soldiers took 13
Italian airmen prisoner in
the town of Kindu. The
action was likely led by
Antoine Gizenga in an
effort to defy central
government. Major. Gen.
Victor Lundula attempted to
free the airmen but attempt
failed. The troops moved to
Albertville and went on a
rampage stealing civilian
property and looting houses.
They set road blocks and
demanded money.
0 Congolese troops left post at
Camp Shinka and began
"plundering property and
molesting everyone on their
way". 4 civilians died in this
incident. This appears to be
a particularly violent
mutiny. The catalyst
appears to be a civilian
beating a soldier until he
was "half dead" and then he
later died. Story is a bit
confusing and doesn't give
many important details.
This does appear to be a
mutiny as these events were
not ordered directly by a
commander or the
President.
1 Congolese troops terrorized
a copper mining town in
Kolwezi. This event killed
at least one Belgian and one
"African". Article does not
indicate whether or not they
were civilians. Story does
not give many details, but it
seems like soldiers
plundered and looted
through this resource rich
city.
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0 Mutiny occurred when
troops led by Christophe
Gbenye began fighting in
military barracks and in
residential parts of the city
of Stanleyville. Gbenye
requested that an aircraft be
placed at his disposal in a
Burundian airport. Fighting
was reported on the
Northern bank of the Congo
river.
1 Rebellious troops in
Kisangani were former
members of the Katangese
gendarmerie, which fought
for Tshombe against the
central government.
However, they were
technically incorporated
into the Congolese National
Army, which is why this
event is considered a
mutiny. The troops mutinied
in July of 1966. The central
government was not able to
crush the mutiny decisively
and had to reach a
compromised settlement.
1 This story is very confusing,
but it seems that mutinous
soldiers went to Bukavu and
started killing any
Europeans they suspected of
support anti-regime
mercenaries. This was not
an ordered attack, but rather
soldiers just taking their
own initiative.
0 3,000 paratroopers mutinied
in Zaire. The mutineers
pillaged stores in Kinshasa.
The country's main airport
was forced to close There
were unconfirmed reports of
shootings and civilian
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deaths. Soldiers mutinied
over back pay that they had
not received for several
months. Firing was heard in
two neighborhoods that
house wealthier residents.
0 Mutineers rebelled because
of back pay they never
received. The mutiny spread
to at least four southern
towns. Soldiers began
looting and committing acts
of "vandalism", specifically
targeted at foreigners. The
unrest appears to be spurred
by the firing of Etienne
Tshisekedi, a popular
opposition leader that
Mobutu named prime
minister. The appointment
of Tshisekedi was made
under the pressure of
western governments after a
similar mutiny occurred the
month prior.
0 News story does not give
many details. Mutiny
appears to occur over pay.
Soldiers began looting and
arrested a regional
governor. The state radio
said that mutinous soldiers
were blaming their
commander for bad pay.
1 Mr. Tshisekdi (PM
appointed under pressure of
Western powers) urged
soldiers to not accept a
newly printed 5 million
Zaire bank note as pay. This
mutiny appears to be
particularly violent and
bloody. As least 1,000
people were killed over the
weekend. Most of them
appear to be soldiers, but
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there are also civilian
deaths. Civilians had to flee
areas of conflict.
Mutineers formed a militia
and fought troops loyal to
President Pascal Lissouba.
Mutineers vowed their
loyalty to ex-president
Denis Sassou Nguesso. The
mutiny appears to be
extremely bloody and
violent.
Mutiny was sparked over
back pay. The senior
military source interviewed
in story seemed to
downplay the sedition and
imply that it was localized.
However, other reports
suggested the unrest was
much more serious and two
soldiers had died. Mutineers
engaged in looting and
firing weapons into the air.
This mutiny was spurred
largely by ethnic division.
The military revolt was
sparked by officers and
troops of Tutsi and other
minority ethnic groups, and
fighting in the capital,
Kinshasa. Officers
reportedly pitted Tutsi army
units against those of other
groups. This mutiny spread
to a number of other cities.
The news story for this
event comes at the point that
soldiers were fired for
sedition (about 5 mo. After
the actual event). The
mutineers rebelled in
January and looted a
number of civilian
properties. There was an
accusation of rape of a
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young girl but the charge
was not upheld by the court
for lack of evidence. The
story does not detail the
cause of the mutiny.
Soldiers opposed to their
redeployment and back pay
of 5 months’ worth of salary
caused mutiny. The
mutineers fired shots into
the air and caused civilians
to flee certain areas. The
soldiers were redeployed
with a joint operation with
the UN Mission in DR
Congo to root out the
Democratic forces of the
liberation of Rwanda
(FDLR).
Mutineers were protesting
tough living conditions and
corruption that they
observed in the national
army. On Feb. 15 and 16
they protested in the streets
sand fired shots in the air.
Negotiated outcome was
achieved and the fourth
brigade of DRC armed
forces was broken into 4
regiments controlled
directly by a high ranking
general in order to increase
surveillance.
The Congolese army
suspended military
operations in order to bring
a mutiny under control. The
army had been fighting
defectors and hunting order
rebel leaders and mutinous
soldiers.
A general leads soldiers in a
mutiny in DRC. The story is
told through the perspective
of Rwandans that were
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recruited to join the mutiny.
The rebellious soldiers and
general eventually came to
be known as M23, an actual
rebel movement. But at this
moment, they are simply
mutinous factions form
within the state.
0 Mutineers rebel because of
complaints of pay. 250
soldiers if the Ugandan
Rifles mutinied at Camp
Jinja on Lake Victoria and
held their British Officers
hostage. The state denied
reports of the mutiny.
However, the Minister of
the Interior responded to the
event and agreed to grant
soldiers a pay increase.
0 The news story calls this
event a coup attempt, but it
does not appear to be and is
not coded by Powell and
Thyne. There seems to be a
divide between ethnic
groups in the military. The
mutineers are largely
comprised of Langi and
Acholi tribes which are
Christian tribes. 6 soldiers
died during the dissent.
0 Mutiny started in barracks
at Mbarara a town 25 miles
from the Tanzanian border.
The town appeared to be in
control of the mutineers.
The mutiny might have
been in response to
allegations that Cubanbacked Tanzanian forces
launched an invasion into
Uganda. However, some
argued that this was actually
diversionary tactics used by
President Amin and the
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invasion was actually made
up or overstated. The news
story isn't exactly clear
about why the mutiny
occurred.
UPDF soldiers deserted
their official work stations
and stayed with civilian
women around town. This
mutiny occur in the Gulu
municipality.
150 Askari troops mutinied
because they wanted to be
demobilized. They refused
to perform their duties. The
mutiny was violent as
mutineers took over an
ammunition depot in Gilgil.
Mutineers were calling for
the dismissal of senior army
officials that were British.
The mutiny represents a
push back against colonial
powers controlling military
operations.
This mutiny appears to be
spurred by a push back
against colonial powers
leading the military. The
mutineers were seeking the
"Africanisation" of the
military.
Haya tribe led a mutiny that
involved officers but was
quashed rather quickly by
loyalists. The mutiny seems
to be in response to
economic decline that
caused grievances among
the Haya.
There was a mutiny in
barracks in Bujumbura that
involved a shootout. No one
was injured or killed.
Rebels attacked a military
base, but then soldiers
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joined the rebels and
attacked various other
bases. The location that was
primarily targeted trains
Burundi officers. The
mutiny was violent.
Article does not give many
details but a mutiny
occurred in Gisenye and
Ruhengeri in the norths of
the country. The mutiny was
violent and killed at least
27. The article does not say
if these deaths were military
actors or civilians.
Former Presidential Guard
Chief and Serving Col. Tom
Byabagamba, and Brig-Gen.
Frank Rusagara were
arrested for inciting military
rebellion against strong man
President Kaul Kagame.
While there were only 2
implicated in this mutiny, it
is included because they
were military leaders and
commissioned officers.
Article does not give many
details, but indicates that
there was a mutiny in
Kismayu, the capital of
Lower Juba. Somali
Defense minister Husayn
Abd al-Rahman Husayn
Mattan and Commander of
the armed forces Brig-Gen
Masleh Muhammad Siyad
visited the barracks in order
to talk about "the
consolidation of defense"
and "the strengthening of
national unity".
Somalian soldiers defect
from the Puntland state
government on the
frontlines of the battle with
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secessionist Somaliland.
The leader, Col. Jama Muse
Umar told local radio
station that the soldiers
came to speak with
traditional elders in the
Puntland capital because
they had not been paid in
months. There were reports
that soldiers and military
leaders had driven into
Somaliland, in act of
defection. Apparently they
were welcomed warmly by
Somaliland leaders.
0 Somalian soldiers defect to
the Bay and Bakool regions
of southwestern Somalia.
About 100 men with
armored vehicles crossed
into Bay and Bakool
regions, moving away from
the government of
Mogadishu.
0 General Muhammad Gelle
Kahiye was accused by
TFG President Sharif of
being responsible or tons of
weapons missing from the
government's military
facilities in Mogadishu. The
President fired the military
chief and several
subordinates. Meanwhile,
hundreds of TFG troops in
the few areas under
government control have
mutinied due to nonpayment
of salaries.
0 Ahmed Amin Ma'alin
(military officer) defected
from Billa Baydhabo
military camp in
Mogadishu. He deserted the
apostate administration and
asked for amnesty from Al-

Somalia

520

1/1/2011

1

0

Somalia

520

4/4/2011

0

0

Somalia

520

7/20/2013

0

0

Somalia

520

3/15/2014

0

0

209

Shabab. All Shabab paraded
the defected military officer
in Baydhabo town.
Soldiers mutinied in
Mogidishu over
nonpayment of their
salaries. The mutiny was
violent.
Soldiers defected to AlShabab forces. A parliament
member blamed this
defection on some cabinet
ministers (a delegation of
government officials) that
arrived in this region,
spurring a mutiny and
subsequent defection. The
number of defected soldiers
doesn't appear to be too
large (although the article is
not explicit). The rebel
soldiers did take an armored
vehicle with them in their
defection. The
parliamentary member said
that he and his colleagues
used to contribute parts of
their salary to funding
government forces in the
region in an effort to
promote loyalty.
500 soldiers and 13
improvised fighting vehicles
defected from the Khaatumo
regional administration to
Somaliland. An agreement
between local elders in the
south of Sanaag Region
(Northern Somalia) and the
Somaliland administration
led to the defection of the
soldiers in an attempt to
combine previously warring
forces.
Article doesn't give many
details but Puntland Defense

Somalia

520

7/31/2014

0

0

Somalia

520

1/27/2015

0

0

Somalia

520

6/14/2015

0

0

Somalia

520

7/1/2015

0

0

Somalia

520

9/23/2015

0

0

210

Forces in 54th Somali Army
base staged a mutiny. They
set tires on fire and chanted
their military rights.
20 Puntland soldiers
defected to Somaliland's
separatist administration
after striking over salaries
that were unpaid.
Presidential Security Unit
(PSU) soldiers mutinied at
Boosaaso palace over
delayed pay. They had not
been paid for seven months.
A senior Commander of the
Interim Jubba
Administration defected to
Al-Shabab. Yusu Ma'alin
Abdi Nur defected because
of the atrocities carried out
by Jubaland forces against
civilians in the region. He
reportedly said that he
defected because he was
"disillusioned" by the
atrocities being carried out
by the local forces against
resides of the town
Husingow.
Mutiny is spurred over the
sacking of a military
commander by the Puntland
President. Soldiers were led
by General Muhidin. The
Puntland government
responds quickly due to the
geographical proximity of
the mutiny to Al-Shabab
activity.
Puntland paramilitary
soldiers entered the
administration's finance
office in Northern
Gaalkacyo and a local bank.
The soldiers were mutinying
over salaries that had not
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been paid in the last 7
months. The soldiers stated
that they were "not out to
cause trouble".
Troops formerly stationed in
the town of Gaalkacyo
mutinied. The exact reason
was not identified in the
article, but this seems like a
pay mutiny, which Somalia
is particularly prone to
during this time period.
An officer that previously
worked for the Galmudug
region government in
central Somalia handed
himself over and defected to
Al-Shabab. He was received
in ceremony at Xarardheere
town. He pledged his
allegiance to Al-Shabab and
vowed that he would never
return to work for
Glamudug and Puntland
administration in the future.
Soldiers mutiny over unpaid
salaries. Article doesn't give
many details.
Puntland military officers
took over the main customs
office and complained of
lack of salaries and
allowances from the
administration of President
Abdiweli Mohamed Ali
"Gas". Soldiers also seized
the region's parliamentary
compound several days
prior.
Soldiers were being housed
in Bali Doggle Airbase,
after 1500 mutineers were
drive out of Mogadishu. The
soldiers were protesting
unpaid salaries. The soldiers
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have been battling AlShabab for years.
0 Troops who were sent to
quell riots and dissent were
upset about pay. After
suppressing dissident
activity, soldiers requested
higher pay. They were
ultimately granted an
increase but said that it was
not good enough. The
dissident activity was
largely in response to an
economic downturn caused
by inflation and severe
drought and famine. A
second article discusses the
mutiny within the air force
which occurred
simultaneously. This mutiny
appears to be largely over
pay concerns and working
conditions.
0 Troops ended a three day
occupation of Asmara. The
rebel troops were making
various demands to the
central government and the
article indicates that most
times, the government
complied. The dissident
soldiers took hostages. The
unrest appeared to be
spreading to other parts of
the country.
0 Troops revolted and began
holding parts of Addis
Ababa. They took over a
radio station and forced
employees to broadcast
statements denouncing
former cabinet ministers and
army officers. The rebel
soldiers were protesting
their officers’ inaction
against 8 members of
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Parliament who called for
the release of 25 officials
that were held on corruption
charges.
Similar to event described
above. A rebellious faction
of the military took over a
radio station to appeal to the
population to help them
located individuals that
were on wanted list for
suspicion of corruption.
Military officers defected to
neighboring countries
including Kenya as the
intensity of conflict in
Ethiopia increased.
An army general (Gen.
Kemal Gelchu) deserted the
government and headed to
Eritrea (enemy of Ethiopia)
across the border with tens
of senior army officers and
hundreds of fully armed
soldiers. The general
allegedly defected because
of what he called
widespread violations of
human rights throughout the
country.
7 high ranking Ethiopian
military officers defected to
Ogaden National Liberation
Front. The officers defect to
ONLF and asked for a safe
passage to Somalia where
they believe they can get
Somali smugglers to take
them to Kenyan Refugee
camps. The article suggests
many more soldiers were
expected to defect in the
coming days, but there is no
follow up article to suggest
whether or not this actually
happened. Defectors
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reported that corruption
within the Ethiopian
Military, delayed pay and
bad strategy were the
primary reasons for the
defection.
6 high ranking military
officers defected from the
state after being scheduled
to deploy to Ogaden in
Southeastern Ethiopia
where government forces
are engaged in fighting
against rebels of ONLF. It
appears that this defection
was a result of
overwhelming losses and
commando attacks from
ONLF.
60 soldiers and two high
ranking colonels defected
from Ethiopia and fled to
Kenya. The article states
that the Weyane (Ethiopian)
government was trying to
return the defected soldiers
back to Ethiopia illegally.
Eight pilots crossed the
Eritrean boarder with an
unspecified number of
fighter jets to join the
Ginbot 7 and the Ethiopian
People's Patriotic front
armed opposition forces.
Three high ranking pilots
using sophisticated MI-35
helicopter gunship defected
to Eritrea. The Ethiopian
regime accused Eritrea of
hijacking the military
planes. However, this was a
high level defection.
100 soldiers lead by Saleh
Uthman, an officer,
surrounded the perimeter of
Eritrea's ministry of
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Information. The mutineers
had a long list of demands
that included:
implementation of the
constitution, installation of a
transitional government,
accountability, elimination
of officers' corruption,
release of political
prisoners, and others. This
does not appear to be a coup
attempt and is not coded by
Powell and Thyne.
0 A mutiny broke out among
MPLA units stationed in
Huambo. Dozens of soldiers
were injured in the fighting
between rival factions of the
MPLA army. The mutiny
spread to the town of
Longonjo, where there were
more shootouts.
0 Soldiers mutinied and
abandoned their units
fearing possible reprisals
from civilians in the event
of peace. During the 15 year
long war, many civilians
were subject to human
rights violations at the
hands of MPLA soldiers.
The mutinies were
occurring in several parts of
the country.
0 The 47th Tactical Group of
the MPLA stationed in Uige
mutinied because they were
demanding regular food
supplies. The mutineers
stated that they had been
without food from the
Luanda government for
months. They had been
relying on food that they
looted from local civilians.
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0 Article does not give many
details but states that a
mutiny occurred in Cahama.
Mutineers rebelled against
their commander. The
soldiers stormed the house
of the commander and took
civilian property that the
officer had stolen.
0 Government troops
mutinied in Lunda Province.
The unhappy soldiers were
demanding immediate
demobilization and
reintegration into civilian
live. The article indicates
that the mutiny was violent.
1 A mutiny erupted in
Cabinda because soldiers
were demanding an
immediate demobilization
and payment of salary
arrears. The army confirmed
that three government
soldiers were killed in the
violence. 9 individuals in
total were killed.
0 Demobilized soldiers
mutinied. More than 50
mutineers put up barricades
blocking main routes into
the city of Soyo.
0 300 soldiers from Maputo
garrison mutinied in
Marracuene. The mutineers
set up a barricade on the
road to the north of the
country. The government
said that the mutinies may
have been because soldiers
were, "manipulated by
agitators alien to the army."
0 Soldiers mutinied for two
days because they had not
been paid for 18 months.
They looted and robbed
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local shops. They seized a
plane of the state-owned
light aircraft company and
took the pilot hostage for
one night. They ended their
mutiny but threatened to
resume on 10/1 if their back
pay was not paid.
Two civilians were killed
after a mutiny in Chimoio.
The mutineers were
protesting, demanding
social reintegration and food
assistance.
100 demobilized soldiers
mutinied near the Nampula
provincial government
building. They were
demanding that they be paid
funds that were made
available by the central
government to help soldiers
reintegrate into society.
Soldiers mutinied because
they were protesting delays
in demobilization. Attempt
to assuage them only made
matters worse. The article
indicates that this was likely
several mutiny events
(average of 1 per day in
July).
Mutineers undertake
rebellion in response to the
peace process. The
mutineers blocked a dozen
roads and looted markets.
Reports suggest that women
were raped by rebellious
soldiers. The troops were
demanding immediate
demobilization.
4 sergeants were found to
incite mutiny of 43 soldiers.
The mutineers were part of
the Mozambique Defense
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Armed Forces (FADM) but
were previously part of the
rename ranks (National
resistance army).
A 16 hour long mutiny
began because soldiers were
protesting their working
conditions and the fact that
their salaries had not been
paid (specifically the
salaries of demobilized
soldiers), due to peace
agreement. The government
in Maputo quickly agreed to
pay the soldiers more in an
effort to end the rebellion.
100 demobilized soldiers
mutinied in front of the
Machava administrative
building because they were
promised to be paid
subsidies by Culima, a
Mozambican
nongovernmental
organization. A Culima
official was held hostage.
Two air force officers
defected from Malawi and
fled to Tanzania, asking for
political asylum. The prior
month, 12 army officers fled
to Zambia and asked for
political asylum.
200 armed guards from
nearby tea plantations
marched into Milange and
demanded demobilization
money ahead of the October
elections and the conclusion
of 16 years of civil war.
Soldiers of the UDF were
involved in a maizesmuggling scheme. The
Minister of Information
pointed out that this was a
mutiny, not a coup attempt
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like media outlets had been
reporting.
Article does not give many
details but suggests that Lt.
Col. James Joloma was
inciting soldiers to mutiny
using violence.
50 soldiers rebelled and
threatened to shoot their
military commander
General Kelvin Simwaka
due to a disagreement over
training allowances. A
paying officer told the
soldiers that they were
getting underpaid, which set
the mutiny into motion. The
army general did not move
to rectify the situation
which lead the soldiers to
mutiny. Soldiers were
rounded up by military
police and locked up at a
military barracks.
Officers within the
Malawian army were
dissatisfied with Army Chie
Ignancio Maulana because
their salaries were deducted
when they were serving on a
peace keeping mission in
the DRC. They protested
and stated that if he did not
step down that they would
take action to have him
removed.
New story doesn't give
many details. It indicates
that there were mutinies and
desertions that marked Mr.
Mugabe's rule in 1980 and
1981. These mutinies and
desertions seem to be a
result of ethnic divisions
(between the shonas and
Ndebeles).
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0 50 soldiers plus a few
officers refused to deploy to
Congo and have been
arrested. Many were
arguing that the war is not
constitutional and therefore
invalidates their contracts of
service.
0 26 army deserters were
recruited by the opposition
Movement for Democratic
change (MDC) and were
deployed into high-density
suburbs of Harare and
Chitungwiza to terrorize and
beat up civilians while
wearing army uniform in an
effort to prompt an uprising
by civilians. The deserters
were suspected to have
strong links with the MDC's
underground military wing
which had allegedly planned
to bomb all service stations
in Harare and other major
cities during this uprising.
The MDC later denied that
it had any connection to
these renegade soldiers.
0 During the height of a
Cholera epidemic, soldiers
mutinied after they failed to
access their paltry wages as
a result of cash strapped
banks. The mutiny is violent
and full of riots, but the
soldiers were unarmed. The
news story suggest that this
unrest is a reflection of
Mugabe's waning popularity
and legitimacy.
0 Mutineers take to the streets
of Harare and attack and rob
foreign currency dealers
because they had not been
paid. They had demanded
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money from the banks but
the mint had not been able
to print enough. The news
story suggest that the "vast
majority" of all troops are
very unhappy with Mugabe.
The unrest seems to be a
symptom of the
disintegration of
Zimbabwe's economy.
15 armed soldiers looted a
shop belonging to an
opposition movement,
Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC). The
soldiers said that they were
looting because their
salaries were not sufficient.
The military took over the
census tracking and
counting process because it
paid $90 a day. Thousands
of soldiers stormed centers
where enumerators (mostly
teachers) were completing
their final training session.
The soldiers forced the
teachers out and started
counting.
Lt. Gerald Andreas Eckert
defected to Mozambique in
order to, "show that there
are also whites inside the
South African armed forces
who do not agree with
apartheid". While this
mutiny was only carried out
by one individual it is
included because he was a
commissioned officer.
Story doesn't give many
details but the mutiny was
largely in response to the
troops' unhappiness with
their involvement in the
Angolan War. The state
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leadership was subsequently
accused of brutality while
breaking up the uprising.
The state and loyal military
officials seemed to be quite
heavy-handed in their
repressive response.
0 400 black soldiers mutinied
and refused to fight on the
side of the rebels of the
National Union for the total
indolence of Angola, or
UNITA, which was trying
to overthrow the sovietbacked Angolan
government. South African
troops were in southern
Angola fighting on the side
of guerilla forces against
Angolan Troops. These
battles seemed to be
extremely bloody.
0 Transkei soldiers that were
part of the state military
took 23 senior officers
hostage. They were
protesting pay disparities
between the south African
defense force and their
traskei military battalions.
General Holomisa promised
to reform the command
structure in response to the
demands of the mutineers.
0 Close to 200 men mutinied
and complained about
corrupt generals and poor
working conditions. They
were expected to travel via
government vehicle 20 km
from Lenasia to Doornkop
every day. However, due to
a shortage of space in
vehicles, they decided to
walk in a form of protest.
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0 Soldiers marched in Pretoria
to the Union Buildings and
demanded a 30% increase in
pay. At the time of the
story, the soldiers and the
state were still negotiating.
The news story implies that
there will likely be more
mutinies, however there are
no follow up articles.
Military intelligence had
exposed a plan to kidnap
senior military officials at a
function at a military base
earlier in the month.
0 3,000 soldiers in Pretoria
mutinied over pay
grievances. The story
doesn't give many details,
but this appears to be a foot
soldier mutiny.
0 2/3 of the Namibia Defense
Force (NDF) did not show
up at a military parade
because they were in shock
over the news that their
Chief. Lt-Gen Martin Shalli
had been suspended. The
soldiers claimed to be sick
but they were really defying
orders because of Shalli's
suspension.
0 Mutiny was spurred by pay
grievances. South African
officials seemed extremely
concerned about the
potential for diffusion of
this unrest to their state. The
mutineers fired mortars and
machine guns. The
mutineers originally
demanded a 100% pay
increase.
0 Mutineers killed one
minister and kidnapped four
others who were taken to
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army barracks and later
freed. The soldiers were
mutinying over pay rather
than trying to stage a coup.
A mutiny was put down just
a few months ago over pay,
and pay policies were never
adjusted or updated.
Protests over a disputed
election led to a mutiny. A
fresh election was to be held
15-18 months after the
disputed election. More than
60 soldiers were killed
during the mutiny
(including troops sent from
South Africa and Botswana
to quell unrest).
23 soldiers of the Lesotho
Defense force (LDF)
mutinied. They were lead by
army commander, Lt-Gen
Maaparankoe Mahao. LtGen was shot by other
military colleagues who
suspected him of leading
this mutiny. The mutineers
sought to topple the LDF
command.
General Fidy went on the
run after a mutiny.
Presidential candidates said
that his defection was
legitimate. His rebellion
was spurred by problems of
low pay for foot soldiers.
Soldiers mutinied at a major
military camp just outside
of Antananarivo in protest
of the government's
repression of opposition
demonstration in months
prior. The soldiers were
calling on all the country's
law and order forces
(police) to join their
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rebellion. The article
indicates that officers
supported and backed the
actions of the soldiers.
Story does not give many
details, but troops mutinied
in Antananarivo. The rebel
troops and security forces
exchanged fire and two
soldiers were killed. The
mutiny only lasted a day.
The story doesn't give
details about why the
mutiny happened. Mutinous
soldiers took over a military
camp and shot an army
officer that was sent in to
negotiate their surrender.
The story calls this a coup
attempt, but it is not a direct
action to oust the executive
and is not coded by Powell
and Thyne. A breakaway
Comorian island of Anjouan
experienced a mutiny.
Troops seized Anjouan's
radio station in an effort to
reinstate their preferred
leader, Col. Said Abeid. The
mutiny was violent and
included a civilian death.
Soldiers mutinied and took
nearly 200 hostages. The
Seychelles government
called for help from
Tanzania, South Africa, and
UK. The story seems to
indicate that the mutineers,
led by Sgt. George Nichole,
were not happy with the
Rene Government.
However, this was not a
coup attempt and is not
coded by Powell and Thyne.
Rebellious soldiers reported
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that they had been treated
like "pigs" by officers.
2,000 Moroccan soldiers
left their camps and crossed
over into Algeria.
50-100 soldiers deserted
during a battle with rebel
nationalists. The French
leadership started a big
round-up to catch the
deserters. Not many details
given.
The stories are confusing.
To condense a lot of
material, French troops
spurred a mutiny in Algiers.
They were staging the
mutiny against President De
Gaulle. It's not immediately
clear what their intentions
were.
This mutiny was a very
large, barracks mutiny.
Reports suggest that 2,5005,000 soldiers rebelled.
These were mostly young
conscripts doing their
compulsory military service.
The government forces
responded with extreme
violence and bombed the
barracks.
An officer in the Algerian
army defected and fled to
Morocco. His decision to do
so was motivated by human
rights abuses in Algeria and
economic hardships.
Although this is only one
individual, it is included as
a mutiny because he was a
commissioned officer.
600 soldiers rebelled and
troops loyal to Col.
Muammar el-Qaddafi
crushed the rebellion. There
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were no known deaths
associated with the mutiny.
The article doesn't indicate
why the original mutiny
occurred. It is clear that the
state was trying to cover-up
the rebellion and down play
its significance in an effort
to look strong and resolute.
Libyan Army and Air force
mutinied after receiving
orders to invade Tunisia.
The article says that troops
tried unsuccessfully to
overthrow the Libyan
Leader, Qaddafi, but this
doesn’t appear to be a coup
attempt and is not coded by
Powell and Thyne.
A lieutenant colonel, a
senior officer, and his crew
landed their plane in Abu
Simbel airport in upper
Egypt after defecting from
the battlefield in Chad. The
individuals disagreed with
the campaign and strategy
in Chad. Also, they may
have been upset about the
killing of three dissident
soldiers several weeks
before the event.
A mutiny occurred in the
Aziza camp after the U.S.
amped up air raids. 8
mutineers were shot and
killed. The mutiny was in
response to Gadhafi's
extreme policies that
resulted in the ramping up
of U.S. aggression.
Troops mutinied over pay at
the Zawiyah barracks.
While this happened in very
close proximity to a coup, it
is clear that there is a low
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level mutiny occurring
several days before the coup
attempt.
Mutiny broke out when
units of the army refused to
attack Misrata, Libya's third
largest city and the only
place in the west of the
country that was still
defying Gaddafi's rule.
There was infighting
between troops loyal to
Gaddafi and those that
weren't.
A limited mutiny took place
inside Gaddafi's residence.
The mutiny was led by
junior officers from the proLibyan regime armed
forces. Gaddafi's security
forces intervened and
crushed the mutiny
immediately. This does not
appear to be a coup attempt,
but rather intimidation
tactics. This event is not
coded by Powell and Thyne.
A Colonel, four lieutenant
colonels, and four rank and
file soldiers left their post
and fled to Tunisia. This
seems to be one event of
many like this in the same
month.
360 soldiers of the
Equatorial corps of the
defense force mutinied and
forced senior officers to
flee. This mutiny was
violent. Powell and Thyne
have this coded as a coup
but I think this is incorrect.
At least from the sources I
located, this event was
targeted at military
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leadership, not the
executive.
60 army officers mutinied
because they were
dissatisfied with the
government's attempts to
repress the rebellion among
southern Sudanese. During
the mutiny, officers refused
to receive orders from
superiors. Later they
demanded that the army
commander listen to their
demands and grievances
while he was detained.
Article was written in 2014,
but recounts a mutiny that
occurred in 1983. Sudanese
army units took place at Bor
and the Khartoum army
leadership dispatched
Colonel Garang to suppress
the mutiny. However, Col.
Garang joined the mutiny
and became its leader rather
than suppressing it. Many
trace back to this event to
explain the rise of SPLA,
the guerrilla movement.
Article doesn't give many
details, but states that a
detachment of Division 105
of the First Battalion of the
Southern Region mutinied.
The command had shown
signs of indiscipline over
the proceeding months. The
mutineers stole large
quantities of arms,
ammunition, and explosives
from a store in Bor.
Mutiny occurs in North
Khartoum and in
Omdurman. Mutiny
appeared to have ben in
response to northern troops
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refusing to obey orders to
enter the war zone in the
south. Civilians died during
this mutiny. Roadblocks
were set up to apprehend
deserters and mutineers.
State troops mutinied in
Juba as they were ordered to
transfer to the north. They
took control of the Juba
airport and ordered an
airline to take them to
Khartoum. 65 men
including the commander
and his deputy were
captured and killed by loyal
forces.
A military battalion
stationed at the Kutum
Garrison in Darfur refused
orders from the Armed
Forces General Command's
operations department in
Khartoum. The battalion
had been ordered to move to
the Eastern border for
military preparations. Local
populations expressed
sympathy for the rebel
battalion and supplied them
with food and water. The
battalion warned that they
would fire on anyone who
went near them.
Students in military training
program defected and fled
the camp in response to a
controversial program that
may have involved
deploying students to war
zone in southern and eastern
Sudan.
Two army convoys in
Sudan mutinied after trying
to recapture the town of
Togan from the opposition
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(National Democratic
Alliance - NDA). The
troops rebelled after
suffering a major defeat
against the NDA.
The date given in the article
is rather unclear. It says the
mutiny occurred sometime
in 2003 or 2004. As such,
the mutiny has been coded
to have occurred in Jan. of
2004, but the article isn't
precisely clear. The mutiny
occurred when 18 soldier
refused to deploy from AlUbayyid city to the town of
Umbro in northern Darfur
and instead went to alFashir capital city with 26
vehicles.
Mutiny occurred over
unpaid salaries. Heavy gun
fire was reported in Juba,
the administrative capital of
South Sudan. The mutiny
began in the barracks.
50 people died in this
mutiny. The mutiny
occurred in Makalal during
the separation of Sudan's
northern and southern
armies right before
secession. The members of
an army unit refused to
redeploy with their weapons
to the north and trend on
other members of their unit.
A paramilitary (central
reserve police) mutinied in
Darfur. They mutineers
fired weapons into the air in
the state capital El Geneina
near the Chadian border.
Members of this
paramilitary group used to
belong to the Janjaweed,
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before being folded back
into the state's military.
"Dozens" of soldiers from
the Sudan Armed Forces
(SAF) and other
paramilitaries deserted their
posts in Makja, Disa, and
Dondero. There are two
possible reasons for this
rebellion. First, the officer
indicated that soldiers
defected because they did
not want to take up arms
against possible relatives in
the state in which rebels
were operating. Second,
they were protesting against
the non-payment of their
salaries after the battles of
Malkin and Kalgo.
A mutiny occurred between
troops loyal to Salva Kiir,
the president, and troops
backing Riek Machar, the
former deputy and leading
cleric. Hundreds of civilians
had to flee to UN bases. The
fighting largely took place
around a barracks. The
article calls this a coup
attempt but it is not coded
by Powell and Thyne and
there is no attempt to oust
the executive.
Air force officers joined
SPLM/A in opposition to a
lack of diversity in the
army. The officers accused
South Sudan's government
of tribalism and a poor
promotion policy.
Major Losuba Lodoru, a
SPLA officer, defected and
formed a new rebel
movement. This officer had
been really well respected
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by military leadership prior
to his rebellion. This event
is included since a
commissioned officer
defected.
Renegade Deputy
Commander Johnson Olony
defected to the rebels. The
state accused him of aiding
the rebels and helping them
cross a river from the
western side of Malakal
city. This helped the rebels
claim part of Malakal city
and recapture it from the
control of President Salva
Kiir's forces.
General Chan Garang
defected to the rebels. While
this mutiny does not meet
the threshold for size, it is
included because he was a
high ranking officer.
Because of a rising death
toll within Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps,
senior commanders and
junior officers refused to
obey orders to fight in
Syria. The mutineers were
referred to a court-marshal
on charges of mutiny and
treason. This mutiny
followed many pounding
losses in Syria and several
deaths of Iranian soldiers,
even though Iran denied the
presence of Iranian soldiers
on the ground in Syria.
500 men from the elite Iraqi
republican guard defected
and fled with their arms
together to Anarab state.
The soldiers did so in
response to Iraq's
aggression against Kuwait.
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0 Two of Saddam Hussein's
sons defected to Jordan.
They were Lieut. Gen.
Hussein Kamel, the husband
of Hussein's oldest
daughter. Kamel oversaw
the biological and chemical
weapons and nuclear
research program in Iraq.
The other defector was Col.
Saddam Kamel who was
married to Hussein's other
daughter, Rana. Kamel was
in charge of Iraq's special
forces.
0 Article mentions a mutiny
that occurred when a
battalion of the Iraqi army
was ordered to deploy to
Fallujah in order to assist
U.S. marines who were
actively fighting there. The
troops refused the orders to
deploy and during the
weeks that followed more
than 15,000 soldiers and
police officers deserted.
This forced the U.S. to
reevaluate recruiting and
retention strategies.
0 A second mutiny occurred
is Fallujah. After being
involved in heavy fighting
with insurgents, a second
unit of Iraqi forces
mutinied. Part of the 36th
battalion rebelled after 11
days of brutal conflict. U.S.
marines had to parse
through and separate
soldiers that wanted to fight
from those that refused. The
article suggests that the
battalion may have split
along ethnic lines. About
half of the soldiers were not
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Iraqi, but Kurdish
Peshmerga. The Kurds were
ready to fight but the Iraqi
Arab soldiers had vowed
that they had enough
fighting.
After completing a 5 week
training program at Camp
Habbaniyah, a base 45 miles
west of the capital, dozens
of soldiers began to protest
the fact that they would
have to serve outside their
home areas. The soldiers
began ripping their clothes
off in rage. The mutiny was
rather short lived and was
brought under control
quickly.
100 soldiers defied orders to
move into Baghdad as part
of a large security
crackdown in the capital
city. The mutiny was
spurred by sectarian divides.
The soldiers believed they
would be operating in their
own region or "homeland"
and did not want to patrol
other areas.
1,300 soldiers and
policemen refused to fight
against Shiite militias in
Basra during an attack.
The awakening guard,
which was heavily funded
by the U.S. experienced a
mutiny in which members
feared they might be
receiving unfair treatment
from the Shia-led
government for sectarian
reasons. The rebellious
troops clashed with Iraqi
forces. Some were
suspected of planting a road
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side bomb. This lead to a
U.S. air strike targeting the
rebellious soldiers.
1,000 Kurdish troops from
the Iraqi army (16th
Brigade) deserted. They
desired to be integrated into
forces loyal to the Kurdish
region. The troops
disobeyed orders to take
part in an operation against
a mainly Sunni Arab town.
Iraqi army deserted Kirkuk
and have been replaced by
Peshmerga fighters. The
soldiers even abandoned
their uniforms and fled in
civilian clothing. These
desertions were largely in
response to the growing
threat of ISIS.
Major General Hussein
Sirry Amer and Col. El
Sayed Farah were charged
with desertion and
attempting to spread alarm
among their troops. The
article doesn't give many
details. While this event
only includes 2 individuals
(although it may have
included their troops too, it's
unclear) it is considered a
mutiny because these were
commissioned officers.
25,000 conscripts of the
CSF (paramilitary force)
staged protest in Cairo in
response to a rumor that
conscription was going to
mandate 4 years of service
instead of three. The mutiny
was very violent. More info
here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wik
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i/1986_Egyptian_conscripts
_riot
There was a mutiny among
Egyptian forces in Saudi
Arabia due to a
disagreement between lower
ranking Egyptian Officers
and the Egyptian forces'
commander. Mubarak sent a
military delegation to Saudi
Arabia to resolve the issue.
In Obour City, hundreds of
Central Security Forces
conscripts mutinied over
torture that they endured
committed by their officers.
They blocked the road and
started chanting anti-police
songs. The mutiny was put
down quickly. The
conscripts were poorly paid,
fed and had to endure
torture.
Col. Kerim Nahlawi staged
a mutiny and recruited
active soldiers. The Syrian
government was locked in
negotiations with the
mutineers that threatened to
occupy Damascus if their
demands were not met. The
article does not clearly
outline what the demands of
the mutineers were. This
event escalated into a coup,
although it very clearly
started as a mutiny.
The article doesn't give
many details but says that
Syrian troop mutinied on
the Israeli frontier because
they demanded that Syria
reunite with Egypt.
Syrian troops mutiny in
Saudi Arabia after seeing
that some of the Western
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military personnel were
wearing a star of David.
Desertions were occurring
in Deir al-Zour in the
northwestern province of
Idlib, and in towns around
Homs and Damascus. Size
of desertions not mentioned.
Soldiers mutinied in Jisr alShughor is response to
heavy repression committed
by pro-government gunman
known as "shabiha".
Soldiers ultimately defected.
It seems that the soldiers
were most likely Sunni,
resizing the Alawite
minority that rules. Mutiny
was certainly spurred by
sectarian divisions.
Similar as above. Defectors
were reported to launch
deadly guerrilla raids on
state loyal convoys and
fortifications. Article points
out that Syrian defectors
lack international support,
which is likely why Assad is
able to weather such large
defections.
4 high ranking Syrian
officers defected to camp in
Turkey. Many of them seem
to have ties to the FSA. Lt.
Khaled al-Hamoud joined
the ranks of the FSA as an
advisor.
Report suggests that there
were "major defections"
from units in the Syrian
Army that were
headquartered close to the
Republican Palace in
Latakia. The mutiny
involved 30 soldiers.
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0 Syrian air force colonel
defects to Jordan. This event
does not meet the threshold
for mutiny, but because
commissioned officer
defected, it is included in
dataset. The article indicates
that this was an anti-Assad
act on behalf of the colonel.
0 A general, a major, 2
colonels, and 33 soldiers
defected from Syria in an
act against Assad. They fled
to Turkey.
0 A female military officer
announced her defection
from Assad on video.
Colonel Zubaida al-miki an Alawite Muslim, calls on
other officers to join her in
defection against Assad.
She stated that he was
fomenting a "sectarian
conflict in order to destroy
the revolution." While this
event does not meet the
minimum threshold for a
mutiny, it is included
because Al-Miki is a
commissioned officer.
0 15 military officers and
their families crossed the
Syrian border to the Turkish
Reyhanli area in the
Antakya-Hatay province.
The motivation of this
mutiny was not stated.
0 Major General Abdul Aziz
Jasssem al-Shallal, the chief
of the military police,
appointed by Bashar al
Assad to prevent defections,
defected himself. He said
that the Syrian military had
"deviated from its mission
to protect the country and
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had transformed in a gang
for killing and destruction."
He fled to Turkey. This
event does not meet the
threshold for mutiny, but
because commissioned
officer defected, it is
included in dataset.
A Syrian general (high
ranking) who once led the
military intelligence office
defected from the army and
presumably joined the
rebels. This defection
occurred immediately after
the rebels' top military
commander called for
members of the armed
services to join the uprising
against Assad. Although
this doesn't meet minimum
threshold for size, it is
included because this was a
commissioned rank that
defected.
Soldiers turn in their
weapons to state loyal
leaders. This events
occurred because regime
forces wanted to instant a
rocket launcher to shell the
Eastern Ghouta District of
Jaramana, which residents
felt to be a breach of a
previous agreement to keep
this area out of the Syrian
war.
Mutineers were led by
Junior officers in a mutiny.
The mutineers demanded a
salary increase and also the
dismissal of the Premier; the
army chief of staff, and Lt.
Gen Zaid Ben-shaker.
A Christian officer, Col.
Paul Faris, led a rebellion
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against General Aoun. He
set up a "neutral Command"
in Amsheet and encouraged
soldiers to join him in
resisting General Aoun
because of the way he led
the army. Faris argued that
Aoun deserved to be
executed. Aoun condemned
Faris's actions and called
him a renegade.
Article doesn't give many
specifics. Sheikh Ahmad
Abd-al-Wahid was killed at
a military check point. It
was not clear exactly who
killed him, but it clearly was
not ordered by military
leadership. More
information can be found
here:
https://www.theguardian.co
m/world/2012/may/23/syria
-uprising-lebanon-assad
Article is brief but says that
15 mutineers were
imprisoned for their recent
protest against extending the
draft period from 2 years to
30 months. The article
indicates that the mutiny did
not last very long.
The article does not give
many details but states that
Abraham Isaac Polack, a 32
year old officer in the Israeli
army, defected to S.
Lebanon. He is one of four
soldiers to do so within the
month. While this event
does not meet the minimum
size threshold it is included
because a commissioned
officer was involved.
60 soldiers mutinied
because their commanding
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officer would not allow
them to sleep and forced
them to train in a state of
sleep deprivation. They
announced that they refused
to eat, drink or change until
the officer was replaced.
Finally, the brigade
commander was brought in
and was able to end the
strike.
0 Israel soldiers mutinied
because of what they felt
was mismanagement by
some of their officers. The
officers had failed to
anticipate and ambush
because they literally fell
asleep on the job. The
situation was complicated
by illicit drug trade
conducted by Israeli
officers.
0 28 air force pilots were fired
and set to be tried for their
mutiny which resulted in
them refusing to attack
Palestinian towns. The
pilots wrote a letter that
outraged the military
establishment and must of
the public who had
previously held the pilots
with high esteem. The pilots
were unsatisfied with the
grand strategy of the
military establishment.
0 20 soldiers mutinied and
forced commanding officers
to chase them through the
streets in public in the
northern border town of
Kiryat Shmona. The mutiny
was staged in support and in
solidarity with 6 soldiers
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after infantrymen had their
privileges suspended.
10 soldiers and 2 officers
refused to take part in a raid
that was intended to remove
thousands of Jewish settlers
from the Gaza strip. More
than 40 soldiers considered
not following orders after
consulting with rabbis and
family members, according
to the article.
A mutiny followed a protest
by conscripts that disrupted
a swearing in ceremony.
These mutineers were prosettler soldiers. There was
another small mutiny in
November but it was not
large enough to meet formal
coding rules.
Article doesn't give specific
date, but mutineers were
protesting what they saw as
incompetence on the part of
their platoon commander.
They had reported concerns
that went unanswered. As
such, they refused orders
during training in the Jordan
Valley.
Article says that Saudi
troops mutinied in
Awamiyah after an
accidental explosion killed
many soldiers. The article
suggests that the mutineers
rebelled because they did
not want to carry out field
operations against civilians
and follow the regime's
orders to "crackdown" on
protestors.
Republican security forces
in the Yemeni capital shot
and killed Maj. Abdel
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Raqeeb Abdel-Wahab. The
major shot at the forces that
had surrounded his house.
The general was considered
to be a hero among leftists
and those that belonged to
the Shafei sect of Sunni
Islam.
Article doesn't give many
details but a mutiny
occurred within the divided
army apparatus. The rebel
soldiers defected while a
large portion of the military
remained loyal to president
Saleh.
300 Yemeni soldiers
defected to rebels. The state
responded with heavy
repression and fighting. One
strike hit a bus carrying
civilians, resulting in
causalities.
400 Yemeni troops mutinied
as they refused orders to fire
on peaceful protestors. They
were welcomed by troops
that had mutinied in the
previous March. The
protestors celebrated the
defections.
Soldiers rebelled against the
authority of General
Mohamed Saleh al-Ahmar,
former president Saleh's
half brother. The rebel
soldiers staged a sit-in at a
military base and
encouraged other soldiers to
join them and support their
demands. The soldiers cited
corruption in the form of
military leadership stealing
portions of their salaries to
line their own pockets. The
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state responded by heavily
repressing soldiers.
Article discusses a mutiny
against a rebellious general.
This does not count as a
mutiny as these troops had
already split from the state,
but the article discusses two
other mutinies that occurred
in military camps. On in the
southern Shabwah
Governorate. Hundreds of
soldiers mutinied
demanding payment of
overdue salaries.
Same as above but occurred
in Aden. Shots were fired
into the air to disperse
soldiers.
"Thousands" of airmen
mutinied in order to
encourage the new president
to dismiss the commander
of the air force who held his
post for more than 20 years.
The commander had had
familial ties to the ousted
president. Airmen camped
out for weeks near the
president’s home. Many low
ranking airmen went on
strike for more than two
weeks to press their
demands.
A new leader of the 3rd
Republican Guard Brigade,
Al-Halili, was unable to
assume control of his new
position. He was appointed
to replace former president
Salih's nephew, by new
President Hadi. Maqwala,
brigadier chief of staff and
on of the former president's
aides, deployed tanks in and
outside of the brigade's
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headquarters. He instructed
soldiers to reject the new
appointment and resist the
commander's orders.
0 93 soldiers and officers
mutinied and assaulted a
military defense complex in
Sanaa. They deserted their
posts, refused orders, fired
on military leaders.
0 According to available
information, Brigadier AlQushaybi was besieged in
the Al-Amaliqah Brigade's
headquarters, which he
visited the day before
yesterday to contain the
incidents. Other protesters,
who demanded that their
former commander return to
his post, prevented General
Al-Qushaybi from leaving
the headquarters to perform
the Friday prayers.
According to information
leaked from the brigade's
headquarters, this triggered
severe tension as loyal and
protesting officers drew
their guns against one
another, prompting
Brigadier Al-Qushaybi to
remain at the headquarters
and perform the prayers
there.
0 Mutineers demanded the
ousting of commander
Brigadier Mohammad alBukhaiti. They besieged his
office and a clash broke out
between guards of the
commander and the soldiers
who were wanting him to be
dismissed because of
accusations that he was
making illegal deductions
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from their payroll. Weapons
were used.
1 In Rada, soldiers mutinied
form the RG 1st Mountain
Infantry division. They
blocked roads and forced
locals to close businesses.
Many believe that this event
was carried out in collusion
with or under the directive
of al-Qaidah. The mutinous
soldiers were very
aggressive and conducted
violent confrontations with
civilians that resulted in
civilian casualties.
0 Mutineers opened fire in the
air to prevent security chief
from entering the
administrative building in
the capital. They blocked
Chief of capital secretariat
security, brigadier Dr. Umar
Abd-al-Karim Abdu from
entering his office until
demands are met. The goals
of the mutineers were not
directly stated.
0 About 500 soldiers mutinied
against president AbdRabbuh Mansur Hadi. The
soldiers were from the
former presidential Guard
used weapons to confront
units of the presidential
protection force. Mutineers
demanded the dismissal of
the defense minister
Muhammad Nasir Ahmand,
and Finance minister Sakhr
al-Wajih stating that they
had abused human rights.
The mutiny was suppressed
within hours. This does not
appear to be a coup attempt
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and was not coded by
Powell and Thyne.
Parts of the Special Security
forces mutinied in response
to the former president,
Hadi, being fired from his
post as secretary general.
The new appointee, Maroni,
had close ties to the Houthi
movement. The
appointment was thought be
part of the government's
plan to integrate Houthi
militants into the country's
military.
A portion of Yemeni troops
tried to defect to Houthi
rebel forces. They were met
with air strikes. More
information here:
http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east33443092
Soldiers rebelled and took
control of the Kingdom's
primary port, Hodeida. A
soldier was killed by a
judge, which did not stop
his car when the soldier was
trying to get him to stop.
This resulted in troops
killing the judge and his
brother. They then paraded
the body through the streets
and destroyed the judge's
house.
Afghan troops mutiny
against Soviet-backed
government. Mutiny puts
pressure on soviets to
repress heavily or pull out
completely.
Mutiny occurs in Kabul.
Government loyal forces
were able to put it down.
There were civilian deaths,
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but these deaths appear to
be unrelated to the mutiny
itself. Article doesn't
indicate why mutiny
occurred in the first place.
Troops of the 8th division in
the Afghan army deployed
in South Kabul mutinied
against their Soviet
commanders The troops
used their weapons against
the Soviet troops. The
Soviet troops responded by
moving against the
rebellious troops and
dropping bombs.
Demoralized Afghan
soldiers mutinied, killing 30
officers and blowing up an
ammunition dump. Not
immediately clear who led
mutiny.
100 Karmal troops of the
8th division mutinied.
About half of the mutineers
defected to join insurgent
groups.
Afghan soldiers deserted
their posts after news came
that tours were to be
extended from three to four
years. Many soldiers on
guard near Kabul airport
and the main army bases in
SW Kabul fled their posts
after hearing the news. The
size of the mutiny is not
reported.
Afghani troops mutiny after
Soviet officers execute one
of their comrades. Said
comrade was executed
because he reportedly
bought hashish frequently
from Muslim rebels. Violent
mutiny with lots of
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destruction of military
property.
184 Afghani soldiers
defected to a leading
guerilla group. The article
indicates that the defection
was likely a result of low
morale because of a lack of
supplies.
Assassination of Abdul
Rahman Haqqani, a member
of the Afghan Mujahedeen,
sparked mutiny. General
Abdul Malik led the mutiny
because he felt that a
general was protecting
Haqqani's killers.
Afghanistan Special Forces
Commander defects to
insurgents. While this event
does not meet the minimum
threshold, it is considered a
mutiny since a commander
was involved. The
commander took with him
his teams guns and high
tech equipment.
25 soldiers defected to the
Taliban in Qaysar.
300 Arbakis joined the
Taliban and vowed to
support its interests
Very similar event to
10/20/2014 defections, but
smaller and in a different
location. 25 soldiers
defected in Kohestanat and
joined the Taliban. They
took with them over 15
Kalashnikovs.
71 active soldiers defected
to the Taliban. They took
with them tanks, vehicles,
and weapons. They vowed
to support the goals of the
Taliban.
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0 30 Afghan soldiers defected
to the Taliban in Kohestanat
district. They pledged to
support the goals of the
Taliban for the rest of their
lives. They took their
weapons and ammunition
with them when they
defected.
0 70 Afghan soldiers and 5
commanders defected to the
Taliban in the district of
Sangin. The deserters took
their weapons with them
when they defected. A local
tribal elder indicated that
the soldiers defected due to
a lack of weapons,
ammunition and rations.
The Taliban had distributed
leaflets stating that if the
soldiers stayed and fought
they would be killed but if
they defected they would be
spared.
0 41 Afghan National army
soldiers surrendered their
base to the Taliban in Chora
district. This follows several
other small events of base
surrender in the same week.
0 Two army commanders
partnered to lead mutiny.
The mutiny was "short
lived" and the mutineers
were appeased by changes
in the cabinet. Opposition
fighters took advantage of
the confusion and launched
a new assault in the
mountains of central
Tajikistan.
0 Colonel Mahmud
Khudoiberdyev led 1,200
troops in the North and
seized several towns. For
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more information see:
http://www.rferl.org/a/1089
948.html
Mutiny commanded by
former deputy defense
minister Abukhalim
Nazarzoda. Attack on police
station and weapons depot
in Dushanbe. Participants
were recently tried.
Communist troops attacked
Nanking and the state troops
fled the area. This gave way
to looting and the
destruction of civilian
property. The article
suggests that the troops
deserted the city because
they believed that their
commanders had lost
control of the situation.
The article is very brief but
says that a battalion of
Chinese communist (6th
security regiment( mutinied
on Dec. 22 on Taishan
Island off the south China
coast. The mutiny was led
by a battalion commander.
200 (possibly more) of his
troops turned machine guns
on other loyal soldiers. It
appears that the mutineers
left their post and joined
Chinese guerrillas.
China military vessel
experiences mutiny. Several
soldiers die. Floats into
South Korean waters when
runs out of fuel. Is returned
eventually to China.
Troops fought among
themselves at the Nanyuan
military air base south of
Beijing. The fighting was
very violent and shelling
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could be heard from far
away. The People's
Liberation Army was deeply
split over the massacre that
occurred earlier in the week.
Sections of the army wore
white arm bands to signify
support for the student
protestors.
Xu Junping, a senior colonel
in the People's liberation
army defected to the U.S..
He also held the position of
director at the Defense
ministry's Bureau of North
American and Oceanic
Affairs. This event does not
meet the minimum size
threshold for a mutiny but
because it was a colonel (or
a commissioned officer) it
counts as a mutiny.
Maj. Huang Che Cheng
flew his plane into Chinese
territory and defected. This
event does not meet the
minimum size threshold for
a mutiny but because it was
a major (or a commissioned
officer) it counts as a
mutiny.
Maj. Li Dawei flew his
plane into Chinese territory
and defected to communist
China. This event does not
meet the minimum size
threshold for a mutiny but
because it was a major (or a
commissioned officer) it
counts as a mutiny.
A North Korean fighter
pilot flew his plan into
South Korean air space and
dipped his wings to signal
that he was not hostile. He
landed the plane and was
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monitored closely. He
indicated that he could no
longer live under the North
Korean regime. The article
indicates that this pilot was
someone who the regime
trusted and clearly a higher
ranked military actor. Thus,
while this event does not
surpass the threshold of
minimum size for a mutiny,
it counts because a high
ranked military actor was
involved.
31 men mutinied against
their commanders in 1971
in a secret mission that was
never fully realized and
carried out. Unit 684 was
kept on an island because
relations had improved with
north Korea so the mission
was postponed. Several died
in bad conditions and the
rest mutinied in order to
escape the conditions.
5 generals led a mutiny of
Dec. 12 1979 that killed
three men and seriously
injured many others. The
leading general (General
Chung) was charged with
sedition. There were
allegations that he was
taking side payments for his
actions. There article does
not indicate why the
original mutiny occurred.
Indian troops revolt against
British leadership. 8
causalities and 33 wounded.
Revolt was against imperial
rule and contributed to
independence of India.
Similar as above
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0 Article only briefly
mentions information on
1984 mutiny. Sikh soldiers
mutiny as Indian military
desecrates holy sites. More
info found at
http://www.csmonitor.com/
1984/0612/061237.html
0 A young soldier died after
the infantry units leadership
ordered a 10 km march.
After the soldier’s death,
several other soldiers
mutinied and began fighting
senior officers. There aren't
many details about the
event.
0 Soldiers took to social
media complaining about
poor food and facilities.
While this alone does not
constitute an obvious
mutiny, one paramilitary
soldier in India's elite
security units shot for of his
senior officers dead in an
act of protest. Taken
together, this month’s
events represent an
observable violation of the
chain of command.
0 Brig Ali is charged and
convicted of encouraging
mutiny among 4 other
officers. He himself is a
Brigadier.
0 Large mutiny, up to 70
killed in Dhaka. Elements of
the paramilitary Bangladesh
Rifles mutinied for 33
hours.
0 There was a four day long
mutiny that occurred in the
town of Thayetmyo. It
appears that the mutineers
began attacking loyal
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troops. The article does not
give many details about this
event, but it appears to be a
violent mutiny that lasted
four days. Other articles
indicate that this was a
mutiny among the Burma
Rifles battalions.
Troops joined
prodemocracy protests
because regime was
targeting peaceful
protesters.
200 air force pilots defected
to the anti-government
protestors side. This event
was in close proximity to a
coup. This is clearly mutiny
activity because the pilots
make no attempt to depose
the executive.
Officer defects to Thailand
after being ordered to beat
protesting monks. This
event comes among many
other reports of mutiny in
East Myanmar. Soldiers all
over country seem to be
resisting orders to repress
protesters.
Troops mutiny after fighting
Tamil rebels in northern Sri
Lanka. Military leadership
tried to blame destruction
and chaos on rebels, but
civilians report that it was
the state's troops
perpetrating the violence.
Civilians were killed and
businesses were burned
Tamil rebels establish edge
over state forces. After
driving state forces out of
several towns, state troops
refuse to fight and kill two
military policemen in
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resistance. There are a
number of additional
articles that detail desertions
that occur between 19992005. However, these
articles do not discuss
specific events. It seems that
there is a slow stream of
desertions that occur during
this period.
3,000 soldiers and 7 officers
were arrest for desertions
that took place during the
military campaign against
the Tamil Tigers in the lead
up to victory in 2009.
An officer from the APF
defected with weapons and
joined rebel forces. While
the article calls the APF a
police force, this groups is
actually a paramilitary
organization that carries out
military objectives as well
as law enforcement.
Because this was an officer,
while this event does not
meet the minimum
threshold for a mutiny, it is
included.
Poor living conditions and
discrimination lead 200
soldiers to mutiny.
The Indrabaksha Battalion
mutinied after Army Major
Arun Bahadur Singh forced
soldier Ram Bahadur
Chaudhary to continue
exercise after complaining
of chest pain. The soldier
died as a result, and the
troops were furious with
major.
Rebel soldiers (members of
the Burma Rifles battalions)
mutinied and seized the
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Rangoon. They advanced
southward in an attempt to
overrun Rangoon and
establish military rule,
according to the article.
However, this event is not
coded by Powell and Thyne.
There seems to be no direct
action made at the
executive. The rebel troops
captured Thayetmo,
petroleum center. The
mutiny appeared to last
around 20 days.
0 Rebel soldiers mutinied in
Thayetmyo. The
government forces indicated
that they had the situation
under control after four
days. The article does not
give a clear reason for the
mutiny other than rebel
soldiers may align with
communist factions. The
government assured
civilians that everything
would be okay and there
would be no food shortages
despite food and commodity
price shocks.
0 Troops kill senior officers
and take over airport control
tower. This mutiny was in
response to a purge of the
military earlier in the year.
0 Article doesn't give many
specific details about the
event. It says "hundreds of
soldiers of the puppet Heng
Samrin army of Kampuchea
stationed in a barrack near
Kompong Cham recently
staged an uprising against
the control of the
Vietnamese aggressor
troops..." The mutineers
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killed many Vietnamese
troops and crossed over to
Pol Pot's army.
A two day mutiny occurred
in Kompong Thom when
Cambodian soldiers were
forced by Vietnamese
enemies to carry out orders
in Kampuchea. The
mutineers used tanks and
cannons against the
Vietnamese, causing deaths
on both sides. The soldiers
were upset due to the
Vietnamese use of chemical
weapons and genocidal acts
in Kampuchea.
Cambodian troops mutinied
against the allied
Vietnamese occupation
troops. The mutineers were
upset over the forcible
recruitment of local people
to work at security posts
near the border. The
Cambodian mutineers (850
soldiers strong) seized two
tanks and five trucks. This
mutiny set back the
Vietnamese strategy in
Cambodia.
5 truckloads of Cambodian
soldiers mutinied when they
arrived in Thmar Puok.
They killed 6 Vietnamese
soldiers then fled back to
their hometowns. There
were several small mutinies
this month. They were in
protest to orders given by
the Vietnamese to conduct
operation in the jungle.
Cambodian soldiers
mutinied in Chakrei Ting
against a company of
Vietnamese soldiers. They
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were upset because
Vietnamese soldiers were
forcibly recruiting
Cambodians to fight. The
mutiny was violent, 13
Vietnamese were killed, and
24 injured.
100 Cambodian soldiers
deserted their post at a
Vietnamese (ACO) military
training center. They killed
a number of Vietnamese
soldiers and fled to their
homes. They took their
weapons with them, in order
to defend their villages and
families from the DK
national army.
200 Cambodian soldiers
deserted after being ordered
to the Pailin battlefield by
Vietnamese officers. They
revolted a killed some of
these officers. It appears
that most mutineers returned
home after the event.
This mutiny appears to be a
classic example of
desertion. 500 forcibly
recruited soldiers deserted
their posts upon being sent
to the Pailin battlefield,
which they felt meant
certain death.
Troops mutiny and rampage
through Koh Kong. Soldiers
reportedly destroyed houses
and property. Troops were
disgruntled about longer
deployment than they were
promised.
The article does not give
many details about the
mutiny event but states that
troops defected in Luang
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Prabang to right wing
rebels.
Article doesn't give many
details about this event.
500-1,000 soldiers rebelled
and seized the town of
Thakhek. They were given a
48 hour ultimatum to
surrender but ultimately fled
north. Although this event
occurs in close proximity to
a coup, there is not attempt
made to depose the
executive.
300 soldiers mutinied in
support of an exiled rightist
general, Phoumi Nosavan.
The mutineers deserted their
positions in the Mekong
River town of Paksane.
While this event occurs in
close temporal proximity to
a coup, the act of desertion
clearly makes this event a
mutiny. These 300 soldiers
make no attempt to oust the
executive.
Powell and Thyne have this
event coded as a coup.
However, its clear that the
mutineers are targeting
military leadership at the
beginning of the event.
Since they target military
headquarters, this is a
mutiny event that picks up
steam and also becomes
coup activity.
40 Vietnamese soldiers at
Phum Anlung Toek rebelled
against their commanders.
They killed these two
commanders and fled home
to Vietnam. These
commanders were notorious
for being cruel and
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threatened to kill any
Vietnamese soldiers who
refused to go on operations.
22 soldiers mutinied and
lobbed grenades at company
commanders then fled
home. They were constantly
ordered to go on operation.
Additionally, Vietnamese
soldiers from the North and
South were in daily conflict
with each other. The Khmer
soldiers and the Vietnamese
often fired at each other.
This constant conflict made
conditions very dangerous
for soldiers.
The article doesn’t give
many details, but a fight
broke out within a
Vietnamese unit in the
village of Thnol Tah. The
fight ended with 15
casualties.
Mutineers killed three of
their own officers and 19 of
them fled. It appears that the
soldiers were deserting their
posts to go home.
10 Vietnamese soldiers flew
across the border into
China's Guangzi Zhuang
region. They explained that
they were unhappy with
their conditions in Vietnam.
They flew the helicopter
into Chinese airspace and
hung a white flag. They
were led by Luit. Khieu
Than Luc. While 10
individuals falls below the
threshold of a mutiny,
because they were led by a
higher ranking official, this
meets the formal definition
of a mutiny.

Vietnam

816

8/4/1982

1

Vietnam

816

9/30/1984

1

Vietnam

816

6/25/1992

1

The Repulic
of Vietnam

817

4/2/1966

0

The Repulic
of Vietnam

817

4/27/1969

0

263

0 Vietnamese soldiers posted
in Trapeang Svay mutinied
against their commander
and killed him. They fled
back home to Vietnam.
They deserted their posts
due to low morale among
soldiers fighting in
Kampuchea.
0 Vietnamese soldiers
mutinied in Prey Veng
province. They began firing
on commanders when the
commanders threatened to
kill them with pistols after
refusing orders to fight in
Kampuchea.
0 13 Vietnamese soldiers
from a platoon in Treng
were angry with aggressive
and abusive commanders.
The mutineers lobbed
grenades and the
commanders and killed two
of them. They then fled
back to Vietnam.
0 Three thousand South
Vietnamese troops marched
through the streets of Hue in
protest of the military
government. These soldiers
were encouraged to protest
by their officers. The article
discusses a number of other
dissident activities, but this
appears to be the only
mutiny event with military
actors involved.
0 The article indicates that the
Vietcong were defecting in
gradual waves all spring.
However, it specifically
mentions that 556 soldiers
defected from Sedac. The
article points out that most
of these defectors are very
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young men that failed to
adopt the ideology of the
Vietcong.
0 Soldiers at a military camp
mutinied and deserted their
post due to harsh conditions.
The camp was on
Corregidor island. The
mutineers killed the camp
commander.
0 50 soldiers mutiny and try
to free comrades that were
in jail after the unsuccessful
coup of the previous
January. This is not a coup
attempt, as the target was
not the executive, although
it comes at a time when the
Philippines were
particularly apt for coup
activity.
1 A rebellion from within the
Philippine Military came
despite the government's
claim that the attempted
coup against president
Corazon C. Aquino had
been crushed. This is clearly
a mutiny as rebel soldiers
were fighting within the
army headquarters at Camp
Aguinaldo. Rebel soldiers
were using cannons and
various other weapons
against state loyal forces.
This was not a counter coup
or an attempt at ousting the
executive, although it
happens wihtin close
temporal proximity to the
Dec. 3 coup. One article
points out that the main
objective of the mutineers
was to kill the country's
military leadership (Ramon
Montanto, the chief of the
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constabulary forces and
Renato de Villa the army
chief of staff).
Major Cerdena led about
200 soldiers and took
control of a military camp in
Butuan. This event was
followed by a clear coup
attempt, however, this act of
taking over a military camp
does not explicitly target the
executive. Thus, this event
is a mutiny.
300 soldiers mutiny against
Mrs. Arroyo, who enjoyed
large amounts of support
from Bush Administration.
The mutiny was clearly
organized by officers, not
just haphazardly thrown
together by idealistic foot
soldiers. The Philippines
has one of the most corrupt
military organizations. The
Bush Administration had
actually supported 70 of the
officers that turned out to be
rebellious, prior to their
sedition. Referred to as the
"Oakwood mutiny"
30 officers and soldiers on
trial for coup plotting in
2003 and 2006 walked out
of the courtroom during
their trial and
commandeered the nearby
Peninsula Manila Hotel.
They demanded the ouster
of President Arroyo and
were calling for a dissident
movement against the
government.
Capt. Andi Abdul Aziz, 26
year old, led a mutiny
against the central
government. The forces
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under Captain Aziz were
Indonesian soldiers that had
recently transferred to the
Indonesian Army from the
Royal Netherlands
Indonesian army after
independence in December
of 1950. The revolt was
largely in response to the
disbanding of the Royal
Netherlands Indonesian
Army and its subsequent
absorption into the
Indonesian army.
0 Colonel Simbolon and
5,000 rebel soldiers
declared that they had
seceded from Indonesia's
central government because
the president had failed to
clean up corruption as the
army had been putting
pressure on him to do so.
The mutiny appeared to be
non-violent.
0 Colonel Barlian,
commander of the Second
Territorial District,
announced that Jakarta had
failed to lead the country
toward attainment of its
ideals and for this reason
stated that he was going to
take over administrative
processes.
0 Rebel soldiers turned on the
government and seized the
military center of Medan, a
strategic location. The
mutiny only lasted 1 day,
before U.S. trained military
officials took back control
of Medan. The original
cause of the mutiny is
unclear.
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0 Timorese soldiers in the
Indonesian army serving in
East Timor mutiny after the
death of a sergeant.
Sergeant was killed by
Indonesian soldiers, not east
Timor rebels, as the
Indonesian army claimed.
300 soldiers refused to
return to barracks and
insisted on answers
surrounding their leader’s
death.
0 Troops mutiny in East
Timor, threatening
Indonesian democracy.
Article does not give much
information about the
motivation of the mutineers,
other than resisting
Indonesia's power over the
military apparatus.
0 Military signals its defiance
by protesting in very clear
opposition to the presidents
tactics to stave off
impeachment proceedings.
They parade through the
streets in opposition.
0 Police and military troops
mutiny because Wahid
dismissed the chief, gen.
Suroyo Bimantoro.
Mutineers accused the
president of trying to
politicize the police and
military in order to secure
his own tenure.
0 Indonesian soldiers
mutinied against a
commander in Indonesia's
Papua Province. 100
soldiers participated in the
mutiny. The mutiny was
specifically targeted at the
battalion commander. Shots
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were fired in the air, but no
one was injured. The
soldiers were upset because
of the commander's decision
over returning a body of a
dead soldier as a function of
the cost of this action.
Troops mutiny because of
poor living conditions and
selective promotions.
Troops are largely made up
of what used to be rebel
fighters (fighting for
independence from
Indonesia).
Half of the East Timor
military mutinied. This
mutiny was largely led by
officers that felt they had
been passed over for
promotion. A number of
soldiers were killed during
the unrest. Situation
eventually brought under
control by Australian
troops.
Pilots refuse to fly new
Tiger attack helicopters
because of safety concerns
surrounding fumes in the
cockpit. Pilots were upset
that there was not a decision
to suspend flying until
technical issues were
resolved.
80 soldiers protested over
pay. They clashed with
local, civilian police forces.
60 soldiers were arrested.
PNG government hired
mercenaries to control and
respond to a 9 year rebellion
on the island of
Bougainville. This
infuriated the army that
mutinied and rioted for 9
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days. They were joined by
civilian protesters that
blockaded the parliament
building and refused to let
lawmakers leave. This
spurred the PM to step
down voluntarily.
Soldiers took up arms in
support of brig-gen Jeery
singirok who led the
3/17/1997 mutiny. Soldiers
loyal to Gen. Singirok
armed themselves in
expectation of a policy
attempt to aren't the former
commander. Mutiny appears
to be peaceful.
Troops mutiny because the
government planned to cut
the military in half (to 1,900
men). 100 soldiers seized
weapons at Murray
Barracks in Port Moresby.
The government quickly
scrapped these plans. The
mutiny was peaceful even
though weapons were
seized.
PNG defense force troops
mutiny for 10 days in
response to a retrenchment
scheme (reduction of
forces). The renegade
soldiers took control of
Moem Barracks in Wewak.
Mutiny seems peaceful.
This mutiny event happens
in very close temporal
proximity to a coup attempt.
However, there is a mutiny
event because soldiers were
targeting military leadership
and seeking to depose
military leaders, not the
executive. The mutineers
placed Brigadier Agwi
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under house arrest. The
mutineers were led by
Colonel Yaura Sasa.
150 airmen of the New
Zealand air force mutinied
at a hangar in Whenuapai.
They were upset because
they were demanding an
earlier release to civilian life
and were protesting
mustering out delays.
This event is similar to the
9/1945 New Zealand
Mutiny. Airmen of the New
Zealand air force mutinied
at the Rapa Island Station.
The men quit their duties for
two hours in protest of
demobilization delays and
the conditions in which they
were serving. The men
eventually resumed their
duties when they were told
that their chief demand (a 5
day work week) would be
granted.
Vanuatu paramilitary
officers mutiny over low
and delayed pay. A
spokesmen of the
paramilitary said over radio
broadcast that the
paramilitaries were "in
command" but that it was
not a military takeover.
This event is confusing,
because there are many
stories only written at the
point of the trial of the
soldiers. This specific story
indicates that 63 soldiers
were tried for a mutiny that
occurred in November of
2000. There was a coup in
May of 2000. This mutiny is
largely in response to the
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coup. A high ranking
military official appears to
have encouraged this event.
0 A high level military
official, Lieutenant- Colonel
Ratu Tevita Mara, defected
to Tonga after being falsely
accused of trying to depose
the president. The defector
said that the military regime
has been responsible for
heavy amounts of repression
and military style torture of
civilians at the Queen
Elizabeth barracks in Suva.
Although this is only one
actor, it counts as a mutiny
because this is a high
ranking official.
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